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Abstract
Demographic composition contributes to the development and economic
stability of a country. Research into demographic issues allows policymakers
to address potential economic and social challenges in both the intermediate,
and long run. One of the most urgent issues under the banner of population or
demographic studies is population stability, which is closely linked to fertility.
This thesis explores recent developments in the fertility literature in the con-
text of Australia. Specifically, this thesis focuses on individual preferences for
child bearing, the determinants of the fertility decision and the effectiveness
of policies implemented by the government aimed at improving total fertility.
The first study highlights the impact of monetary incentives on the decision
to bear children in light of the differential responses across the native and
immigrant population. The second study analyses the role of unemployment
and job stability on the fertility choice of mothers. The final study exam-
ines whether the quality-quantity trade-off exists for Australian families and
explores the impact of siblings on the outcomes of children across the distribu-
tion of heterogeneous child ability. This thesis applies various methodologies
that to address the issues of endogeneity that occur within the relationships
we examine.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Population stability is central to sustainable long run economic growth. A sustain-
able increase in the labour force can improve human capital, drive innovation, and
enhance productivity.1 On the other hand, an ageing population is a key concern for
policymakers and researchers and is subsequently at the forefront of research world-
wide, as it poses a serious challenge to long-term economic stability. To address
falling replacement rates, fertility levels have become the focus of population policies
in many developed countries with declining populations.
Fertility issues have become a centrepiece in the discussion of Australia’s future.
The total fertility rate (TFR) has declined to a point significantly below the required
replacement levels needed to sustain the economy in the long run. The replacement
rate is the number of births per woman needed to maintain the current population
level. If the TFR falls below the replacement rate, long-term population instability
may occur if appropriate policy is not enacted to counteract the effects of an ageing
population. This thesis explores the issues surrounding fertility levels and the fertility
decision in Australia, by focussing on individual preferences for child bearing, the
determinants of the fertility decision and the effectiveness of policies implemented
by the government aimed at improving total fertility. The findings in this thesis can
be used to provide guidance for policymakers responding to the issues of an ageing
population, and may be useful for other developed countries experiencing similar
problems.
1.1 Background
Since the 1980’s, literature on fertility decisions has been expanding. From the
determinants of those who bear children, to how to encourage families to have more
or less children, the decision is not taken lightly. Each country faces its own challenges
1This is one aspect of long run growth. Investment in the current population’s human capital
also drives innovation and productivity.
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surrounding the fertility decision. This thesis investigates three aspects of fertility
economics yet to be explored in the context of Australia. This thesis begins by
exploring the response of women to monetary incentives aimed at increasing the
total fertility rate. This study consists of a natural experiment, which allows for
the analysis of revealed preferences. The study analyses the overall effectiveness of
policies implemented by governments to increase a countrys fertility rate. The second
study specifically focuses on unemployment and job stability and their respective
impacts on the fertility decision. The focus of this study is on low labour market
participation rates for women with children and identifies the key labour market
determinants that drive the fertility decision. The last study provides evidence of
the quality-quantity trade-off. The quality-quantity trade-off is the main theory
economists use to explain the observed decreasing fertility rates across developed
nations. However, there is limited empirical evidence regarding how the trade-off
plays out in Australia, particularly with respect to the fertility decision. The three
studies are strongly interrelated and together can inform policymaking on population
issues.
This thesis also contributes to the literature through the application of selected
econometric methodologies that address endogeneity issues which are problematic
in the fertility literature. We apply methods from public policy and labour eco-
nomics such as difference-in-difference analysis, propensity score matching and quan-
tile treatment effects to help further research in the fertility literature.
1.2 Key Research Questions
Study 1
The first study focuses on the implementation of the ‘baby bonus’ provided by
the Australian government. There has been a significant amount of discussion in
academia and the political arena on the effectiveness of pro-natal policies and their
ability to increase fertility rates. Whilst many countries use a system of ongoing
3
financial or social incentives to encourage child-bearing, only a few have employed
pro-natalist policies like the baby bonus which provides a once off payment for having
a child. The first research question relates to whether the bonus achieved its main
aim: an increase in the fertility rate. Our analysis specifically looks at the effects
before and after the introduction of the baby bonus by the Australian government.
RQ1: Does the use of family payments increase fertility rates?
This analysis raises the question: which groups within the population are likely
to respond to monetary incentives for child bearing? Given that Australia has a
significant immigrant population, it is important to examine whether the response
to monetary incentives for immigrant and Australian born (native) women may be
different.
RQ1a: Which group is most likely to respond to the implementation
of monetary incentives aimed at increasing fertility?
RQ1b: Do immigrants and natives react differently to such payments?
RQ1c: If such a difference exists, how can we explain the different
reactions?
We develop a theoretical model to express these differences, which are driven
by fertility norms an individual may be exposed to. This thesis also explores the
outlined research question using an empirical framework.
4
Study 2
The second study investigates the effect of job instability on the fertility decision. The
role of unemployment in the fertility decision has been found to have a both a negative
and positive effect on individual and total fertility levels, leading to inconsistencies in
the literature. This issue should therefore be examined on a case-by-case basis, as the
social and economic conditions in each nation may be different. These economic and
social differences can have a diverse implication on the fertility decisions occurring
within a nation, at both the individual and national level. This thesis investigates
the role of employment stability on the decision to have children in the context of
Australia. This analysis will add to the relevant literature on the role of employment
stability, which has yet to be investigated within the Australian economy. The main
research question of this study is:
RQ2: What is the effect of employment instability on the fertility
decisions of Australian mothers?
Study 3
The third study explores the quality-quantity trade-off in Australia. The quality-
quantity trade-off refers to the decision to have more children, or invest in current
children to improve their ‘quality’, which is measured through child outcomes. This
study focuses on analysing the impact of family size on child quality through an
analysis of this trade-off. There is a distinct lack of consistent empirical evidence
to support the quality-quantity trade-off theory. Most of the existing literature
focuses on the ‘average’ effect of family size on the outcomes of a child or the level
of investment in quality, which may explain the inconsistent results. This thesis
addresses this problem by conducting a distributional analysis across child outcomes.
Therefore, the principal research question for this study is:
5
RQ3: What is the distributional effect of family size on child quality
measured through child outcomes?
This analysis is followed by two additional research questions, based on existing
themes within the quality-quantity trade-off literature:
RQ3a: How does an increase in the number of children in a household
affect child outcomes?
RQ3b: Does the number of children in a household affect the
probability of private schooling or parental time investment?
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is structured in the following manner. The second chapter
reviews the relevant literature. The third chapter highlights the impact of mone-
tary incentives on the decision to bear children in light of the differential responses
across the native and immigrant population. The fourth chapter analyses the role of
unemployment and job stability on the fertility choice of women. The fifth chapter
examines whether the quality-quantity trade-off exists for Australian families and
explores the impact of siblings on the outcomes of children across the distribution
of heterogeneous child ability. The final chapter discusses the results of the three
studies contained in this thesis and outlines overall conclusions and limitations, with
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Fertility has become an increasingly important topic with respect to both population
policy and labour economics. Total fertility rates (TFR) have decreased significantly
in developed countries over the past two decades (Adsera, 2011; Kreyenfeld, 2005).
As a result, most developed countries are experiencing the strain of an ageing pop-
ulation on the stability of the economy (Adsera, 2004).
Australia is not exempt from the decline in the total fertility rate (see Table
2.1); although Australia has been overlooked in many academic economic analyses
due to being a smaller nation in terms of population.2 As seen in Table 2.1, the
total fertility rate reached a minimum in Australia in 2003, and has been steadily
increasing. However, the TFR has still not reached the optimal level. The increasing
TFR observed over the past decade is likely due to the Australian government actively
implementing pro-natal policies aimed at improving the TFR. It may be suggested
that without such policies, the TFR may have continued to decline. This thesis aims
to explore the issues surrounding fertility in the context of Australia and analyse the
effectiveness of policies implemented by the Australian government to address the
decline in fertility.
2There have been numerous studies conducted by the Australian Productivity Commission;
however, there is a strong focus on the ageing population issue and a less significant focus on
fertility.
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Table 2.1: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for OECD Nations 1970-2010
1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia 2.86 1.89 1.90 1.76 1.76 1.75 1.76 1.79 1.82 1.92 1.96 1.90 1.89
Austria 2.29 1.65 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.38 1.41 1.39 1.44
Belgium 2.25 1.68 1.62 1.67 1.65 1.67 1.72 1.76 1.80 1.82 1.85 1.86 1.87
Canada 2.33 1.68 1.71 1.49 1.50 1.53 1.53 1.54 1.59 1.66 1.68 1.67 ..
Chile 3.95 2.72 2.59 2.05 1.94 1.89 1.85 1.84 1.83 1.88 1.92 1.94 ..
Czech Republic 1.91 2.10 1.89 1.14 1.17 1.18 1.23 1.28 1.33 1.44 1.50 1.49 1.49
Denmark 1.95 1.55 1.67 1.77 1.72 1.76 1.78 1.80 1.85 1.85 1.89 1.84 1.88
Estonia .. 2.02 2.05 1.39 1.37 1.37 1.47 1.50 1.55 1.63 1.65 1.62 1.63
Finland 1.83 1.63 1.79 1.73 1.72 1.76 1.80 1.80 1.84 1.83 1.85 1.86 1.87
France 2.48 1.95 1.78 1.87 1.86 1.87 1.90 1.92 1.98 1.96 1.99 1.99 1.99
Germany 2.03 1.56 1.45 1.38 1.34 1.34 1.36 1.34 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.36 1.39
Greece 2.40 2.23 1.40 1.26 1.27 1.28 1.30 1.33 1.40 1.41 1.51 1.52 1.51
Hungary 1.97 1.92 1.84 1.33 1.31 1.28 1.28 1.32 1.35 1.32 1.35 1.33 1.26
Iceland 2.81 2.48 2.31 2.08 1.93 1.99 2.03 2.05 2.07 2.09 2.14 2.22 2.20
Ireland 3.87 3.23 2.12 1.90 1.98 1.98 1.95 1.88 1.90 2.03 2.10 2.07 2.07
Israel .. 3.14 3.02 2.95 2.89 2.95 2.90 2.84 2.88 2.90 2.96 2.96 3.03
Italy 2.43 1.68 1.36 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.32 1.35 1.37 1.42 1.41 1.41
Japan 2.13 1.75 1.54 1.36 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.26 1.32 1.34 1.37 1.37 1.39
Korea 4.53 2.82 1.57 1.47 1.17 1.18 1.15 1.08 1.12 1.25 1.19 1.15 1.23
Luxembourg 1.98 1.50 1.62 1.78 1.63 1.62 1.66 1.62 1.64 1.61 1.60 1.59 1.63
Mexico 6.77 4.97 3.43 2.77 2.46 2.34 2.25 2.20 2.17 2.13 2.10 2.08 2.05
Netherlands 2.57 1.60 1.62 1.72 1.73 1.75 1.73 1.71 1.72 1.72 1.77 1.79 1.80
New Zealand 3.17 2.03 2.18 1.98 1.89 1.93 1.98 1.97 2.01 2.17 2.18 2.12 2.15
Norway 2.50 1.72 1.93 1.85 1.75 1.80 1.83 1.84 1.90 1.90 1.96 1.98 1.95
Poland 2.20 2.28 1.99 1.37 1.25 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.27 1.31 1.39 1.40 1.38
Portugal 2.83 2.18 1.56 1.56 1.47 1.44 1.40 1.41 1.36 1.33 1.37 1.32 1.37
Slovak Republic 2.40 2.31 2.09 1.29 1.19 1.20 1.24 1.25 1.24 1.25 1.32 1.41 1.40
Slovenia 2.21 2.11 1.46 1.26 1.21 1.20 1.25 1.26 1.31 1.31 1.53 1.53 1.57
Spain 2.90 2.22 1.36 1.23 1.26 1.31 1.32 1.34 1.38 1.39 1.46 1.39 1.38
Sweden 1.94 1.68 2.14 1.55 1.65 1.72 1.75 1.77 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.94 1.98
Switzerland 2.10 1.55 1.59 1.50 1.39 1.39 1.42 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.54
Turkey 5.00 4.63 3.07 2.27 2.17 2.09 2.11 2.12 2.12 2.15 2.15 2.07 2.03
United Kingdom 2.43 1.90 1.83 1.64 1.64 1.71 1.77 1.79 1.84 1.90 1.96 1.94 1.98
United States 2.48 1.84 2.08 2.06 2.01 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.10 2.12 2.08 2.00 1.93
OECD Average 2.76 2.18 1.91 1.68 1.63 1.63 1.65 1.65 1.68 1.71 1.75 1.74 1.74
Source: OECD (2013)
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Figure 2.1: Australian Population Distribution by Age and Sex
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014)
Population ageing and decreasing fertility rates are interrelated. Like most devel-
oped countries, Australia’s population is ageing as a result of sustained low fertility
and increasing life expectancy (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Figure 2.1
shows the process of an ageing population through a comparison of the distribution
by age and sex in 1994 against the distribution in 2014. The percentage of people in
working ages (below 50 was higher in 1994 than that in 2014 while the opposite is true
for older age groups (above 50). This implies there is an increasing dependency on
healthcare, and social welfare systems, which is a serious concern for policymakers.
An ageing population can have a significant impact on many aspects of govern-
ment policy and planning including; healthcare, the working-age population, the
provision of housing and demand for skilled labour (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2014). Addressing issues surrounding decreasing fertility rates may help alleviate
some of the implications of an ageing population. However, increasing the TFR is
not the only method of addressing the ageing population issue, others being immi-
gration, increasing human capital and encouraging innovation and productivity.
This chapter discusses the literature relevant to fertility. This area of population
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economics is wide and encompasses many subcategories of population and demo-
graphic literature. Therefore, this chapter will give a brief overview of fertility issues
and focus predominantly on the literature for the three key focus areas; (1) fertility
and monetary incentives, (2) the role of unemployment and job stability, and (3) the
quality-quantity trade-off.
2.2 Fertility
Empirical evidence suggests that many industrialised countries have been experienc-
ing persistent low fertility rates, with no exact or definitive underlying explanation.3
For example, the total fertility rate in the US was 2.1, whereas in Japan it was 1.39
in 2012 (World Bank, 2012). However, the literature has reached a consensus sug-
gesting that the persistent low fertility rates may be due to the dynamic transition of
fertility, driven by changes in higher educational attainment, decreasing infant mor-
tality, increased investment in child quality and increased labour force participation
of women in the workplace (Caldwell & Schindlmayr, 2003). While many studies take
these factors into account, the dynamic aspects of fertility are difficult to capture
and empirical evidence is mixed, suggesting there is scope for further investigation.
One of the key determinants of fertility is educational attainment. Several studies
have found strong links between education and the postponement of fertility. Women
who have achieved a higher level of education tend to postpone childbearing due
to increased opportunity costs and human capital depreciation (Klesment & Puur,
2010; Billingsley, 2011). Similarly, Preston & Hartnett (2008) found that in America,
educational attainment resulted in postponement of childbearing. However, the TFR
in the US is greater than many other developed countries; these studies suggest
higher education may be contributing to falling fertility rates in many other countries.
Overall, the literature suggests educational attainment contributes significantly to
the fertility choices of individuals.
Educational attainment is highly correlated with female labour force participa-
3See Table 2.1 for OECD total fertility rates.
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tion. The literature has shown that labour force participation is a key determinant
in the fertility decision (Gronau, 1973; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1980; Schultz, 1990;
Angrist & Evans, 1998). However, there is an endogenous aspect that links the
fertility decision and the labour market choice. In many instances, having a child
usually requires at least a brief exit from the labour market, and an exit from the
labour market can lead to an increase in fertility intentions. This results in an issue
of causation between the two decisions as they may not be mutually exclusive. Stud-
ies that have explored this endogenous relationship have shown that an increase in
fertility leads to a decline in mothers’ labour force participation and an increase in
unpaid work (see for example Angrist & Evans, 1998; Frenette, 2011a).
Literature shows that fertility is important for the long-term growth and sustain-
ability of an economy (McDonald, 2006). A sustainable population is a key element
in promoting long term economic growth, and has been a key initiative of the Aus-
tralian government and many other governments around the world (Parliament of
Australia, 2013). Many governments have employed policies that target replacement
rates and incentivise the population to have children. The replacement rate is the
average number of children each woman needs to have to maintain the current popu-
lation. In Australia, the government implemented a ‘baby bonus’ as an incentive to
improve the total fertility rate (Risse, 2010). As this thesis focuses on fertility and
the role of policy, this baby bonus can be used to examine the role of incentives on
fertility.
2.3 Fertility and Welfare Payments
The ‘baby bonus’ is the first Australian government policy specifically targeting
the fertility rate at a national level, through direct cash payments. A significant
amount of taxpayer dollars were committed to incentivise families to have children,
by reducing the direct cost of having a child (Drago et al., 2011). The goal was to
support the Australian economy in the long run through the alleviation of problems
associated with an ageing population. The use of monetary incentives to motivate
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individual behaviours is not new to economics. The implementation of monetary
incentives by policymakers to motivate families in the long term rearing of their
children has been prevalent within the fertility literature in recent times and is driven
by the need to address the ageing population (Gauthier & Hatzius, 1997). As a result,
economists have been attempting to determine whether the implementation of such
programs encourages higher levels of fertility, or whether they are an inefficient use
of government resources.
There are a significant number of studies that compare and contrast alterna-
tive government support systems and their effects on fertility decisions (Gauthier &
Hatzius, 1997; Milligan, 2005). More recent studies have become highly focused on
the financial incentives enacted by governments. Laroque & Salani (2008) examined
financial incentives in France, employed through the use of tax benefits on both the
fertility decision and labour market outcomes. They found that the response of po-
tential parents relied significantly on the age of the parent and the age of existing
children. Milligan (2005) also explored the effects of tax reforms on parity specific
fertility rates including first, second, third, and higher order births of children, find-
ing a strong positive effect of tax reforms on the fertility decision.4 Overall these
studies found that monetary incentives had a statistically significant effect on the
fertility decision.
Empirical evidence suggests that individuals who have one child may be more
likely to have a second or third child after the introduction of monetary or finan-
cial incentives. Families who are deciding whether or not to have their first child
may respond differently to financial incentives or welfare reforms than those having
additional children. Therefore, there is an issue of parity based on the number of
children in existence before the implementation of fertility policies. Studies such as
Azmat & Gonzlez (2010) and Duclos et al. (2001) analysed the effects of financial or
4Parity refers to the order in which children are born. The parity specific fertility rate is the
number of births of specified birth order (first child, second child, etc.) to the number of women
who have borne one child less than the number indicated by the specified birth order. See Kippen
& others (2003) for more detail of parity specific birth rates in Australia.
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monetary incentives on the fertility rate in the form of tax-transfer benefits. Such
studies have provided evidence that the implementation of taxation policies results
in both increased overall fertility, increased second order births and increased labour
force participation, across the board.
Within the context of Australia, a number of studies have focused on the determi-
nants of fertility, bargaining power, and childbearing intentions of Australian women
(see Yu, 2006; Risse, 2010; Fan & Maitra, 2010; Sinclair et al., 2012). Monetary pay-
ments have been found to increase the bargaining power of women in childbearing
decisions, and as a result of positive fertility intentions, there may be an increase
in realised fertility. Although educational attainment has been shown to result in a
postponement of fertility, the expectations of fertility or future fertility intentions are
higher for those with a higher level of education (Risse, 2010). Furthermore, Gans &
Leigh (2009) found parents postponed births where possible in order to receive the
bonus, with the number of births dipping sharply before the policy commenced. How-
ever, monetary incentives may not be sufficient for working women to change their
labour market decision in preference of childbearing (Drago et al., 2011). Therefore,
there is evidence that suggests fertility intentions increase with the implementation
of the baby bonus; however, no analysis has been undertaken regarding the impact
on realised fertility at the individual level.
Our first study aims to expand this literature on monetary incentives by explain-
ing differentials between fertility rates for the purpose of policy analysis and future
policy implementation. The study also aims to extend the literature with respect
to the immigrant and native populations in Australia, in an attempt to consolidate
the literature on welfare benefits and immigrant-native fertility discrepancies. This
analysis will result in important policy implications for Australia. Immigrants and
native women have been found to have different responses to monetary incentives
within the welfare literature (see for example Borjas, 1999; Kaestner & Kaushal,
2005; Dustmann et al., 2005). The next section discusses the literatre relating to
fertility and immigration.
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2.3.1 Fertility and Immigration
Immigration is known to be a key driver of economic and population growth in
many developed countries. Immigration can be used to address issues revolving
around an ageing population (Gauthier & Hatzius, 1997). With 28 per cent of
the Australian population born overseas, immigration plays an important role in the
decisions made by policymakers and has widespread implications (Australian Bureau
of Statistics, 2012). As an ageing population leads to a reduced labour force, many
countries rely on immigration to provide additional labour in the economy. Overall,
immigration can be used to increase labour force participation levels and/or change
the composition of a country’s labour market (Dustmann et al., 2005).
Research investigating the impact of immigration on the host country’s economy
has strongly focused on the labour market outcomes (see Borjas, 2003; Dustmann
et al., 2005). Recently research has branched out to incorporate the impact of im-
migration beyond the scope of the labour market; including the use of production,
technological processes (Lewis, 2005; Ottaviano et al., 2010), capital accumulation
and productivity (Ortega & Peri, 2009), and social welfare (Dustmann et al., 2005).
Furthermore, studies suggest that immigration assists job creation and increases de-
mand in an economy (Borjas, 2003). Consequently, immigration can be considered
an important factor that impacts on productivity and technological processes leading
to economic growth in the long run (Friedberg & Hunt, 1995).
Immigrants can be fundamentally different from native individuals in the context
of many potential outcomes, including employment and fertility (Borjas, 1999; Mayer
& Riphahn, 2000; Andersson, 2004; Camarota, 2005; Ferna´ndez & Fogli, 2006; Liv-
ingston & Cohn, 2012). Furthermore, social norms of immigrants differ significantly
from natives, and are important in the decision to have children. Consequently, so-
cial norms can result in an excess or lack of fertility that can be exploited for policy
purposes. That is, if fertility is higher (or lower) for specific immigrant groups than
the level of fertility seen in the native population, monetary incentives can be used
to change their behaviour. This excess or lack of fertility may be used to a country’s
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advantage and add to the total fertility rate allowing a nation to effectively achieve
replacement rates (Mayer & Riphahn, 2000; Woldemicael & Beaujot, 2012). The
aim of such policies is to either promote or suppress fertility assimilation of immi-
grants.5 In Australia, there is evidence that shows immigrants assimilate differently
depending on factors including, but not limited to, country of origin, and religion
(Abbasi-Shavazi & McDonald, 2000). Therefore, fertility assimilation of immigrants
is an important factor policymakers must consider when implementing social pro-
grams to modify individual fertility behaviour.
Dustmann et al. (2005) suggested that immigrants might be more dependent on
public services, such as welfare payments in the short term. However, in the case
of pro-natal policies such as the ‘baby bonus’, this may be beneficial. Therefore
policymakers can use the selection process for immigration into Australia to their
advantage by incentivising those immigrants who have high levels of fertility to retain
their norms and encourage those with low fertility norms to have more children
through the use of pro-natal policies such as the baby bonus. Employing a policy
that constructively uses such characteristics may lead to an increase in the total
fertility rate, moving towards the replacement levels which are important for long
run economic growth.
Kaestner & Kaushal (2005) explored the effect of welfare reform in the United
States and employment decisions of immigrants and natives. The study used a
difference-in-difference (DID) method, exploiting the fact that the reforms were
specifically aimed at low-educated immigrant and native, married and unmarried
women. This particular reform was aimed at reducing welfare dependency, an im-
portant issue facing high welfare nations, including Australia. The study found that
immigrant women made different decisions to native women in response to welfare
reforms. Additionally, Borjas & Hilton (1995) and Borjas (1999) also found that im-
migrants responded differently to welfare reforms than native individuals, specifically
5Fertility assimilation refers to the adjustment of immigrant fertility choices to reflect or assim-
ilate to the fertility levels observed in the host country.
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with respect to welfare magnets.6 These studies provide an important foundation
for our study and motivate our expectation that immigrants and natives have dif-
fering responses to the introduction of a baby bonus. The first study addresses this
research gap by determining whether immigrants are driving the increase in fertility
levels seen after the introduction of the ‘baby bonus’.
In this section we explored the literature with respect to fertility, monetary in-
centives and immigration. There is a dearth of literature that combines all three
of aspects this literature together. In general, we find that monetary incentives di-
rected at increasing fertility could be effective in increasing the level of fertility at
both the individual and aggregate level. However, there is a distinct lack of evidence
in Australia over the direct impact of the ‘baby bonus’ as a monetary incentive for
improving fertility. We therefore explore the implementation of the baby bonus to
determine the impact at the individual level. The literature regarding immigration
and social welfare payments shows a positive effect of monetary payments on the
decisions of immigrants compared to those of natives, in terms of employment and
relocation decisions. However, the differences in these two subpopulations have not
been analysed in the context of the fertility decisions. This thesis specifically links
these aspects of immigrant-native fertility and public policy together to determine
the effects of the implementation of the baby bonus on the individual level of fertility
for Australian families.
2.4 Fertility, Unemployment and Stability
This section discusses the literature which relates fertility to labour market par-
ticipation, which is the focus of the second study in this thesis. Economic and
social conditions are known to impact on the decision to bear children, but the ex-
act relationship is still indeterminate due to the complexity of the fertility decision.
Classical economic theory suggests a counter-cyclical relationship between fertility
6A welfare magnet is used to describe the geographical relocation of low-income individuals to
secure higher welfare benefits.
16
and unemployment rates should be expected. That is, during times of high (low) un-
employment, women should have more children as opportunity costs are low (high)
(see Engelhardt & Prskawetz, 2004; Adsera & Menendez, 2009; Sobotka et al., 2011;
Del Bono et al., 2011). However, more recent studies over the past decade from
Europe, have refuted this hypothesis, suggesting a negative relationship between un-
employment and earnings, with fertility of individuals (Schmitt, 2008; Kogel, 2004;
Adsera, 2004). That is, when more people are employed, women are more likely to
have children. Whilst the pro-cyclical relationship between fertility and unemploy-
ment is observed in Australia at the aggregate level, very little work has been done
on the individual level of unemployment and the effects on the fertility decision.
Recent studies mainly focus on the effect of employment uncertainty on the de-
cision to bear children. Studies have not adequately developed a reason for the
reversal of the relationship between unemployment and fertility observed in many
developed countries (Castles, 2003; Kogel, 2004). However, it has been suggested
that it is not unemployment that plays the central role, but economic instability
and uncertainty about the future (Santarelli, 2011; Vignoli et al., 2012). Although a
few key papers have explored this relationship between stability and fertility, it has
not been investigated in the context of the Australian economy. Furthermore, most
studies that link unemployment to the fertility decision in an Australian context use
hazard ratio models (see for example Fan & Maitra, 2010). However, these models
do not consider the endogenous connection of fertility and unemployment derived
from the underlying economic theory we wish to test. This thesis contributes to the
literature through the analysis of the endogenous relationship between fertility and
employment, and argues that it is not the level of employment that matters in the
childbearing decision, but the stability of a woman’s job or her employability.
Empirical studies of preferences and fertility have investigated both the level of
desire for children and the impact of unemployment and income on the decision to
bear children (Pailhe & Solaz, 2012). Studies have shown that if the female’s level
of desire for children is high, there is an increased chance of fertility (Fan & Maitra,
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2010). Additionally, the literature suggests that whilst the woman’s job stability and
income will have an impact on the level of fertility, it is the male partner’s economic
uncertainty, income and job stability that plays a central role in the decision (Pailhe
& Solaz, 2012; Vignoli et al., 2012; Schmitt, 2012). The economic stability of a
potential mother plays a lesser role in the fertility choices of families. Overall, male
economic uncertainty is the only factor for which there is a clear consensus of the
impact of employment outcomes of men on the level of fertility (Vignoli et al., 2012).
Schmitt (2012) suggested that when experiencing unemployment or unstable em-
ployment, the labour market outcomes of men hindered the fertility decision of a
family significantly. This was consistent for men in the UK and Germany. Such
results were reiterated by Kravdal (2002); Berninger et al. (2010) and Vignoli et
al. (2012). Furthermore, these studies suggest that male earnings and job stability
have a strong effect on the decision. This is especially the case if the employment
of the male is a temporary contract or casual employment. That is to say, if the
potential father is in a fairly stable labour market position, there is an increase in
the probability of the female partner’s childbearing.
Research suggests that when unemployment is low and job stability is high, fertil-
ity levels tend to centre near the replacement rates required for a sustainable popula-
tion, in favour of the pro-cyclical fertility theory. This is exhibited in most Northern
European countries (Schmidt, 2008; Hondroyiannis, 2010; Kreyenfeld et al., 2012).
Whereas if unemployment is relatively high or employment consists predominantly
of temporary contract jobs, fertility rates are substantially low and the opposite re-
sult is found (Adsera, 2004; Kreyenfeld et al., 2012; Santarelli, 2011). Therefore, the
stability of a potential parent’s employment plays a significant role in the fertility
decision.
Del Bono et al. (2011), showed that the reduction in fertility was not due to
the income loss generated by unemployment, but arose due to displaced workers
undergoing a career interruption, resulting in a significant loss of firm specific human
capital. They suggested that the birth of a child also reduced the accumulation of
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firm specific human capital. Therefore, the fertility decision is strongly tied to the
impression of career interruption or job stability, such that it creates a disincentive
for women with high education or qualifications to have children.
As discussed above, the current literature suggests that a change in the level
of fertility is associated with changes in the labour market outcomes of potential
mothers. The second study in this thesis aims to explore the issue of employment
stability and job displacement on the fertility decision of Australian women using the
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. At present,
the literature has not developed a clear and adequate explanation for why there has
been a shift towards the pro-cyclical theory of fertility. This thesis aims to provide
empirical evidence in support of the pro-cyclical fertility theory in the Australian
context and explore the relationship between fertility and job security. We postulate
that employment stability plays the key role in the fertility decision. Due to the
endogenous nature of fertility, we use instrumental variables and propensity score
matching.
2.5 The Quality-Quantity Trade-Off
In economic theory there is a model that explains the shift in fertility preferences,
known as the quality-quantity trade-off. The quality-quantity trade-off theory de-
scribes the decision of families to have additional children, or to increase expenditure
on current children to improve child ‘quality’. Improved child quality refers to en-
hanced child outcomes which parents invest to provide a potentially better future for
the child. Improved outcomes include, but are not limited to educational and labour
market outcomes. Many developed economies have experienced a shift from ‘quan-
tity’ to ‘quality’ resulting in the deterioration of total fertility rates, as the number
of births decreased (see Becker, 1992; Becker & Tomes, 1976; Becker et al., 1960). It
has been postulated that this change is a consequence of post-World War II increases
in relative income that have allowed for an increase in investment in child quality
(Becker, 1992). There are many ways the outcomes of each child can be improved
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by the decision of a family to invest in the quality of a child. The investment in each
individual child can range from spending on education through private schooling
or tutoring, to providing a child with extra curricula activities or individual space.
Although a ‘higher quality’ child is not necessarily superior, higher quality children
tend to have improved educational and labour market outcomes. However within the
relevant literature, empirical evidence is inconclusive on the nature of this trade-off,
leaving scope for further inquiry.
Literature suggests that, coupled with decreasing mortality rates, there has been
a reduction in the need for larger families, increasing the endowment bestowed to
each child (Becker & Barro, 1988; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002; Soares, 2005; Doepke, 2005).
However, the actual return on the increase in child quality through investment is
not clear within this literature, as it tends towards using anecdotal evidence and
achieves somewhat erratic results, which strongly depend on birth order effects and
the economic environment in the country of analysis. Furthermore, the inconsistency
in the empirical evidence for the quality-quantity trade-off is a consequence of the
inability to measure the impact of inputs on child outcomes. The child quality
resulting from the investment decision is treated like a production function in which
the parents allocate inputs, such as educational investment and parenting time, to
improve child quality. However, child outcomes prove difficult to measure due to the
endogeneity involved in the decision to have additional children or invest in current
children. Moreover, it is difficult to determine which inputs affect which outputs as
there are numerous factors involved in influencing child outcomes, creating further
empirical inconsistencies in the literature.
There are two core areas on which the quality-quantity trade-off literature is
focused; (1) the expected negative association between family size and investment
in children, and (2) the effect of additional births on the cognitive development or
schooling outcomes of children in the family. Frenette (2011b) found that an un-
expected increase in family size, which is associated with the presence of multiple
births, reduced the probability of attending a private or non- religious school. Angrist
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et al. (2010) found that when using multiple instruments, instrumental variable (IV)
estimation showed no evidence of a negative association of family size on child out-
comes. Millimet & Wang (2011) who also investigated the impact of household size
on the entire distribution of child outcomes, found no evidence of a quality-quantity
trade-off across the distribution or on the average, with the exception lying on the
tails of the distribution of health indicators of child outcomes. These studies did
not find significant evidence of a quality-quantity trade-off, but they did find some
information in the extremes. Therefore additional investment in a child may simply
exert little or no influence on the measured child output or child outcomes, or there
is an issue of disentangling the causal relationship. This problem of causality arises
from the difficulty in determining the specific inputs used to improve child quality,
as well as the associated outputs from investment in child quality.
In addition to measurement issues, the relationship between family size and child
investment is highly endogenous. An increase in family size should reduce parental
investment per child, and result in a decrease in child quality; but parental investment
may decrease due to the decision to increase in the number of children (Angrist et
al., 2010). Many studies use IV and other such econometric methods of estimation
to adjust for this bias or endogeneity in the quality quantity trade-off (for example
Angrist et al., 2010; Glick et al., 2007; Black et al., 2005; Angrist & Evans, 1998).
Given that these methods focus on the average result for all children within the
sample, the distribution of outcomes may be skewed.
The final study in this thesis explores the issue of this quality-quantity trade-
off in the context of Australia, specifically focusing on educational outcomes and
policy implications. We focus on the distributional effect of additional children in a
household on child quality. This is the main contribution of this study, as there is an
expectation that additional children may have a diverse impact on existing children
due to heterogeneity in child ability. The measures of ability used in this theses are
those currently used in the literature: health and educational outcomes. Using a
distributional analysis we will be able to provide a clearer result than the existing
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studies which primarily focus on the effects on the average child.
2.6 Conclusion
This section explored the literature relevant to the three aspects of fertility we in-
vestigate in the context of this thesis. Firstly, the literature in relation to fertility,
immigration and monetary incentives was discussed. A research gap was identified
in the literature with respect to how fertility incentives can be used to incentivise
immigrant and native behaviour. This research gap will be incorporated into the
analysis of the ‘baby bonus’ provided by the Australian government.
Secondly, we discussed the roles of labour market participation, unemployment
and job stability in the fertility decision. The literature shows that female unemploy-
ment has little impact on the fertility decision of women. Few studies have suggested
that female job and employment stability plays a more important role than female
unemployment. The second study contributes to the literature through the analysis
of unemployment, employment and perceived job security in the context of Australia.
Finally, the main theory used to explain the decrease in total fertility rates; the
quality-quantity trade-off was discussed. We identified key methodology limitations
in the literature resulting from its focus on the average effect of an increase in family
size on child quality, measured by child outcomes. The final study in this thesis con-
tributes to the literature through an analysis of the distributional effects of additional
children on a child’s outcomes.
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Chapter 3 Study 1: The Impact of the
Baby Bonus: An Immigrant vs Native Per-
spective
3.1 Introduction
Overall, the rapid decrease in fertility rates has caught the attention of policymakers
around the world due to issues surrounding population decline (Adsera, 2011). The
lack of consensus with respect to microeconomic theory and empirical findings in
the area of monetary incentives and fertility makes it a prime area of study for both
developments of economic theory and policy implications. Furthermore, there is a
dearth of literature that specifically targets Australia’s fertility issues. This study
aims to explore incentive payments and fertility interactions in an Australian context.
Additionally, the study examines perceived fertility differences between natives and
immigrants which has not been considered in any significant manner in the last
decade. This analysis is critical for Australia due to the high level of immigration
into the country. As both immigration and fertility are dynamic processes that affect
the demographic composition of a nation, there may be an important unexplored
relationship between the two mechanisms.
This chapter develops a model to explain fertility differentials between immigrants
and natives, followed by an empirical investigation. In particular, we evaluate the
differences in the responses to the incentive between immigrants and natives using
theoretical and empirical models. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
relevant policy implications.
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3.2 Theoretical Model
In this section we develop a simple theoretical model of fertility to explain why re-
sponses to fertility incentives may differ significantly among natives and immigrants.
The aim is to highlight the role of cultural norms in shaping the fertility prefer-
ences of natives and immigrants, and characterise the optimal responses to fertility
incentives, such as a ‘baby bonus’, across these groups.
The literature reviewed in Section 2.3.1 provides evidence that suggests immi-
grants and natives differ with respect to many decisions and preferences. Moreover,
research shows immigrants respond more to monetary incentives compared to natives
with similar demographics (see for example Borjas, 1999; Brewer et al., 2011). Many
studies have highlighted the differences in observed fertility between natives and
immigrants (see for example Mayer & Riphahn, 2000; Andersson, 2004; Camarota,
2005; Ferna´ndez & Fogli, 2006; Livingston & Cohn, 2012). Within this literature, it
has been established that cultural norms influence the fertility decision of immigrants
(Ferna´ndez & Fogli, 2006). Similarly, studies suggest immigrant childbearing norms
in the home country are a key determinant in the higher fertility of immigrants in
the host country and explain a significant proportion of the differentials seen be-
tween immigrant and native fertility (Cygan-Rehm, 2011).7 Therefore, host country
cultural norms for fertility may be considered a key driver of the observed fertility
differences between the immigrant and native populations (Cygan-Rehm, 2011).
Three hypotheses explain the fertility behaviour of immigrants; socialisation, se-
lection, and adaptation.8 The model developed in this study focuses on the socialisa-
tion and adaptation hypotheses.9 The adaptation hypothesis focuses on the impact
7The home country is the immigrants country of origin, whereas the host country is where they
reside.
8Two additional hypotheses, known as the interrelation and disruption hypotheses, can also
be used to describe the fertility choice of immigrants. These hypotheses focus on the decision to
postpone fertility, which is not part of the decision process this study investigates. Further detail
can be found in Schmid & Kohls (2009).
9The selection hypothesis is not the focus of this model as the selection hypothesis suggests
immigrants self-select into countries that have similar underlying fertility preferences to the immi-
grant.
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of the host country on fertility norms as the predominant force on immigrant fertility
decisions through observed social interactions (Schmid & Kohls, 2009; Kahn, 1994).
The socialisation hypothesis suggests that migration does not affect fertility as the
cultural norms in the home country dominate in reproductive behaviour (Schmid &
Kohls, 2009). Given the outlined hypotheses, this model incorporates both social
and cultural norms into the development of the theoretical model.
We define social norms as the norms observed in a social frame of reference.
Cultural norms are norms embedded in preferences from experience in the home
country. Social and cultural norms do not differ for natives. For immigrants, the
social norm represents the norm prevailing in the host country whereas the cultural
norm is the norm experienced from their experience in the home country.
We argue that the impacts of social and cultural norms on fertility decisions are
heterogeneous in nature. Following this, different immigrant groups are expected to
have diverse cultural norms, given their country of birth. For example, immigrants
from high fertility countries such as North and Central Africa tend to exhibit higher
fertility norms than those from East Asia where families tend to be smaller on average
(Ferna´ndez & Fogli, 2006). Assuming people are conformist by nature, potential
parents evaluate both the economic and social impacts of their fertility decision
when choosing their optimal family size (Bhattacharya & Chakraborty, 2011). For
each group, the deviation from the host country’s social norm may impact negatively
on the derived utility from having children. In addition, potential parents attempt
to minimise this psychological cost associated with deviating from the social fertility
norms in the host country whilst partially retaining the norms from the home country.
Therefore, potential parents attempt to minimise the social distance between the host
country norm and the optimal fertility choice taking into account the home country
fertility norm (Akerlof, 1997).
Potential parents make a net fertility decision based on the trade-off between
observing the dual fertility norms. The fertility decision minimises the social dis-
tance from others as the deviation from the observed fertility norms may impose a
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psychological cost on an individual (Akerlof, 1997). Consequently, an individual’s
utility, which depends on consumption, inputs required in child rearing and the social
distance between fertility norms, expressed as:
U = ln(c) + βln(nQ)−D(n, ns, n∗s) (1)
where c is household consumption, n is the number of children, Q is the quality
of the child,10 and β < 1 is the discount factor. In addition to children, parents
derive utility from overall child quality. Parents suffer a utility loss arising from the
asynchrony between realised fertility and the social fertility norms in the host country.
The utility loss does not vary for natives as they face a single set of fertility norms;
however, the loss differs across immigrant parents according to their country-specific
cultural fertility norms. D is the metric that represents this fertility heterogeneity in
our model, measuring the social distance of fertility norms. ns is the fertility norm
in the host country and n∗s is the fertility norm in the home country if the parent is
an immigrant. Note that all variables are measured at the individual level. However,
we do not incorporate individual identifiers to avoid notational clutter.
Child quality Q is determined by time spent on child-rearing, q, as well as explicit
investment in child quality, X. For simplicity we choose a simple Cobb-Douglas form
to express child quality:
Q = MqαXµ (2)
where M > 0, q represents the level of effort used in raising children, chosen by
the parents. Child quality exhibits diminishing returns such that 0 < α < 1 and
0 < µ < 1. Therefore, time spent on child-rearing and explicit investment in child
quality decreases as the number of children increases (see for example Becker &
Lewis, 1974; Becker & Tomes, 1976; Angrist et al., 2010, more recently).
We incorporate a utility loss for deviating from social norms similar to that used
in Bhattacharya & Chakraborty (2011). Potential parents attempts to minimise the
10Child quality refers to child outcomes, further explored in Chapter 5. Child outcomes are an
indirect measure of quality.
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distance between the number of children and the prevalent social fertility norm in
the country of residence. Where this study differs from previous studies is through
the introduction of the importance of the cultural norms regarding fertility, inherited
by the immigrants from their home countries. We take the absolute value of distance
between the fertility in the host country and the individuals observed level of fertility,
as in Bhattacharya & Chakraborty (2011). However, we also adjust net fertility to
incorporate the difference in fertility norms in the home and host country if the
parent is an immigrant. A parent faces:
D(n, ns, n
∗
s) =
γ
1 + γ
∣∣∣∣(1 + γ)ns − n(1 + γ nsn∗s
)∣∣∣∣ (3)
where γ > 0. This equation suggests that the deviation from the social norm has a
heterogeneous effect on utility which depends on the values of n, ns and n
∗
s. For na-
tives, ns = n
∗
s therefore D = γ|ns−n|. This corresponds to the utility loss function in
Bhattacharya & Chakraborty (2011), which is nested as a special case in our model.
To observe the effect of equation (3) on the utility of a parent, we consider two sit-
uations for the outcome of the absolute value given in equation (3) as detailed below.
Case I: (1 + γ)ns > n(1 + γ
ns
n∗s
):
Consider three possible scenarios for ns relative to n
∗
s and the utility cost represented
by D in equation (3):
Suppose ns > n
∗
s : If n > ns > n
∗
s the utility cost, D is (A)
higher than when ns > n > n
∗
s.
11
Suppose ns = n
∗
s: Then n < ns = n
∗
s, the utility cost D
depends on the difference between
n and ns.
Suppose ns < n
∗
s: If n < ns < n
∗
s, the utility cost D
is higher than when ns < n < n
∗
s.
11This argument does not necessarily hold if n  ns. However, the socialisation, selection and
adaption hypotheses provide evidence to suggest that this assumption is not extreme as the host
country fertility level is also crucial in the fertility decision. See Schmid & Kohls (2009).
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Case II: (1 + γ)ns < n(1 + γ
ns
n∗s
):
Again consider three possible scenarios for ns relative to n
∗
s and the associated
utility cost represented by D.
Suppose ns > n
∗
s : If n > ns > n
∗
s the utility cost, D is (B)
higher than when ns > n > n
∗
s.
Suppose ns = n
∗
s: Then n < ns = n
∗
s, the utility cost D depends on
the difference between n and ns.
Suppose ns < n
∗
s: If ns < n
∗
s < n, the utility cost of D
is higher than when ns < n < n
∗
s.
12
Subcases (A) and (B) suggest D is higher if actual fertility is larger or smaller
than both the cultural (home country) and social (host country) norms; and D is
lower if fertility is in between the two norms.
Finally, the budget constraint faced by potential parents can be expressed as:
c = wh(1− qn)−Xn+Bn (4)
As the amount of time available to an individual is normalised to one, parents can
spend q amount of time raising children. Therefore, wh(1− qn) represents net earn-
ings. X is the real explicit investment in child quality and Xn is the total explicit
investment for all children the individual has. All parents receive lump-sum payment
of B per child.
Substituting (3) into (1), we obtain:
U = ln(c) + βln(nQ)− γ
1 + γ
∣∣∣∣(1 + γ)ns − n(1 + γ nsn∗s
)∣∣∣∣ (5)
As in Bhattacharya & Chakraborty (2011), we study a static model. For the
sake of simplicity the partial equilibrium is analysed, although the fertility decisions
may be affected by general equilibrium effects, to the extent that the immigrants’
12Again, if n  ns, this argument does not necessarily hold. However, this is not an overly
restrictive limitation.
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fertility behaviour may alter the social norm in the host country. This, however, is
not the focus of this study. Our model differs from Bhattacharya & Chakraborty
(2011) through the incorporation of human capital investment. As fertility choice
depends on education, analysing the role of human capital investment is a significant
contribution of this model to the literature. We begin our analysis by focusing on
Case I.
Case I: (1 + γ)ns > n(1 + γ
ns
n∗s
)
This inequality implies ns > n for natives, but not necessarily for immigrants, as it
depends on the ratio ns/n
∗
s being greater or less than one. The utility loss is highest
when n < ns < n
∗
s, and lowest when fertility lies between the two norms.
A parent maximises:
max
n,X
U = log(c) + βlog(nQ)− γ
1 + γ
{
(1 + γ)ns − n
(
1 + γ
ns
n∗s
)}
(6)
Equation (6) suggests that if the actual fertility is smaller than both the cultural and
social fertility norms, the impact on utility is larger, whereas the impact on utility
will be smaller if actual fertility lies between the two norms.
We substitute (4) and (2) into (6) and derive the first order conditions. The first
order condition for n is given as:
∂U
∂n
=
−whq −X +B
wh(1− qn)− n(X −B) +
β
n
+ Ω = 0 (7)
where Ω represents the distance between social and cultural fertility norms:
Ω =
γ
1 + γ
(
1 + γ
ns
n∗s
)
The first order condition with respect to X is:
∂U
∂X
=
−n
wh(1− qn)− n(X −B) +
βµ
X
= 0 (8)
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Rearranging equation (8) to solve for X gives:
X = κ
[
wh(1− qn) +Bn
n
]
(9)
where κ = βµ
(1+βµ)
Equation (9), implies that ∂X
∂n
< 0 and ∂X
∂B
> 0 unambiguously. Therefore, as the
number of children increases, explicit investment per child decreases and as the bonus
increases, explicit investment per child increases.
We substitute (9) into (7) to get
(1− κ)Bn− (1 + κ)wh(1− qn)
(1− κ)(wh(1− qn) +Bn) + β + Ωn = 0 (10)
We note that equation (10) does not yield an explicit solution for n. However, the
optimal number of children, nopt, can be expressed as:
nopt = n(h,B,Ω) (11)
which depends on parental human capital, the amount of baby bonus and an indicator
of the difference in fertility norms in the home and host country if the parent is an
immigrant, given by Ω.
Ceteris paribus fertility response to baby bonus (B) payment.
For the purpose of this study we explore the effects of monetary incentives on fertility
choices. To determine the effect of the baby bonus on the equilibrium number of
children, we take the total differential of equation (10) with respect to n and B to
get the following:
∂n
∂B
=
n(1 + β + Ωn)
B(1− β + 2Ωn)− wh[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)] (12)
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Equation (12) captures the heterogeneity in changes in fertility behaviour across
the natives and immigrants in response to changes in the baby bonus. The right hand
side of the expression shows that the magnitude and direction of fertility response
depends on the magnitude of Ω which in turn depends on the ratio of host and home
country fertility norms. For the natives, Ω = γ and the heterogeneity of fertility
response within this group depends on the heterogeneity in human capital. Since the
home country norms differ across immigrants’ country of origin, Ω differs not only
across immigrants but between natives and immigrants.
The sign of this partial depends on the sign of the denominator. For a given n
and Ω, the denominator is positive if:
B >
wh[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)]
(1− β + 2Ωn) ≡ B¯I (13)
A sufficient condition for the numerator of the right hand side to be positive is
1 − 2nq > 0 i.e. nq < 1/2. We impose this upper bound on child rearing time
following De La Croix & Doepke (2003). This assumption is not overly restrictive to
this model. Given this restriction, the numerator of equation (13) is strictly positive.
Therefore an individual will have a positive fertility response to the baby bonus if the
bonus B is greater than the threshold level of B¯I for a given γ and n. However, this
threshold B¯I is determined by the difference in fertility norms in the home and host
country, Ω and the fertility choice n and will therefore be a heterogeneous threshold
value. For natives Ω = γ, therefore the response will be positive if the bonus is above
the required minimum for natives for a given γ and n.
It is useful to take the second derivative of (13) to determine how a change in the
bonus impacts the optimal fertility decision
∂
∂B
(
∂n
∂B
)
=
−n(1− β + 2Ωn)(1 + β + Ωn)
{B(1− β + 2Ωn)− wh[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)]}2 (14)
Equation (14) implies that ∂
∂B
(
∂n
∂B
)
< 0. This implies that as the bonus increases,
the response is smaller for a given n, Ω and h. This is true for natives as well, as
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Ω = γ.
Ceteris paribus response of social and cultural norms to the baby bonus (B) payment.
For a given number of children n amount of bonus B, we find from (12) there will
be a positive response to the bonus if:
Ω <
(1− β)(whq −B)
2Bn− wh(1− 2nq) ≡ Ω¯I (15)
The sign of the right hand side of equation (15) is ambiguous. However, we know
that Ω > 0 which implies that Ω¯I is the upper bound. Therefore, as Ω has to be
positive, the response of immigrants to the bonus should be positive; however this
also implies that the fertility response in equation (12) cannot be positive. Again,
taking the second derivative of (12) with respect to Ω, we find an ambiguous result
for ∂
∂Ω
(
∂n
∂B
)
this suggests the response to the bonus depends on the ratio of social
norms for a given n, h and B.
Ceteris paribus response of human capital to the baby bonus (B) payment.
The empirical literature shows that human capital contributes significantly to the
fertility decision (see for example Preston & Hartnett, 2008; Klesment & Puur, 2010;
Billingsley, 2011). Therefore, we extend the analysis in this study to investigate the
relationship between human capital and the baby bonus. Equation (12) suggests the
response to the bonus will be positive if the denominator is positive. We can express
this requirement in terms of human capital, to find the threshold:
h <
B(1− β + 2Ωn)
w[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)] ≡ h¯I (16)
A parent will have a positive response if their level of human capital is below the
threshold level h¯I for a given value of Ω and n.
Finally, for Case I, wish to examine how the response to fertility incentives dif-
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fers with human capital level of parents. Therefore we need to look at the second
derivative of equation (12) with respect to h. The result is:
∂
∂h
(
∂n
∂B
)
=
wn(1 + β + Ωn)[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)]
{B(1− β + 2Ωn)− wh[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)]}2 (17)
The numerator in (17) is unambiguously positive. This result suggests that as human
capital increases, the likelihood of a positive response to the baby bonus increases.
Similarly, for natives the response will also be unambiguously positive as Ω = γ.
Therefore natives experience a positive response to the baby bonus as human capital
increases if ns > n, differing to immigrants only in magnitude.
Case II (1 + γ)ns < n(1 + γ
ns
n∗s
)
This inequality implies ns < n for natives, but not necessarily for immigrants, and it
depends on the ratio ns/n
∗
s being greater or less than one. The utility loss is highest
when n > ns > n
∗
s, and lowest when fertility lies between the two norms. Parents
maximise:
max
n,X
U = log(c) + βlog(nQ)− γ
1 + γ
{
n
(
1 + γ
ns
n∗s
)
− (1 + γ)ns
}
(18)
Equation (18) suggests if actual fertility is larger than both the cultural and social
fertility norms, the impact on utility is larger. If actual fertility is between the two
norms the impact on utility is smaller.
The first order condition for X remains the same as specified in (8), however the
resulting first order condition for n becomes:
∂U
∂n
=
−whq −X +B
wh(1− qn)− n(X −B) +
β
n
− Ω = 0 (19)
Equation (19) differs from the previous case with Ω changing sign from positive
to negative. Substituting X from (9) into equation (19) gives the following result:
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(1− κ)Bn− (1 + κ)wh(1− qn)
(1− κ)(wh(1− qn) +Bn) + β − Ωn = 0 (20)
Again, equation (20) yields no explicit solution. However, the optimal number of
children, nopt can be expressed as:
nopt = n(h,B,Ω) (21)
which depends in parental human capital, the amount of the bonus and the ratio of
fertility norms from the host and home countries, represented by Ω.
Ceteris paribus fertility response to the baby bonus (B) payment.
To examine the effect of the bonus payment on the number of children, we take the
total differential with respect to n and B in equation (20) to derive the following
results:
∂n
∂B
=
n(1 + β − Ωn)
B(1− β + 2Ωn)− wh[(1− β)q − Ω(1− 2nq)] (22)
In this case the sign is ambiguous. For the response to be positive, it requires
the numerator and denominator to have the same sign. The numerator will be
positive if Ω < (1 +β)/n, moreover the denominator will be positive if wh(1−β)q >
Ω(1 − 2nq). If both conditions hold, the overall impact of the baby bonus will be
positive. However, the response to the baby bonus can also be negative if Ω is large
enough, suggesting no clear result in this scenario.
The threshold value of the bonus for equation (22) which will result in a positive
response given by:
B >
wh[(1− β)q − Ω(1− 2nq)]
(1− β + 2Ωn) ≡ B¯II (23)
The numerator is more likely to be positive if ns/n
∗
s < 1, for a given Ω and n.
If we take the second derivative of (22) to determine how a change in the bonus
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impacts the optimal fertility decision, we find:
∂
∂B
(
∂n
∂B
)
=
−n(1− β + 2Ωn)(1 + β − Ωn)
{B(1− β + 2Ωn)− wh[(1− β)q − Ω(1− 2nq)]}2 (24)
This suggests an ambiguous sign for ∂
∂B
(
∂n
∂B
)
, which depends on the magnitude
of Ω. Equation (24) implies the fertility response to the bonus is inversely related to
the value of the bonus. Therefore as the bonus increases, the response is smaller for
a given n, h and Ω. This is true for natives as well, as Ω = γ.
Ceteris paribus response of social and cultural norms to the baby bonus (B) payment.
For a given amount of B and n, equation (22) implies there will be a positive response
to the baby bonus if:
Ω <
(1− β)(whq −B)
2Bn+ wh(1− 2nq) ≡ Ω¯II (25)
Again this result is ambiguous and depends on the size of B for a given n. For
the response to be positive, it requires B > whq. However, we know that Ω > 0
which implies that Ω¯II is the upper bound. As Ω has to be positive, the response
of immigrants to the bonus should be positive; however this also implies that the
fertility response in equation (22) cannot be positive. Furthermore, we find from the
second derivative, ∂
∂Ω
(
∂n
∂B
)
is negative and the response to the bonus depends on the
ratio of social norms for a given n, h and B.
Ceteris paribus response of human capital norms to the baby bonus (B) payment.
Equation (22) suggests the response to the bonus will be positive if the denominator
is positive. Thus we can express this result in terms of human capital:
h <
B(1− β + 2Ωn)
w[(1− β)q − Ω(1− 2nq)] ≡ h¯II (26)
Hence there will be a positive response for a parent if the parent’s level of human
capital is below the threshold level h¯II for a given value of Ω and n.
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In this case, taking the second derivative of ∂/∂h (∂n/∂B) with respect to h gives
following:
∂
∂h
(
∂n
∂B
)
=
wn(1 + β − Ωn)[(1− β)q + Ω(1− 2nq)]
{B(1− β − 2Ωn)− wh[(1− β)q − Ω(1− 2nq)]}2 (27)
The denominator of equation (27) is always positive; however, the sign of the nu-
merator depends on the magnitude of Ω. Therefore, the impact of human capital on
the response to the baby bonus is ambiguous in this case. For natives, Ω = γ and
therefore this result only differs in magnitude.
3.2.1 Conclusion
This section developed a theoretical model to highlight the difference between native
and immigrant fertility. The main contribution of this model is in the incorporation
of both social and cultural norms for immigrant and native groups. In both the
native and immigrant scenario, social norms play an important role in the fertility
decision. The distinction between the two groups is the magnitude of the utility
loss. Immigrants face two social norms, which impact on a parent’s fertility decision,
whereas natives face a single set of norms which influence their decision.
In this study we explored whether the baby bonus increased or decreased fertility,
measured by the number of children. We investigated the fertility response of immi-
grant and natives to determine if response to the baby bonus is different between the
two groups. We find the expected response was the same, differing only in magni-
tude. The magnitude of the utility loss is can be larger or smaller for immigrants as
the immigrant fertility depends on the ratio of norms in the host country compared
to the home country. We find an positive response of immigrants and natives in both
instances as long as the bonus is above the reserve threshold for the bonus (B¯), how-
ever the response decreases as the bonus increases. Therefore, the introduction of
the bonus should increase overall fertility. The scenario for natives is similar, except
the magnitude of the effect depends on γ. With respect to the relationship between
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human capital and the baby bonus, we found an ambiguous result. This motivates
the empirical analysis conducted in the following section.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Introduction
This study examines the impact of monetary incentives on individual fertility de-
cisions. Specifically, we explore the dynamics of the ‘baby bonus’ on native and
non-native women in Australia. We analyse the response to this policy using the
Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. We estimate
the relationship between child bearing and monetary incentive using the introduction
of this policy in the setting of a natural experiment. In particular, we evaluate the
differences in the responses to the incentive between immigrants and natives using
both difference-in-difference and semiparametric models.
Our study aims to expand the relevant literature by evaluating differentials be-
tween fertility rates for the purpose of policy analysis and future policy implementa-
tion for governments seeking to improve fertility rates. The relevant literature shows
immigrant and native women have differing responses to monetary incentives within
the welfare literature (see for example Borjas, 1999; Kaestner & Kaushal, 2005; Dust-
mann et al., 2005). However, the role of fertility incentives and pro-natal policies,
such as the baby bonus, has not been explored in the context of these subpopula-
tions. Additionally, a contribution of this study is the consolidation of the literature
on welfare benefits and immigrant-native fertility discrepancies. This analysis may
therefore result in important policy implications for Australia and other countries
with significant immigrant populations.
The results of this study indicate that the implementation of the bonus led to
higher fertility for immigrant women than a comparable native born woman. Ev-
idence provided by this study suggests the policy initiative may have failed in ob-
taining a response from its intended targets, although the policy was successful in
achieving an overall increase in the nation’s reproductive goal.
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3.3.2 Background to the Baby Bonus
In an attempt to increase the fertility rate across the nation, the Australian Govern-
ment introduced a one off payment as an incentive for having children. The scheme
initially offered a singular payment of $3000 to all women having a baby on or after
July 2004. The program replaced a means-tested maternity tax offset of up to $2500
that women could previously claim as a rebate over a five-year period. However, un-
like the maternity tax offset, the baby bonus offered an immediate non-means tested
cash incentive. The baby bonus payment has since undergone a series of alterations
from its implementation in 2004, to the dissolution of the program in 2014. The
payment was raised to $4000 and again to $5000 in July 2006 and July 2008, respec-
tively. During the interim, the payment was indexed to rise alongside the national
consumer price index (see Table 7.1 in the appendix for exact values).
In 2012 the baby bonus program became means tested, with families earning
over $75,000 per annum unable to receive the bonus. Furthermore, the most recent
changes stipulate that the bonus payment cannot be obtained if the mother has access
to paid parental leave. More recently the government has reduced the payment
amount to $3000 and staggered the payments across 12 weeks in the 2013-2014
financial year.13 As of May 2014, there will no longer be family payments in the
form of once off bonus payments. The policy will revert to a means tested maternity
tax offset, with compulsory implementation of paid parental leave.14 This tax offset
is only available to working mothers, making the payments an incentive for those who
are actively employed. Overall, abolishing the baby bonus is expected to reduce the
strain of those who are welfare dependent on the government’s budget (Parliament
of Australia, 2013).
13These values were as of July 2013
14At the time of writing, Australia had a change in government. These numbers are therefore
subject to consideration and review by the current government.
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3.3.3 Data
The data set used in this analysis is the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics
in Australia (HILDA) Survey, which began in 2001. The HILDA survey consists
of a sample of the Australian population, representative of private households. All
individuals in the household, over the age of 15 were interviewed for the purpose
of the survey. We specifically consider data from 2003-2007, which incorporates the
period of introduction and initial revisions of the baby bonus, prior to the recent
shift to a paid maternity leave program funded by the government. Using 2003
as a reference year, this study aims to determine the effect of the bonus on the
childbearing decision. In the literature, most studies show a postponement effect of
incentives on fertility. In the case of the HILDA there may not be a postponement
effect exhibited in the data, due to the nature of fertility, survey collection timing
and the timing of the announcement for the bonus.15
The analysis in this study focuses on immigrant and native-born individuals.
An immigrant is defined as an individual who has a country of birth other than
Australia. It is important to note that the sample of immigrants in the HILDA is
not representative of the population over time due to the dynamics of immigration.
This is because there is no resampling over the time period of interest; as a result
we cannot analyse migration dynamics in Australia. However, within this analysis
we are not specifically interested in looking at immigration into the country, but
rather the characteristics of those who are having children within the native and
immigrant cohorts in the HILDA. Furthermore, the baby bonus is only available
to those individuals who are permanent residents or are de-facto to a permanent
resident. This implies the immigrant cohort will have at least 2 years of assimilation
to local conditions, which is the minimum stay for residency. Fertility, our dependent
variable is measured as a binary indicator for having a child in a given year. The
15We do not expect the data to show any form of short run announcement or timing effects
because the HILDA data collection is undertaken in August, which is too soon to reflect any changes
resulting from the introduction of the baby bonus. However, there may be long term changes in
child bearing preferences.
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sample we use is focused on both women of child bearing age (18-45) and those
with completed fertility (45-60). Women with completed fertility are included in the
analysis for robustness in the selected difference-in-difference methodology.
For this analysis we select the control covariates from the existing fertility litera-
ture which are known to impact on the decision to bear children. These include age,
marital status, number of children, labour force status, education, partners educa-
tion, partner’s labour force status and religion. We drop all responses where data is
missing for these variables. After trimming the data to those we have information
available on, we obtain 22,565 observations; 17,992 being Australian Born and 4,573
immigrants, pooled across 2003-2007. A description of the variables used in this
analysis can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Variable Description
Variable Type Description
Fertility Binary Had a baby that year. (0) No (reference), (1) Yes.
Age Continuous Age of the mother.
Age Squared Continuous Age of the mother squared.
Marriage Binary Married or Defacto (0) No (reference) (1) Yes.
No. Children Continuous Number of children the woman already has.
Employment Dummy Employment (1) Employed (reference) (2) Unemployed
Status & (3) Not in labour force.
Education Dummy Education level. Three categories (1) < High School (reference)
(2) = High School & (3) > High School.
Partners Dummy Employment (1) Employed (reference) (2) Unemployed
Emp Status & (3) Not in labour force.
Partners Dummy (1) Postgrad, (2) Grad Diploma/Certificate, (3) Bachelor or
Education honours, (4) Diploma, (5) Cert III or IV, (6) Cert I or II
(7) Cert Other (8) Year 12 (reference) (9) Year 11 and below,
(10) No Partner Info
Religion Dummy Religion of mother. (1) Judeo-Christian (reference) (2) Buddhism
(3) Hinduism (4) Islam (5) Judaism (6) Other Religion
(7) No Religion
Immigrant Binary Immigrant status by country of birth (0) Native, (1) Immigrant.
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3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest can be found in Table 3.2 and Table
3.3. We conducted t-tests on the native and immigrant subsamples to test whether
there is a significant difference in the covariates included in the regression analysis.
In this case, we find a significant difference in the means across almost all variables.
There are 2 cases where there is no significant difference: the Advanced Diploma
qualification and unemployment indicator. The unconditional probability of having
a child in a given year lies at around 5 per cent pooled across the sample. Furthermore
Table 3.2 also shows that on average, the probability of having child in a given year is
higher for those in the native category. This is attributed to the pooling of the data
across all years and the number of natives is substantially higher than immigrants,
and therefore there is a higher probability of a positive response to the baby bonus by
native individuals. Additionally, the data indicates that immigrants have on average
1.69 children compared to 1.58 children per native, a significant difference, indicating
the opposite of the fertility probability indicator. This suggests immigrant women
tend to have higher number of children on average compared to natives. We also find
that the average age of an individual in this dataset is approximately 39 for the entire
sample. However, when broken down into the immigrant and native subpopulations,
the average age is almost four years higher for those in the immigrant category.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable All Native Immigrant Mean
Difference
Fertility 0.048 0.049 0.041 0.008*
(0.213) (0.216) (0.199) (0.004)
Immigrant 0.203 0 1 -
(0.4020) (0.000) (0.000) -
Age 39.013 38.157 42.381 -4.224***
(11.905) (11.977) (10.988) (0.195)
No. Children 1.602 1.581 1.686 -0.105***
(1.461) (1.471) (1.417) (0.024)
Married/ Defacto 0.664 0.648 0.724 -0.076***
(0.472) (0.477) (0.447) (0.008)
Labour Force Status
Employed (reference) 0.721 0.730 0.683 0.047***
(0.447) (0.444) (0.465) (0.007)
Unemployed 0.032 0.032 0.033 -0.001
(0.177) (0.176) (0.178) (0.003)
Not in LF 0.247 0.237 0.284 -0.046***
(0.431) (0.426) (0.451) (0.007)
Qualifications
Postgraduate 0.031 0.026 0.052 -0.026***
(0.173) (0.159) (0.222) (0.003)
Grad Diploma, Grad Cert 0.067 0.064 0.079 -0.015***
(0.250) (0.245) (0.269) (0.004)
Bachelor or Honours 0.160 0.151 0.195 -0.044***
(0.367) (0.358) (0.396) (0.006)
Adv Diploma, Diploma 0.095 0.093 0.102 -0.010*
(0.293) (0.290) (0.303) (0.005)
Cert III or IV 0.143 0.146 0.132 0.014*
(0.350) (0.353) (0.338) (0.006)
Cert I or II 0.018 0.020 0.012 0.007***
(0.133) (0.138) (0.110) (0.002)
Cert not defined 0.006 0.006 0.008 -0.003*
(0.078) (0.074) (0.091) (0.001)
High School (reference) 0.187 0.183 0.200 -0.0168***
(0.390) (0.387) (0.400) (0.006)
Year 11 and Below 0.294 0.313 0.220 0.093***
(0.455) (0.464) (0.414) (0.008)
No Obs 22565 17992 4573 22565
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for variable means whereas
standard errors are reported for means differences.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 respectively.
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Table 3.3: Partner’s Descriptive Statistics
Variable All Native Immigrant Mean
Difference
No Partner Info 0.396 0.407 0.353 0.054***
Reported (0.489) (0.491) (0.478) (0.008)
Qualifications
Postgraduate 0.032 0.026 0.056 -0.030***
(0.177) (0.160) (0.230) (0.003)
Grad Diploma, Grad Cert 0.034 0.032 0.041 -0.009**
(0.181) (0.176) (0.199) (0.003)
Bachelor or Honours 0.087 0.080 0.113 -0.033***
(0.281) (0.271) (0.317) -0.005
Adv Diploma, Diploma 0.058 0.052 0.080 -0.027***
(0.234) (0.223) (0.271) (0.003)
Cert III or IV 0.186 0.192 0.162 0.030***
(0.389) (0.394) (0.369) (0.006)
Cert I or II 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.005***
(0.085) (0.091) (0.053) (0.001)
Cert not defined 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002***
(0.040) (0.045) (0.000) (0.001)
High School (reference) 0.065 0.063 0.071 -0.008*
(0.246) (0.243) (0.257) (0.004)
Year 11 and Below 0.529 0.544 0.473 0.0703***
(0.499) (0.498) (0.499) (0.003)
Labour Force Status
Employed (reference) 0.879 0.887 0.850 -0.0239**
(0.326) (0.316) (0.357) (0.007)
Unemployed 0.020 0.019 0.023 -0.004*
(0.139) (0.136) (0.151) (0.003)
Not in LF 0.061 0.056 0.082 -0.0261***
(0.239) (0.229) (0.274) (0.006)
Observations 22565 17992 4573 22565
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses for variable means whereas
standard errors are reported for means differences.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and ***p<0.01 respectively.
44
The descriptive statistics also show that employment is lower for those in the
immigrant category with a difference in means of more than a five per cent, signif-
icant at a one per cent level. This is consistent with the literature on immigrant
employment outcomes. Furthermore, immigrant women are also less likely to partic-
ipate in the labour force relative to native women. Regardless of immigrant status
an individual from the sample is likely to be unemployed 3.2% of the time. These
descriptive statistics also show that immigrants are more likely to have a higher
level of education. We attribute this to the positive selection immigration policy for
obtaining residency imposed by the Australian government.
Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the partners characteristics, which
may impact on the fertility decision. We observe a significant difference between
both the immigrant and native women across all partner characteristics. We also
find that the labour force participation rate is high, above 85% for both the pooled
sample and the two sub populations. However, labour force participation is higher
among the native category.
These observed differences between immigrants and natives add to the motivation
behind the use of propensity score matching and semiparametric estimation. Overall
the descriptive statistics indicate that there are significant differences between im-
migrant and native women, especially in the area of fertility. This finding solidifies
the analysis presented in Section 3.2.
As there are significant heterogeneous characteristics between people from differ-
ent countries, the mean fertility response based on region of origin was also examined,
as shown in Table 3.4. Australian born women have a 4.9% probability of having a
child. This is in stark comparison to immigrants from North East Asia, the Americas
and Sub Saharan Africa, who have a higher probability of having a child (around
6%). We note that those individuals from North Africa and Middle East have a rel-
atively low probability of childbearing, which is counter-intuitive to the assessment
given the data from the ABS where on average these immigrant individuals have on
average 3 children in comparison to an Australian who has 1.95 children (Australian
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Table 3.4: Fertility by Region of Birth
Country Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Australia 17986 0.0493 0.2164
Other Oceanic 570 0.0491 0.2163
North West Europe 1588 0.0277 0.1642
Southern and Eastern Europe 504 0.0298 0.1701
North Africa and Middle East 152 0.0395 0.1954
South East Asia 686 0.0496 0.2172
North East Asia 305 0.0590 0.2360
Southern and Central Asia 224 0.0446 0.2070
Americas 291 0.0619 0.2413
Sub Saharan Africa 254 0.0591 0.2362
Bureau of Statistics, 2012). This may be due to the small representation of immi-
grants in the HILDA. Finally, it can be seen that immigrants from Europe exhibit
much lower fertility probabilities than other regions of the world.
The descriptive and unconditional fertility statistics indicate that there are sig-
nificant differences between immigrant and native women, especially in the area of
fertility. This supports the hypothesis outlined in Section 3.2, and motivates us to
further investigate the issue.
3.3.5 Methodology
In this section we outline and motivate the methods used in this analysis. We
use a difference-in-difference (DID) estimation technique to examine the variations
in the responses of native and immigrants to the ‘baby bonus’. This method has
wide applications in the literature to evaluate the implementation of public policy.
Difference-in-difference allows for the analysis of changes in the fertility response
induced by a treatment or event, in this case, the baby bonus. Using this method,
the effect on those women exposed to the treatment and those not exposed to the
treatment (the control) over two periods in time can be separated out, in order to
isolate the effects of the policy or intervention.
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The use of a control group in the analysis makes it possible to difference out fac-
tors that may bias the analysis and decompose the treatment effect and magnitude
of the treatment. In this study, we examine the effects of the bonus on the indi-
vidual fertility decision in a natural experiment setting. This exposes the revealed
preferences for child bearing for Australian women. Given that the baby bonus is
available to all Australian women; it is difficult to determine if women are having
children due to the existence of the bonus or whether other factors are driving their
decision such as marital status, religion and employment status. Additionally the
widespread availability of the bonus to all women does not allow for accurate use of
the bonus as a treatment in this analysis. The causal effect of the bonus on fertility
would be unidentifiable by using the baby bonus directly in this analysis, due to this
non-excludability of the payment.16 We therefore develop our own treatments groups
for the DID estimation, focusing on those women who are most likely to respond to
the implementation of the baby bonus. We also develop various control categories
for comparison and robustness checks. This analysis uses the Household Income and
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey data acquired using Panelwhiz (see
Haisken-DeNew & Hahn, 2010) in conjunction with Stata 12.17
Difference-in-Difference Setup
To begin this analysis we estimate the linear probability model expressed in equation
(1) to determine whether there is a difference in the fertility outcomes of those women
in the treatment group over time:
Fi,t = α0 + α1Xi,t + β1τi,t + β2Ti,t + β3(τi,t × Ti,t) +  (1)
where Fi,t represents fertility, taking a value of 1 if an individual has a child in a
given year and 0 otherwise. Xi,t is a vector of individual level characteristics, τi,t is
16As a result the baby bonus cannot be used as a treatment in the application of DID.
17Panelwhiz is a data management and extrapolation tool for larger data sets such as the HILDA,
GSOEP, and BHS, that allows for quick retrieval of variables of interest.
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an indicator variable for treatment status and Ti,t is a vector of time dummies for the
period of 2003-2007. We interpret coefficient β3 as the difference-in-difference (DID),
which represents the fertility gap between the treated and untreated individuals over
time. The vector of individual characteristics controls for age, age squared, marital
status, religion, number of children, employment status, partner’s education and
partner’s labour force status as covariates in the regression. As education is used to
segregate the treatment and control groups, it cannot be included directly as control
in the regression. A summary of these demographics can be found in Table 3.1.
These variables contribute significantly to the fertility decision within the literature,
as seen in chapter 2. Immigrant and religious status are included to incorporate
heterogeneous social norms into the model.
Specifically the research question aims to investigate whether immigrants and
natives reacted differently to the baby bonus, given their level of human capital.
Hence, we extend the model specified in equation (1) to include a three- way interac-
tion between immigrant status (Ii,t), treatment group representation (τi,t), and time
(Ti,t):
Fi,t = α0 + α1Xi,t + β1Ii,t + β2τi,t + β3Ti,t + β4(Ii,t × τi,t)+
β5(Ii,t × Ti,t) + β6(Ti,t × τi,t) + γ1(Ii,t × τi,t × Ti,t) + 
(2)
This equation will allow for the empirical analysis of the response of immigrant
women to the baby bonus is significantly different from their native counterparts.
The resulting coefficient of γ1 shows the response of immigrant women relative to
native women in the treatment group, accounting for the change in means for the
immigrants in the control group and natives in the treatment group. 18
18See derivation of interpretation in the appendix for further detail.
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3.3.6 Semiparametric Difference-in-Difference
Finally, we estimate the propensity scores and use these scores to conduct a semi-
parametric difference-in-difference analysis. This analysis is necessary due to the
strong assumptions used in DID. That is, prior to the implementation of the bonus,
both the treatment and control groups follow the same trajectory over time. In
this case, when implementing DID, we are making the assumption that this com-
mon trend holds true, conditional on the covariates when evaluating the effect of the
baby bonus on fertility. This assumption may be violated as the selection for treat-
ment may depend on individual transitory or dynamic shocks not accounted for in
DID estimation. Using semi-parametric techniques as outlined in Abadie (2005), we
take into account any deviations from the common trend that is driven by observed
characteristics for the treated and untreated groups.19
In DID we assume that all factors affecting the outcomes of individuals, other
than the treatment, are observable. These factors are assumed to be the same for the
treated and untreated groups, which may not always be the case.20 Furthermore,
the application semi-parametric DID method is particularly useful as we cannot
determine if the assumption of a pre-treatment common trend assumption holds due
to a limited pre-treatment period. Hence, the application of semi-parametric DID
will be relevant given the data available in the HILDA, where many of the groups
follow similar, but not exact paths pre-treatment.
Using the fitted values from the propensity scores for the immigrant and native
subsamples, we weight the average treatment effect, given the unconditional proba-
bility of belonging to the treatment group.21 We match on the same demographics in
19The problem with non-parallel outcomes is that they violate the common trend assumption,
which underpins the use of a difference-in-difference estimation technique.
20The covariates are assumed to be similar for those in the treated and untreated groups sug-
gesting that there are no unobservable factors that may affect the treatment or control group alone.
21This is equation (10) in Abadie (2005), reported here in equation (3) using the HILDA data
over the time period 2003-2007, with period one being 2003 and period 2 being 2007. Therefore
the results will show the overall change in fertility in response to the treatment, but will not show
the dynamic change over time.
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the DID methodology. Additionally we match on age and education when possible.22
We estimate the following equation from Abadie (2005):
E
[
F 1(1)− F 0(1)|τ = 1] = E [F (1)− F (0)
P (τ = 1)
× τ − P (τ = 1|X)
1− P (τ = 1|X)
]
(3)
where F 1 and F 0 are the outcomes if the individual is exposed to treatment or not,
respectively. Therefore, F 1(1) − F 0(1) shows the treatment on the treated. F (0)
is the level of fertility in 2003, the pre baby bonus which will be a value of 0 if no
children are born in 2003 and 1 if the individual has a child in 2003. F (1) is the
count of children post baby bonus levels up until 2007. τ is a dummy for belonging
in the treatment group, P (τ = 1) gives the probability of being in the treatment
group and P (τ = 1|X) is the propensity score conditional on the specified matching
covariates. This weights the observations such that the distributions of covariates
for the treated and untreated are the same (Abadie, 2005).
3.3.7 Treatment Selection
To implement this difference-in-difference methodology, we need to identify the rel-
evant treatment and control groups. This section examines trends in the fertility
of various subsamples to develop valid treatment and control groups for the analy-
sis. Following a similar method as used by Kaestner & Kaushal (2005) we begin by
identifying individuals who fall in the treatment group as those who are expected to
respond to the implementation of the baby bonus. The relevant literature on welfare
payments suggests that women who have a low level of education are more likely to
respond significantly to monetary incentives (see Kaestner & Kaushal, 2005; Martin
et al., 2012). Furthermore, studies show that women who have a preference for child-
bearing are less likely to pursue higher education and women with higher levels of
education, are significantly more attached to the labour market; therefore, less likely
22We match on age or education when it varies between the treatment and controls given the
nature of the alternative controls. This allows for the propensity scores to be more precise for
matching.
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to have children (Rosenzweig, 1999; Milligan, 2005; Andersson, 2004). Additionally,
low levels of education are highly correlated with participation in the social welfare
system (Kaestner & Kaushal, 2005). Therefore, we identify women with a low level
of human capital, as the target group for the policy as we expect them to be the
most likely to respond to the implementation on the baby bonus.
As this analysis investigates the effects of incentives on fertility, we restrict the
treatment group to women of child bearing age. We specifically allow for heterogene-
ity in age due to its importance in the fertility decision as outlined in the relevant
fertility literature (i.e. young women will make a different fertility choice based on
their age as opposed to women considered to be in their child bearing prime). Conse-
quently, we allow for variation in the treatment groups based on age. Therefore, the
treatment considers women who are; less than 25, less than 30, less than 35, and less
than 40, all with a level of education below high school. These treatment groups are
referred to as Treatment A, B, C, and D respectively (see Table 3.5). Therefore, as
age increases, more women of child bearing age are incorporated into the treatment.
Table 3.5: Treatment and Relevant Control Groups
Treatment Controls
Treatment A Control 1 Control 2 Control 3
< HS < 25 ≥ HS < 25 < HS ≥ 25 < 40 < HS ≥ 25
Treatment B Control 1 Control 2 Control 3
< HS < 30 ≥ HS < 30 < HS ≥ 30 < 40 < HS ≥ 30
Treatment C Control 1 Control 2 Control 3
< HS < 35 ≥ HS < 35 < HS ≥ 35 < 40 < HS ≥ 35
Treatment D Control 1 Control 2 Control 3
< HS < 40 ≥ HS < 40 < HS ≥ 40 ≥ HS ≥ 40
In this table < HS < 25 implies a less than high school education and less
than 25 years old etc.
In addition to the education restrictions previously defined, we require a control
group that is not expected to respond to the introduction of the baby bonus. Various
controls are selected for comparison. These controls vary from the treated based on
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age, education or both, as described in Table 3.5. The treatment groups comprises
of those individuals whose behaviour will change as a result of the introduction of
the policy (as outlined above). The treatment group is expected to diverge from
the control, post-treatment implementation. Therefore, the treatment and control
groups must follow a common trend before the introduction of the bonus, but the
treatment group diverges from the control, post-implementation of the bonus. If the
common trend assumption is not met the validity of the DID estimators is ques-
tionable. We compare and contrast four specific treatments against various possible
control groups. Those women with completed fertility are included to check the
robustness in the analysis.
Comparisons of Treatment and Control Groups
A visual analysis of the treatment and control groups for the relevant age categories
can be found in Figure 3.1. The solid lines represent the treatment groups in each
graph. These lines indicate the average fertility of women with an education level
of less than high school. The difference between each graph is the treatment age
restriction. This allows for the inclusion of more women, who also have a low level
of education into the treatment group. The dashed and dotted lines represent the
potential control groups. For example, the first panel of Figure 3.1 shows the treat-
ment of those women with less than high school education, under the age of 25. If
one of the control categories, such as the < HS ≥ 25, is selected it can be seen
that this line lies below that of the treatment (the first panel of Figure 1). This is
because this study includes individuals of the same education category, who have
both complete and incomplete fertility, to the age of 60. This is in stark contrast
to the ≥ HS < 25, which follows a similar trend to that of the treatment group in
this case. The overall position of this line across the first three graphs in Figure 1
is roughly the same across most of the treatment groups (within the band of 6-10%
per cent). For example, the top left graph (Treatment A) shows a similar trend to
bottom left graph (Treatment C).
52
Figure 3.1: Control and Treatment Fertility
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Furthermore, it can be seen that the sample analogues of the treatments follows
a similar overall trend as the treatment groups.23 For the third and fourth panel in
Figure 3.1 we also observe the < HS and ≥ HS groups in the same age category
as the treatment i.e < 35 and < 40 respectively, have very similar fertility levels
prior to the implementation of the bonus (see the blue solid for the treatment and
the red dashed line for the control group). This common trend observed before
the implementation of the policy is a necessary requirement as the use of DID. If
this common trend assumption is not met the validity of the DID estimators is
questionable.
The fourth graph is slightly different to the others as the controls in the first three
graphs would shed no light on Treatment D, as Treatment D incorporates all women
who are in the prime age for having children. The controls for this group have been
adjusted slightly for better comparison given that it includes all individuals with
incomplete fertility (refer to Table 3.5). That is, the treatment age is at the age
limit for this control. Treatment D is included for robustness in this analysis.
We find that the starting position of the treatment categories is similar, with the
position lying between 6% and 10% in 2003. As the treatment generally lies above
the analogue control, this indicates the treatments are relevant to this analysis,
and that the policy is more likely to incentivise those individuals who have a low
level of education compared to those women with a higher level of human capital.
Furthermore, this can be seen in the significant volatility displayed in the graphs of
the treatments. Finally, with respect to Figure 3.1, shows that the dash lines across
all panels are flatter overtime, and follow a similar trend in the < 30 and < 40 age
treatments.
23Here the control group is within the same age category, but those individuals included in the
treatment have an education level above that of the treatment.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Introduction
In this section we analyse and discuss the results obtained through the use of the
methodologies described in Section 3.3.5. We find evidence that suggests the re-
sponse of immigrants and natives to the baby bonus is different. This effect is
particularly significant in 2007 for those in the Treatment A. For Treatment B and
C we find a significant effect in 2006. The effect is strongest for Treatment B, which
corresponds to the age for which women are considered to be in their child-bearing
prime. Our propensity scores find similar results for individuals belonging to the
treatment group, suggesting the treatment selection is effective. Additionally, the
application of semiparametric difference-in-difference results in consistent estimates
which suggest that the response to the baby bonus is higher for immigrants than for
native women, leading to a significant increase in fertility on the whole.
3.4.2 Preliminary Results
In this section we present and discuss the two-way interaction between the treatment
(τi,t) and time (Ti,t) specified in equation (1) and compare this across the alternative
treatment and control categories. Table 3.6 reports the results for those who fall in
the treatment group of having less than a high school education and being less than 25
years of age (< HS < 25). Model (1) estimates the two-way interaction term without
demographic controls and model (2) controls for the individual level demographics
specified in the methodology. The coefficients for the demographics are reported in
Table 7.7 in the appendix of this chapter. The demographic coefficients are found
to be statistically and economically significant in most instances. Furthermore the
demographic controls add vital information to the model, as seen in the increase in
the R-squared in all estimations.
We will begin our analysis of the results from Panel A. In this panel the control
group for the analysis includes those women who have an education greater than or
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equal to a high school level, less than 25 years of age (≥ HS < 25). The difference
between the control group and the treatment, in this case, is the level of education.
This panel shows there is a mild significant effect of belonging to Treatment A. How-
ever, there is no significant time effect across both models. This may be due to the
inadequacy of the control as a comparison to the treatment group, as it is limited
to those within the same age but excludes those who are within childbearing prime,
who may also be a target of the policy. This specification also results in the nega-
tive coefficient seen on the treatment indicator when controlling for demographics.
Considering that we require the control group to be unresponsive in comparison to
the treatment with the introduction of the baby bonus (as defined by belonging in
the treatment), this may indicate that Control 1 is not an adequate control as those
belonging within the control are also responding to the introduction of the baby
bonus, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Panel B and Panel C present the results using the alternative controls of less than
high school, between 25 and 40 years of age (< HS ≥ 25 < 40); and less than high
school, greater than or equal to 25 years, respectively (< HS ≥ 25). As can be seen
these controls vary based on age, but have the same level of human capital as the
treatment. Results in both panels are fairly similar to Panel A, and tend to only
differ in magnitude. Again, we can see no significant time effects, but we note that
the signs on the time dummies are fairly consistent across all panels. There tends to
be a negative effect of time in 2004 possibly driven by the postponement of births
after the announcement of the bonus, similar to that found in Gans & Leigh (2009),
and a positive effect thereafter, when controlling for demographics. Additionally, it
can be seen that there is a positive significant effect of having a child for those in
the treatment group for model (1) in Panel C, which changes signs when controlling
for demographics. There may be unobservable characteristics driving this result, it
is safe to assume that limiting the sample at such a young age might impact on the
analysis. Therefore we increase the age restriction on the treatment to incorporate
more women into the treatment analysis, as shown in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.6: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment A: < HS < 25
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 25 Control 2 < HS ≥ 25 < 40 Control 3 < HS ≥ 25
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment τ 0.0445* -0.0342 -0.0041 -0.0325 0.0539** -0.0999***
(0.0242) (0.0233) (0.0265) (0.0402) (0.0232) (0.0326)
2004 0.0013 -0.0071 -0.0106 -0.0205 -0.0026 -0.0038
(0.0119) (0.0100) (0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0064) (0.0064)
2005 -0.0007 -0.0093 0.0014 -0.0139 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0115) (0.0095) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0067) (0.0066)
2006 -0.0018 -0.0051 0.0180 0.0216 0.0029 0.0078
(0.0115) (0.0097) (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0070) (0.0069)
2007 0.0110 -0.0022 -0.0060 -0.0063 -0.0039 0.0005
(0.0124) (0.0103) (0.0213) (0.0223) (0.0067) (0.0067)
τ *2004 -0.0375 0.0014 -0.0256 -0.0006 -0.0336 -0.0264
(0.0308) (0.0283) (0.0344) (0.0338) (0.0291) (0.0293)
τ *2005 0.0003 0.0247 -0.0018 0.0313 -0.0005 0.0054
(0.0335) (0.0303) (0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0322) (0.0333)
τ *2006 0.0158 0.0137 -0.0039 -0.0029 0.0112 0.0094
(0.0334) (0.0297) (0.0384) (0.0376) (0.0321) (0.0326)
τ *2007 -0.0023 -0.0072 0.0147 0.0103 0.0126 0.0093
(0.0343) (0.0300) (0.0384) (0.0372) (0.0326) (0.0322)
Constant 0.0377*** -0.3418 0.0862*** 0.0436 0.0283*** 0.4757***
(0.0083) (0.3955) (0.0136) (0.1726) (0.0045) (0.0689)
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,528 3,237 2,520 2,360 6,628 6,341
Adjusted R2 0.0056 0.3695 -0.0014 0.1025 0.0089 0.0903
The output for the control variables can be found in Table 7.3 in the appendix of this chapter.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.7 shows the results for Treatment B; women with less than high school
qualification and less than 30 years of age (< HS < 30). Again, these are compared
to the same controls as those seen in Table 3.6, with the age restriction lifted to
30. We find similar, and more significant results in this estimation in comparison
to Table 3.6. We find that depending on the control, belonging to the treatment
group could lead to a significant positive effect on fertility, but this effect reduces
or disappears in significance when controlling for demographics, although it mostly
remains positive. No significant time effects are observed and the interaction terms
between the treatment and time are also insignificant. Overall when it comes to
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Table 3.7: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment B: < HS < 30
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 30 Control 2 < HS ≥ 30 < 40 Control 3 < HS ≥ 30
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment τ 0.0384* -0.0513** 0.0319 0.0055 0.0837*** 0.0178
(0.0218) (0.0226) (0.0246) (0.0368) (0.0206) (0.0311)
2004 0.0038 -0.0049 -0.0089 -0.0145 -0.0016 -0.0014
(0.0119) (0.0110) (0.0202) (0.0207) (0.0057) (0.0058)
2005 -0.0058 -0.0089 0.0074 -0.0074 0.0021 0.0022
(0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0060) (0.0061)
2006 -0.0058 -0.0056 0.0267 0.0271 0.0047 0.0092
(0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0063) (0.0065)
2007 0.0041 -0.0050 0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0012 0.0031
(0.0117) (0.0108) (0.0228) (0.0242) (0.0061) (0.0062)
τ*2004 -0.0370 -0.0200 -0.0244 -0.0153 -0.0316 -0.0339
(0.0287) (0.0284) (0.0331) (0.0332) -0.0268 -0.0275
τ*2005 -0.0061 0.0159 -0.0192 0.0045 -0.014 -0.0161
(0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0354) (0.0361) -0.0285 -0.03
τ*2006 0.0046 0.0326 -0.0279 -0.0176 -0.0059 -0.0101
(0.0300) (0.0288) (0.0366) (0.0368) -0.0285 -0.0297
τ*2007 -0.0151 0.0141 -0.0133 -0.0050 -0.0098 -0.0168
(0.0303) (0.0289) (0.0361) (0.0363) -0.0286 -0.029
Constant 0.0659*** 0.1037 0.0725*** -0.0806 0.0207*** 0.2015***
(0.0082) (0.1624) (0.0140) (0.1181) -0.004 -0.0742
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,746 5,313 2,520 2,360 6,628 6,341
Adjusted R2 0.0010 0.2458 -0.0010 0.1021 0.0222 0.0840
The output for the control variables can be found in Table 7.4 in the appendix of this chapter.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
this specification of the difference-in-difference treatment category, controls (2) and
(3) are the closest representatives of an adequate control group for this treatment,
as the two specifications shown in Panel B and Panel C have consistent signs when
controlling for demographics.
The preliminary results for Treatment C are summarised in Table 3.8. In this case
we have much similar findings as seen in the previous preliminary results presented
in Table 3.7. This table shows that being in the treatment group almost always
results in an increase in the probability of having a child by approximately 4-8.5 per
cent, although this result is negatively significant in Panel A when demographics are
58
Table 3.8: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment C: < HS < 35
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 35 Control 2 < HS ≥ 35 < 40 Control 3 < HS ≥ 35
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment τ 0.0172 -0.0648*** 0.0693*** 0.0132 0.1012*** 0.0841***
(0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0213) (0.0339) (0.0163) (0.0216)
2004 -0.0019 -0.0090 -0.0041 -0.0132 0.0015 0.0010
(0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0200) (0.0222) (0.0041) (0.0044)
2005 -0.0105 -0.0098 0.0043 -0.0061 0.0030 0.0040
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0215) (0.0235) (0.0043) (0.0046)
2006 -0.0053 -0.0018 0.0304 0.0362 0.0049 0.0088*
(0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0256) (0.0277) (0.0046) (0.0050)
2007 0.0025 0.0001 0.0381 0.0450 0.0062 0.0102*
(0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0275) (0.0292) (0.0049) (0.0052)
τ*2004 -0.0258 -0.0075 -0.0236 -0.0128 -0.0292 -0.0307
(0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0296) (0.0309) (0.0221) (0.0226)
τ*2005 0.0066 0.0123 -0.0082 0.0010 -0.0069 -0.0141
(0.0258) (0.0267) (0.0317) (0.0336) (0.0237) (0.0249)
τ*2006 0.0096 0.0298 -0.0261 -0.0261 -0.0006 -0.0022
(0.0258) (0.0253) (0.0347) (0.0362) (0.0238) (0.0247)
τ*2007 -0.0250 -0.0061 -0.0606* -0.0711* -0.0288 -0.0362
(0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0357) (0.0367) (0.0232) (0.0236)
Constant 0.0921*** -0.0354 0.0400*** -0.1039 0.0081*** 0.0166
(0.0079) (0.0903) (0.0139) (0.1172) (0.0027) (0.0584)
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 8,347 7,799 2,520 2,360 6,628 6,341
Adjusted R2 -0.0003 0.1760 0.0055 0.1037 0.0461 0.0912
The output for the control variables can be found in Table 7.5 in the appendix of this chapter.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
included. This may be attributed to the control used; women with a higher level of
education have a tendency to delay child rearing (in the 30-40 year old age category).
We find that the treatment over time tends to be negative. We believe that the best
control for this specification would be Control (1) and (3): greater than high school,
less than 35 and less than high school, greater than 35. That is, in order to meet the
conditions for the use of DID we need the treatment and control groups to follow
similar trends pre policy, and in this case the controls do this effectively.
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Table 3.9: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment D: < HS < 40
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 40 Control 2 < HS ≥ 40 Control 3 ≥ HS ≥ 40
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Treatment τ -0.0064 -0.0635*** 0.0841*** 0.0543*** 0.0814*** 0.0428***
(0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0118) (0.0137)
2004 0.0014 -0.0049 0.0035 0.0033 0.0023 0.0015
(0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0031)
2005 -0.0041 -0.0030 0.0037 0.0055* -0.0002 0.0017
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0028)
2006 -0.0029 -0.0012 0.0015 0.0047 -0.0017 -0.0001
(0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0025)
2007 0.0059 0.0038 0.0017 0.0051* 0.0004 0.0015
(0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0028)
τ*2004 -0.0196 -0.0085 -0.0217 -0.0253 -0.0205 -0.0242
(0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0167)
τ*2005 0.0046 0.0054 -0.0032 -0.0137 0.0006 -0.0102
(0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0174) (0.0180)
τ*2006 0.0189 0.0357* 0.0145 0.0112 0.0177 0.0158
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0180) (0.0187)
τ*2007 -0.0068 0.0110 -0.0027 -0.0102 -0.0013 -0.0069
(0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0182)
Constant 0.0916*** -0.2424*** 0.0011 0.1132** 0.0039** 0.0976**
(0.0068) (0.0541) (0.0011) (0.0444) (0.0017) (0.0417)
Demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,280 10,634 6,628 6,341 9,282 8,923
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.1333 0.0475 0.0890 0.0513 0.0860
The output for the control variables can be found in Table 7.6 in the appendix of this chapter.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Finally, with respect to our preliminary analysis, the results for Treatment D
are reported in Table 3.9. This table shows that the coefficients for the treatment
are much more consistent with respect to the treatment variable in Panels B and
C of Table 3.8. This is logical as it compares people with a significant number
of individuals with incomplete fertility to those with complete fertility. We also
see positive time effects in Panel B from 2005 onwards, although the interaction
terms are not significant. Furthermore controls (2) and (3) show that the treatment
reduces by approximately half when controlling for demographics. Overall there is
an expected increase in the probability of having a child by 4-8% if a woman belongs
to the treatment category with reference to controls (2) and (3).
Now that we have a grasp on the preliminary results from estimation, we can
now estimate equation (2).
3.4.3 Native-Immigrant Difference-in-Difference
This section discuss the results of the three-way interaction DID to determine whether
there is a significant difference in the responses of immigrants in comparison to na-
tives, given the introduction of the baby bonus. The results are summarised in Table
3.10.
In this specification we find that an immigrant in the treatment group, is less
likely to have a child than a native in the treatment group. We can see this in the
interaction between immigrant status and the treatment variable, τi,t × Ii,t. This
is significant across Panel A, B and C, varying slightly in magnitude based on the
control group used in the regression. The effect is also strongest for Treatments B
and C, ranging between a 12 to 14 per cent decrease in the probability of having a
child, conditional on the covariates. We find that the treatment changes the sign and
significance several times across the alternative specifications. For example in Panel
C we find that for those individuals in Treatment C (low education and less than 35
years of age), have a higher probability of having a child in comparison to Control
(1), those individuals with the same level of education over the age of 35. But against
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those in Control (3), the results show that those women with a high level of education
in the same age category have a decreased probability of having a child. This result
is unsurprising, given that 35 years of age is bordering on completed fertility. An
individual over the age of 35 will have a child regardless of the incentives, as their
decision is based almost solely on other factors. Furthermore it was argued by the
Australian government that those under the age of 35 are considered the target group
as a whole, disregarding education levels (Martin et al., 2012).
Additionally, we find that the time effects given by the coefficients of the years
2004-2007 are as expected. We observe a decrease in the probability of having a child
on average, then increase over time. The two-way interaction of immigrant status
and 2004 results in an increased probability of having a child in most cases. However,
the coefficients for the time and immigrant dummies are far from consistent across
specifications. The same result is found when looking at the effect of belonging to
the treatment group over time.
Finally we come to the coefficient of interest (γ1, in equation (2)). This particular
coefficient is difficult to interpret due to the use of a triple interaction. This triple
interaction represents a two-way interaction that differs for each level of the third
interaction (in this case time). The coefficient indicates the response of an immigrant
in the treatment group over time in comparison to a native in the treatment group,
accounting for the difference between immigrants and natives in the control group
over the time period of 2003-2007. For example, the coefficient for the interaction
term in 2004 (Imm ∗ τ∗2004) shows the response of an immigrant in the treatment
group, compared to an native in the treatment group, accounting for the difference
in means for immigrants and natives in the control in 2004.24
24Refer to the appendix for the derivation of this interpretation.
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The coefficient of γ1 is consistently positive in all treatment-control combinations.
In particular, the results show that for Treatment A there is a positive significant
effect in 2007. Panel B shows a significant effect of being an immigrant in the
treatment group in 2004, 2006 and 2007 for various controls and a positive effect for
all other years. For example, in 2006, a female immigrant belonging to Treatment
B has a 28-34 per cent chance of having a baby, in comparison to an immigrant
in the control group. Similar results are seen in Panel A and Panel C. This is
quite a large effect and shows that immigrants do respond to the implementation of
monetary incentives in a significantly positive way. Additionally, there is a similar
effect for immigrants in Treatment C, although the size of the effect is much smaller
in comparison (between 16 and 18 per cent). This provides sufficient evidence that
immigrants respond in a different manner to policies such as the baby bonus when
the individual is a direct target for the policy.
3.4.4 Semiparametric Difference-in-Difference Results
To conduct the semiparametric estimation, we estimate the propensity scores to
scale the distribution of outcomes for the treated and untreated groups such that the
distribution of the covariates are the same for the treatment and control. To estimate
the propensity scores, we compare natives in the treatment group to natives in the
control and immigrants in the treatment to immigrants in the control. This will
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for the two categories
of treated individuals. We then compare the result for the ATT for immigrants and
natives.
The results of the propensity score matching method are summarised in Table
3.11. The table shows that the direction of the ATT is consistent across all treat-
ments, for each given control. From this table, it can be seen that the analogue of the
treatment selected based intuition, is actually the poorest with respect to adjusting
for bias for Treatments A, B and C. This negative coefficient can be attributed to
unobservable characteristics present in the young age category, which may not have
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been controlled for in the matching process. Additionally, this result may be driven
by the fact that, as age increases, the treatment analogue, which is used as a con-
trol, move towards their child bearing prime. Therefore it may not be considered a
relevant control for the higher age restrictions.
Using Controls (2) and (3) we find an overall positive effect across almost all
treatments. For those natives in Treatment A, there is an increased probability
of having a child by approximately 5.8 per cent in comparison to the natives in
Control (2). We see that this result is consistent with the findings for Treatment
B, although there is an increase in this probability as individuals move towards the
prime childbearing age (late 20’s early 30’s). Furthermore, a native in Treatment C
has a 6-9 per cent increased probability of having a child in comparison to Controls
(2) and (3). Treatment D shows a similar result to the other treatments. There is
roughly an 8% increase in the probability of having a child for an individual in this
treatment in comparison to natives for Controls (2) and (3). Again we attribute the
negative coefficients of control (1) to unobservables, which we have been unable to
condition upon in the matching process.
Finally, we compare the results for immigrants. We see that immigrants in the
treatment group have a higher probability of having a child if they are in the treat-
ment, than similar immigrants in the control group. For example an immigrant in
Treatment B is 6.55% more likely to have a baby, in comparison to an immigrant
in Control (2), which is highly significant. We also find that immigrant fertility is
higher at a younger age in compt Overall, the results for immigrants are similar to
that of natives in the same treatment category, but the magnitude tends to be larger
for immigrants. This provides more evidence that natives and immigrants differ with
respect to their response to the baby bonus.
The results in Table 3.11 are consistent with the DID results reported in Table
3.10 which showed an increase in the probability of immigrant fertility for those
immigrants in the treatment group compared to natives in the treatment group.
Propensity score matching based on immigrant status adjusts for any additional en-
65
Table 3.11: Propensity Score Results
Treatment A Treatment B
≥ HS < 25 < HS ≥ 25 < HS ≥ 25 ≥ HS < 30 < HS ≥ 30 < HS ≥ 30
< 40 < 40
Native -0.0160 0.0583*** 0.0696*** -0.0201 0.0655*** 0.0833***
(0.0233) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0196) (0.0141) (0.0112)
Immigrant -0.1200 0.0638 0.1176** -0.0581 0.0732 0.1047***
(0.1328) (0.0518) (0.0481) (0.0776) (0.0668) (0.0362)
Treatment C Treatment D
≥ HS < 35 < HS ≥ 35 < HS ≥ 35 ≥ HS < 40 < HS ≥ 40 ≥ HS > 40
< 40
Native -0.0397** 0.0587*** 0.0910*** -0.0467*** 0.08069*** 0.0812***
(0.0173) (0.0153) (0.0090) (0.0145) (0.0063) (0.0068)
Immigrant 0.0071 0.0806 0.0786*** 0.0871*** 0.0905*** -0.0124
(0.0610) (0.0548) (0.0267) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0451)
We do not include partner’s labour force status as a mating covariate as it causes failure in the convergence
of the propensity score distribution.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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dogeneity or bias that may be present due to observable characteristics, pooled across
years. However, if there are unobservables in this estimation, then propensity score
matching may result in incorrect estimates. Therefore, we use the propensity scores
derived above in a semiparametric estimation of the ATT, which will account for
these unobservables. The results for the semiparametric estimation are summarised
in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Semiparametric Difference-in-Difference
Treatment A Treatment B
≥ HS < 25 < HS ≥ 25 < HS ≥ 25 ≥ HS < 30 < HS ≥ 30 < HS ≥ 30
< 40 < 40
Native -0.0454 0.0583** 0.0878** -0.0553* 0.0447 0.0821***
(0.0398) (0.0285) (0.0291) (0.0322) (0.0279) (0.0237)
Immigrant 0.1900 0.2760 0.2481 0.0965 0.1639 0.1377
(0.1435) (0.1920) (0.1748) (0.0672) (0.1140) (0.0970)
Treatment C Treatment D
≥ HS < 35 < HS ≥ 35 < HS ≥ 35 ≥ HS < 40 < HS ≥ 40 ≥ HS > 40
< 40
Native -0.0469** 0.0231 0.0739*** 0.0747*** 0.0837*** -0.0551***
(0.0238) (0.0300) (0.0190) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0213)
Immigrant -0.0509 0.0964 0.0826 0.0405 0.0489 -0.0517
(0.0624) (0.0671) (0.0582) (0.0296) (0.0344) (0.0394)
Estimated over the time preiod of 2003-2007
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The semiparametric estimation shows there is a general positive probability of
having a child for both immigrant and native women. However, Control (1) switches
sign as the treatment age restriction increases. For Treatment A, the probability of
having a child is substantially higher for immigrant women than for native women,
although insignificant across all three estimations. Treatment A provides evidence
that those women responding to the implementation of the baby bonus are young
adults and have a low level of human capital. This result is consistent with the
findings in Martin et al. (2012).
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The results for Treatment B are similar to the findings of Treatment A, but
smaller in magnitude. We find the probability of having a child decreases against
controls (2) and (3), as we broaden the sample of the treatment group. Again in
Treatment C we see that controls (2) and (3) is higher for immigrants than their
native counterparts. The results for Treatment D are mixed, but are not concerning
as this treatment was included for the purpose of covering the population of possible
women with incomplete fertility. As it is highly unlikely for many women to give
birth in their very late 30’s, therefore these estimates may be biased downwards,
especially since treatments A, B and C show very similar outcomes. Overall we find
that the probability of having a child is higher for immigrant women in the treatment
then their counterparts in the control.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study investigated the effects of monetary incentives on fertility such as the
‘baby bonus’ in a natural experimental setting using the HILDA. The difference-in-
difference and semiparametric DID methodologies applied in this setting allows for
the examination of revealed preferences for child bearing for Australian women. The
main finding of this study is the observed increase in fertility for women with low
levels of human capital when governments provide once off monetary payments for
child bearing.
Overall we find a positive effect of the baby bonus on fertility. This effect is par-
ticularly significant in 2007 for those in the Treatment A. For Treatment B and C, we
find a significant effect over 2006 and 2007. The effect is strongest for Treatment B,
in which individuals are in their childbearing prime. We also find in the years where
major revisions were undertaken the response was stronger. This time effect may be
a result of these subsequent revisions of the baby bonus, resulting in an increase in
the observed threshold. Furthermore, the delayed increase may be attributed to the
amount of time it takes for fertility decisions to adjust over time. Using propensity
score matching, we find similar results for individuals belonging to the treatment
group. We observe a decrease in the probability of having a child on average, then
increase over time.
We find evidence to suggest that the response of immigrants and natives to the
baby bonus is different. The effect is larger for immigrants in the treatment, increas-
ing the probability of having a child by 7-10 per cent in comparison to immigrants in
the control for Treatment B when implementing propensity score matching. Similar
results are found for natives between 6-8 per cent. When applying a semi-parametric
analysis we find these numbers at least double for immigrant women. We also find
that immigrant women have an increased probability of having a child given the baby
bonus if they are in the treatment group than that of native women, although this
result is insignificant. Additionally these findings support the theory developed in
Section 3.2.
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From this we can conclude that the Australian government’s implementation of
the baby bonus was successful in increasing the fertility rate of those most likely
to receive the bonus: women with a low level of human capital. This is especially
true for women in the immigrant category with low levels of human capital. As can
be seen from the data, we can infer that the policy was effective in improving the
fertility rate at the individual level for those residing in Australia. This result is
consistent with previous findings in the literature in the context of Australia.
However, the empirical results of this study suggest that this increase in fertility
associated with the implementation of the baby bonus was driven by an increase in
fertility for women with low levels of human capital. Whether these women were the
intended target of the policy is unclear. Therefore policymakers need to consider the
groups who may respond to incentives when devising population policies.
Additionally, it has been suggested that the overall increase in the fertility rate
is may not be a reflection of the increased child bearing of women with a low level of
human capital, but a reflection of the change in social preferences and this observed
increase is due to other factors other than the baby bonus. There has been a long
term trend towards postponement of children for many women as education levels
increased over time. This may have resulted in the initial decrease in the total fertility
rate. As the cohort of well-educated Australian women is getting older we are finding
a correction for that as previously postponed births are now being born. However,
the development of our treatment and control groups in this analysis confirms the
role of the bonus in increasing the total fertility rate as both women with both high
and low levels of human capital respond to the implementation of the bonus, however
the effect is strongest for those with lower education levels.
As the implementation of this bonus incentivised women with low levels of human
capital to have children, it raises the question on whether this effect was intentional.
The overall result did improve the total fertility rate, however it may be suggested
that the subsequent removal and implementation of the paid parental leave system
may have been a result of this observed increase in fertility for women with low levels
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of human capital. The current paid parental leave system, which replace the bonus,
is aimed at working women, as it is only available to those who are employed. This
change in policies has been actively been debated within Australia for many years as
women with a high level of education are more likely to postpone child bearing and
rearing. The governments paid parental leave system may be an effort to incentivise
working women as those women with a high level of education are more likely to
return to work earlier than women with a low level of education. Providing adequate
incentives to these women can contribute in a positive manner to the total fertility
rate and the economy as a whole.
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Chapter 4 Study 2: Employment In-
stability and Fertility in Australia
4.1 Introduction
Economic and social conditions impact on the decision to bear children; however, the
exact relationship is still indeterminate due to the complexity of the fertility deci-
sion. Classical economic theory suggests that a counter-cyclical relationship between
fertility and unemployment rates should be expected. That is during times of high
unemployment, women should have more children as opportunity costs are low (see
Adsera & Menendez, 2009; Sobotka et al., 2011). With the exception of some Eu-
ropean countries, which experience low levels of female participation in the labour
force, this is not generally observed. Recent evidence shows that most developed
countries exhibit a pro-cyclical relationship between fertility and unemployment.
That is, when more people are employed, women are more likely to have children.
Whilst this pro-cyclical relationship is seen in Australia, very little work has been
done on the individual level of unemployment and the effects on the fertility decision.
Recent studies have focused on the effect of employment uncertainty on the deci-
sion to bear children. Studies have not adequately developed a reason for the reversal
of the relationship between unemployment and fertility observed in many developed
countries (Castles, 2003; Kogel, 2004).
While there are a few key papers that explore this relationship between stability
and fertility, it has not been investigated in the context of the Australian econ-
omy (see for example Schmidt, 2008; Hondroyiannis, 2010; Santarelli, 2011; Vignoli
et al., 2012; Kreyenfeld et al., 2012). This study aims to provide evidence of the
pro-cyclical relationship between fertility and unemployment within Australia us-
ing novel econometric techniques. Australia may provide an interesting case study
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as it has a relatively high female labour force participation rate, whilst being con-
sidered a welfare state (Castles, 2001). Moreover, studies that link unemployment
to the fertility decision in an Australian context use hazard ratio models (Fan &
Maitra, 2010). However, these models do not consider the endogenous relationship
of fertility and unemployment present in the interaction between fertility and labour
market participation, which this study aims to test. We explore this endogenous
relationship; however we argue that it is not the level of employment that matters in
the childbearing decision, but the stability of a woman’s job or employability. The
literature suggests that if unemployment is relatively high or employment consists
predominantly of temporary contract jobs, and fertility rates tend to be low, indi-
cating the importance of the economic stability of an individual contributes to the
fertility decision (Adsera, 2004; Santarelli, 2011; Kreyenfeld et al., 2012). Therefore,
the stability of potential parent’s employment contributes significantly to the fertility
decision.
Del Bono et al. (2011) show that the reduction in fertility is not due to the income
loss generated by unemployment, but arises because displaced workers undergo a
career interruption, resulting in a significant loss of job specific human capital. It has
been suggested that the birth of a child also reduces the accumulation of job specific
human capital. Therefore, the fertility decision is strongly tied to the impression of
career interruption or job stability, such that it creates a disincentive for women with
high education or qualifications to have children.
This study aims to explore the issue of employment stability and job displace-
ment on the fertility decision of Australian women using the Household, Income and
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. At present, the literature has not
developed a clear and adequate explanation for why there has been a shift towards
the pro-cyclical theory of fertility and why there is an increasing emphasis on the im-
portance of employment stability and job security in the child bearing decision. This
study aims to provide evidence in support of pro-cyclical fertility and stability in the
Australian context. Due to the endogenous nature of fertility, we will use instrumen-
73
tal variables and propensity score matching methods in our analysis. Furthermore,
we take into account heterogeneity in age through the use of stratified propensity
score matching, as the fertility decision varies significantly based on the age of the
individual. Finally, we add to the literature through a comparison of employment
stability and fertility for the immigrant and native subpopulations in the HILDA.
4.2 Methodology
The relationship we want to estimate can be expressed as
Fi = β0 + β1Unemployed+ βiXi + i (1)
where Fi is fertility and is defined as a life event, for which the response is 1 for having
a child in a given year and 0 for not having a child in a given year. Xi is a vector of
individual characteristics including age, age squared, number of children, relationship
status, religion, educational qualification, occupation and partner’s education and
labour force status. Our analysis is restricted to females who are active in the labour
force. Unemployment is defined as a binary variable given by the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) definition of employment status, this restricts the sample to those
who class themselves as employed or unemployed and actively seeking work.25
As it is unlikely that unemployment has an exogenous impact on fertility, we use
two techniques to address the endogenous relationship between fertility and unem-
ployment: instrumental variables (IV) and propensity score matching (PSM). We
also investigate the issue of employment instability, which we believe is the true
driver of the fertility decision. We do this by replacing unemployment with a self-
assessed indicator for job security in equation (1). Stability is given by a question
that asks how secure an individual believes their job is on a 7-point scale.26 PSM
25Those individuals who class themselves as ‘Not in the Labour Force (NILF)’ are excluded to
keep the dependent variable binary. These individuals, by definition are not actively seeking work.
26Participants in the HILDA survey are asked to rate the statement ”I have a secure future in
my job” on a scale from 1-7 where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 is Strongly Agree.
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requires a binary variable for stability to explore treatment effects. Therefore, we
use the job security survey response to define an individual who considers herself in
a stable job as one who responds at the high end of the scale between 4-7.27 These
individuals receive a 1 for job stability. Those who answer in the 1-3 point response
are considered to be in an unstable job and are given a 0.
4.2.1 Instrumental Variables
The relationship between fertility and unemployment is endogenous in nature. This
poses two main questions; (1) Do people leave the workforce (become unemployed)
in order to have a child? or (2) Are they already unemployed and therefore more
willing to have a child? Consequently, we need to use an adequate instrument that
is correlated with the unemployment outcome, but is uncorrelated with the outcome
of fertility, making the instrument exogenous to the model, and relevant.
We employ instrumental variables to address this issue of endogeneity in the
fertility decision by estimating a first stage regression using an instrument (Zi) which
is correlated with unemployment but uncorrelated with the fertility outcome.
̂Unemployedi = α + γZi + βXi + νi (2)
We then use the predicted value from the above equation to estimate the second
stage regression
Fi = β0 + β1 ̂Unemployedi + βiXi + i (3)
In economics, the lagged value of a variable is often used as an instrumental
variable. Hence, we begin this analysis with lagged unemployment status as a starting
point. However, lagged unemployment may not be an adequate instrument as periods
of unemployment are highly correlated over time. This may be a problem if we
27Points 4-7 represents those who consider their job as secure to very secure (somewhat agree to
strongly agree with the statement).
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believe unemployment to be endogenous to the analysis. Therefore using the lag of
unemployment as an instrument may not be valid, as it may be correlated with the
error term. Furthermore, as fertility decisions are made over a significantly long time
period, the relationship between fertility and lagged unemployment may be dynamic
over this time period. Therefore we expect the use of lagged unemployment to reduce
the potential bias from the endogeneity issue, but not eliminate it completely. We
therefore use a second, more stringent instrument for our analysis.
Del Bono et al. (2011) recommended job displacement from firm closure as an
instrument for unemployment. Job displacement is exogenous to the unemployment
decision as unemployment is forced onto the individual by the firm. The HILDA does
not track firm closure; hence we are unable to track displaced workers in this manner.
However, the HILDA reports information on significant life events including whether
an individual was made redundant in a given year. We consider forced redundancy,
an exogenous shock to unemployment, and therefore use it as our second and most
important instrument for our analysis.28
We compare the result from using both instruments. We expect that using lagged
unemployment may result in higher coefficient estimates on unemployment than re-
dundancy. We estimate the relationship between fertility and unemployment using
OLS in a pooled and panel framework for comparison. We report the robust stan-
dard errors for the OLS and we cluster on the person identification for the panel
estimations.
4.2.2 Propensity Score Matching
The motivation for the use of propensity score matching arises from the need to
adjust for selection effects, driven by underlying differences in those women who
choose to have a child as a result of being unemployed and those who choose to
have a child given they are employed. Propensity score matching allows us to adjust
28The HILDA allows for the extrapolation of forced redundancy from all redundancy as the
follow-up to the redundancy question is one on whether the redundancy was voluntary.
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the estimates for these differences based on observable characteristics, identify the
treatment effect and reduce potential bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). One of the
advantages of propensity score matching is the reduction in curse of dimensionality.
We match individuals on observed control variables including age, gender, number of
children, marital status, educational qualifications, partner’s labour force status and
religion (see Lehrer, 1996; Van de Kaa, 1996). The simplified version of the original
model can be expressed as:
Fi = βXi + i (4)
where Fi is the binary variable, for having a child. Xi are the control variables used
for matching. We know that:
E(Fi) = 1× Pr(Fi) + 0× Pr(Fi = 0) = Pr(Fi = 1) (5)
Letting Pi = Pr(Fi = 1) and 1− Pi = Pr(Fi = 0) then we can express this as
E(Fi) = 1× Pi + 0× (1− Pi) = Pi (6)
and thus
Pr(Fi = 1|x1,i, x2,i, x3,i, . . . xk,i) = βxi (7)
We need to obtain the difference between the outcomes of having a child on the
unemployment status of the parent, where unemployment is indicated as ui = 1 and
zero otherwise. Defining the choice of the individual to have a child and not have a
child as F 1i and F
0
i respectively. In order to find the treatment on the treated given
as:
E(F 1i − F 0i |ui = 1) (8)
The counterfactual, E(F 0i |ui = 1) is not observed. What is realised in the data is
that the individual does not choose to become unemployed, that is we can ascertain
when an individual remains employed, E(F 0i |ui = 0).
Following this process we then use the conditional independence of those who are
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unemployed and the counterfactual (E(F 0i |ui = 1)). This allows us to then estimate
the parameter of interest, expressed as:
E(F 1i |Xi, ui = 1)− E(F 0i |Xi, ui = 0) (9)
By using propensity scores that are obtained through the matching on Xi, we obtain
a difference between the means of treatment group and those who are not subject to
treatment. This is the difference in fertility for those who decide have a child as a
result of unemployment.
We apply the same method described above to test the hypothesis that em-
ployment instability, in this case measured by self-assessed job stability, contributes
significantly to the fertility decision. Furthermore to analyse the robustness of these
results we use our exogenous variable, redundancy, as a treatment in the propensity
score matching method. This will allow us to see the outcome of an exogenous shock
to unemployment on the fertility outcomes of individuals (see Eliason & Storrie,
2006). For this application of PSM, we use a logit model to estimate the average
treatment on the treated (ATT).
4.3 Data
For this study, we use the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) Survey. The HILDA is a panel survey, which follows a cohort of individuals
from 2001 to 2011. Resampling is conducted only in 2011. We look at women who
are within working age (16-65) over all waves 2002-2011.29 We use Panelwhiz (see
Haisken-DeNew & Hahn, 2010) in conjunction with Stata 12 for our analysis.
The methodology we have selected restricts our sample to women in the labour
force, due to the need for a binary outcome measure or treatment to implement
propensity score matching. We select the control covariates based on the existing
fertility literature. These include, age, age squared, relationship status, education,
292001 was not included in the analysis as we create lagged variables. Therefore we lose a year
of the survey.
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occupation (or prior occupation if unemployed), partner’s education, partner’s labour
force status and religion. The description of the variables we include in our analysis
can be found in Table 4.1.
Our dependent variable is a binary measure of fertility. Fertility is defined as a
life event response from the survey, which specifically asks if the individual had a
child in a given year. We keep only observations that have no missing values for the
variables of interest and covariates. As there are a significant number of responses
with no partner data recorded, if the partner’s data is missing for either education or
labour force status we allocate that observation to an additional “missing” category
to capture any additional information on single households. If information is missing
for the woman’s age, relationship status, education, occupation, or religious response,
the observation is dropped. to balance the sample. In total the sample consists
of 30,435 observations for the analysis of unemployment and 27,990 observations
for stability. Descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 4.2. Additionally, we
report the descriptive statistics for both the employed and unemployed subsamples,
as well as the differences in means. From this table we can see that a woman has
slightly above a two percent probability of having a child across the sample, and
the probability of being unemployed is 4.2%. The unconditional level of fertility is
not significantly different between employed and unemployed women. The average
woman in the sample also has 1.4 children, which is low in comparison to the average
reported by the ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). However, those women
who are employed have 1.45 children compared to the 1.3 for unemployed women.
This is a statistically significant difference at a 5% level.
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Table 4.1: Variable Description
Variable Type Description
Fertility Binary Had a baby that year. (0) No (reference), (1) Yes.
Unemployment Binary ABS LFS Definition (0) Employed, (1) Unemployed.
Stability Binary I have a secure future in my job (0) No, (1) Yes.
Age Continuous Age of the mother.
Age Squared Continuous Age of the mother squared.
Marriage Binary Married or Defacto (0) No (reference) (1) Yes.
No. of Children Continuous Number of children the woman already has.
Status & (3) Not in labour force.
Education Dummy (1) Postgrad, (2) Grad Diploma/Certificate, (3) Bachelor or
honours, (4) Diploma, (5) Cert III or IV, (6) Cert I or II
(7) Cert Other, (8) Year 12 (reference) (9) Year 11 and below.
Occupation Dummy (1) Managers (reference), (2) Professionals, (3)Technicians
and Trades Workers, (4) Community and Personal Services
(5) Sales Workers, (6) Clerical and Administrative Workers
(7) Machinery Operators and Drivers, (8) Labourers, (9) Missing
Partners Dummy Employment (1) Employed (reference) (2) Unemployed
Emp Status & (3) Not in labour force, (4) No Partner LFS Reported
Partners Dummy (1) Postgrad, (2) Grad Diploma/Certificate, (3) Bachelor or
Education honours, (4) Diploma, (5) Cert III or IV, (6) Cert I or II
(7) Cert Other, (8) Year 12 (reference) (8) Year 11 and below.
Religion Dummy Religion of mother. (1) Judeo-Christian (reference) (2) Buddhism
(3) Hinduism (4) Islam (5) Judaism (6) Other Religion
(7) No Religion
Immigrant Binary Immigrant status by country of birth (0) Native, (1) Immigrant.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Pooled Employed Unemployed Mean
Difference
Fertility 0.024 0.024 0.032 -0.008
(0.153) (0.152) (0.176) (0.004)
Unemployed 0.042 0.000 1.000 -1.000
(0.201) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Security 0.842 0.842 0.542 0.301***
(0.365) (0.364) (0.502) (0.043)
General Covariates
Age 39.237 39.499 33.278 6.221***
(12.822) (12.735) (13.343) (0.364)
Agesq 1703.968 1722.364 1285.308 437.056***
(1009.422) (1006.798) (978.319) (28.708)
No children 1.438 1.446 1.260 0.186***
(1.386) (1.379) (1.524) (0.040)
Immigrant 0.181 0.181 0.184 -0.003
(0.385) (0.385) (0.388) (0.011)
Single 0.357 0.348 0.568 -0.220***
(0.479) (0.476) (0.496) (0.014)
Married 0.492 0.502 0.273 0.229***
(0.500) (0.500) (0.446) (0.014)
Defacto 0.151 0.150 0.158 -0.008
(0.358) (0.357) (0.365) (0.010)
Educational Qualification
Postgrad 0.040 0.041 0.019 0.022***
(0.196) (0.198) (0.136) (0.006)
Grad Diploma, Grad Cert 0.079 0.082 0.022 0.060***
(0.270) (0.274) (0.146) (0.008)
Bachelors or Honours 0.178 0.182 0.084 0.098***
(0.383) (0.386) (0.278) (0.011)
Adv Diploma, Diploma 0.101 0.103 0.057 0.046***
(0.302) (0.304) (0.232) (0.009)
Cert III or IV 0.155 0.154 0.176 -0.022*
(0.361) (0.361) (0.381) (0.010)
Cert I or II 0.014 0.014 0.030 -0.017***
(0.119) (0.116) (0.172) (0.003)
Cert not defined 0.005 0.004 0.016 -0.012***
(0.069) (0.065) (0.127) (0.002)
High School (reference) 0.182 0.181 0.212 -0.031**
(0.386) (0.385) (0.409) (0.011)
Year 11 and below 0.245 0.239 0.383 -0.144***
(0.430) (0.427) (0.486) (0.012)
Occupation*
Managers 0.091 0.094 0.007 0.087***
(0.287) (0.292) (0.084) (0.008)
Professionals 0.266 0.277 0.027 0.249***
(0.442) (0.447) (0.163) (0.013)
Technicians and Trades Workers 0.039 0.041 0.009 0.031***
(0.194) (0.197) (0.096) (0.006)
Community and Personal Service Workers 0.142 0.146 0.045 0.101***
(0.349) (0.353) (0.208) (0.010)
Clerical and Administrative Workers 0.234 0.242 0.061 0.181***
(0.423) (0.428) (0.239) (0.012)
Sales Workers 0.119 0.121 0.066 0.055***
(0.324) (0.326) (0.249) (0.009)
Machinery Operators and Drivers 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.009**
(0.102) (0.104) (0.048) (0.003)
Labourers 0.068 0.069 0.059 0.010
(0.252) (0.253) (0.235) (0.007)
Refused occupation response 0.031 0.000 0.723 -0.723***
(0.173) (0.019) (0.448) (0.003)
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics Cont.
Variable Pooled Employed Unemployed Mean
Difference
Partner’s Educational Qualification
Postgrad 0.034 0.035 0.014 0.021***
(0.182) (0.184) (0.118) (0.005)
Grad diploma, grad certificate 0.037 0.037 0.014 0.023***
(0.188) (0.190) (0.118) (0.005)
Bachelor or honours 0.093 0.095 0.037 0.058***
(0.290) (0.293) (0.190) (0.008)
Adv diploma, diploma 0.060 0.062 0.034 0.027***
(0.238) (0.240) (0.182) (0.007)
Cert III or IV 0.181 0.183 0.123 0.060***
(0.385) (0.387) (0.329) (0.011)
Cert I or II 0.006 0.005 0.013 -0.008***
(0.074) (0.072) (0.114) (0.002)
Cert not defined 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.002
(0.040) (0.040) (0.056) (0.001)
High School 0.540 0.550 0.307 0.243***
(0.498) (0.498) (0.461) (0.014)
Year 11 and below 0.112 0.111 0.129 -0.018*
(0.315) (0.314) (0.335) (0.009)
Partner Education Not Reported 0.414 0.406 0.601 -0.195***
(0.493) (0.491) (0.490) (0.014)
Partner’s LFS
Employed 0.062 0.064 0.030 0.033***
(0.242) (0.245) (0.172) (0.007)
Unemployed 0.010 0.008 0.042 -0.034***
(0.097) (0.090) (0.201) (0.003)
Not in LF 0.037 0.036 0.050 -0.014**
(0.188) (0.186) (0.218) (0.005)
No Partner LFS Reported 0.414 0.406 0.601 -0.195***
(0.493) (0.491) (0.490) (0.014)
Religion
Judeo-Christian (reference) 0.628 0.632 0.549 0.083***
-0.483 -0.482 -0.498 -0.014
Buddhism 0.018 0.018 0.012 0.007
(0.133) (0.134) (0.108) (0.004)
Hinduism 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.071) (0.071) (0.074) (0.002)
Islam 0.005 0.005 0.016 -0.011***
(0.073) (0.070) (0.124) (0.002)
Judaism 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.000
(0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.002)
Other religion 0.014 0.014 0.031 -0.018***
(0.119) (0.116) (0.174) (0.003)
No religion 0.283 0.281 0.319 -0.037**
(0.450) (0.450) (0.466) (0.013)
Refused religious response 0.043 0.042 0.065 -0.023***
(0.202) (0.200) (0.246) (0.006)
Observations 30435 29154 1281 30435
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
NOTE: Occupation is derived from current occupation for women who are employed. For women
who are unemployed, the occupation response comes from the previous occupation before
unemployment occurred.
82
The mean differences for education are statistically significant across all levels of
education. A woman in the sample has an 18.2% chance of having a high school
level of education. Moreover, unemployed women are 21.2% more likely to have a
high school level of education, which is 3.1% more than women who are employed.
Furthermore, significantly more employed women have a professional occupation.30
Religious affiliation leans strongly towards Judeo-Christian religions, which account
for 63% of religious affiliations.
30Compared to the response for unemployed women who listed their previous occupation in this
variable.
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4.4 Results
The results for our initial fertility regressions can be found in Table 4.3. Specification
(1) reports the pooled OLS regression results. Specification (2) and (3) report the
fixed and random effects panel models. The random effects model assumes that
individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables within
the model. Alternatively, the fixed effect model relaxes this assumption, allowing
individual specific effect to be correlated with the independent variables within the
regression model. Both models allow for unobserved heterogeneity which is not
accounted for in the pooled regressions.
These results suggest a married woman has a 1.5-6 percent increased probability
of having a child compared to a single woman. A similar result is found for those
individuals in a de-facto relationship. The coefficient on the number of children is
positive and significant. This suggests, if the woman already has a child it becomes
less likely that she will have another child in the future. Education also plays an
important role in the fertility decision. We find that women who have an qualifica-
tion greater than an advanced diploma have a positive and statistically significant
probability of having a child in comparison to women who have a high school level
of education. This is finding is similar across the unemployment and stability speci-
fications, however the coefficients in the stability specification are smaller than those
reported in the unemployment specification. Furthermore, religion does not play a
significant effect overall in any of the specifications.
More importantly, unemployment is shown to have a significantly negative effect
on the probability of having a child in all 3 specifications. Unemployment results in
a 1-1.7% decreased in the probability of having a child, which is as expected. Addi-
tionally, in the stability model we find the opposite significant relationship suggesting
the job stability results in a positive effect on the probability of having a child, but
the magnitude is much smaller. The magnitude for both unemployment is slightly
larger than stability. However, these results do not give us an adequate idea of the
relationship between unemployment and fertility, due to the endogeneity issue going
unaddressed in the simple OLS and panel specifications in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Impact of Unemployment and Stability on Fertility
Dependent variable is fertility
Unemployment Stability
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Unemployed -0.0109** -0.0174** -0.0109**
(0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0052)
Stability 0.0057*** 0.0067** 0.0056***
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0020)
General Covariates
Age -0.0010** -0.0187*** -0.0017*** -0.0010*** -0.0173*** -0.0014***
(0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0004)
AgeSq -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** 0.0001*** -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0181*** 0.0556*** 0.0203*** 0.0146*** 0.0420*** 0.0158***
(0.0037) (0.0086) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0084) (0.0040)
Defacto 0.0196*** 0.0289*** 0.0177*** 0.0202*** 0.0286*** 0.0190***
(0.0040) (0.0067) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0067) (0.0041)
No.Children 0.0123*** 0.1468*** 0.0173*** 0.0110*** 0.1372*** 0.0141***
(0.0008) (0.0118) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0095) (0.0010)
Educational Qualification
Postgrad 0.0261*** 0.0752*** 0.0341*** 0.0248*** 0.0598*** 0.0292***
(0.0060) (0.0192) (0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0179) (0.0070)
Grad diploma, grad certificate 0.0180*** 0.0568*** 0.0218*** 0.0129*** 0.0532*** 0.0152***
(0.0046) (0.0128) (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0131) (0.0048)
Bachelor or honours 0.0165*** 0.0329*** 0.0172*** 0.0127*** 0.0315*** 0.0135***
(0.0035) (0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0060) (0.0036)
Adv diploma, diploma 0.0150*** 0.0234*** 0.0171*** 0.0113*** 0.0192*** 0.0127***
(0.0038) (0.0069) (0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0054) (0.0040)
Cert III or IV 0.0031 -0.0006 0.0024 0.0033 0.0015 0.0024
(0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0068) (0.0031)
Cert I or II -0.0050 -0.0188 -0.0053 -0.0040 -0.0122 -0.0049
(0.0059) (0.0257) (0.0078) (0.0056) (0.0234) (0.0068)
Cert not defined -0.0017 0.0470 0.0043 0.0007 0.0765 0.0030
(0.0118) (0.0630) (0.0194) (0.0112) (0.0731) (0.0178)
Year 11 and below -0.0062*** -0.0292*** -0.0079*** -0.0046** -0.0233*** -0.0057**
(0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0024)
Occupation
Managers 0.0049 -0.0041 0.0032 0.0054 -0.0058 0.0035
(0.0041) (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0074) (0.0045)
Professionals 0.0025 -0.0063 0.0015 0.0029 -0.0050 0.0020
(0.0037) (0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0068) (0.0040)
Technicians and Trades Workers 0.0099* -0.0041 0.0079 0.0114** 0.0001 0.0100*
(0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0082) (0.0057)
Community and Personal Service Workers -0.0008 -0.0034 -0.0015 0.0002 -0.0062 -0.0009
(0.0035) (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0060) (0.0037)
Sales Workers 0.0019 -0.0081 0.0007 0.0010 -0.0087 0.0002
(0.0032) (0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0064) (0.0035)
Clerical and Administrative Workers -0.0030 -0.0065 -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0062 -0.0022
(0.0036) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0039)
Machinery Operators and Drivers 0.0068 0.0143 0.0090 0.0059 0.0141 0.0078
(0.0079) (0.0132) (0.0088) (0.0076) (0.0134) (0.0081)
Missing/Refused Occupational Response 0.0319*** 0.0279*** 0.0323*** 0.0203 0.0276 0.0205
(0.0083) (0.0108) (0.0088) (0.0247) (0.0329) (0.0252)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.3: Impact of Unemployment and Stability on Fertility Cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Unemployment Stability
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Partner’s Educational Qualification
Postgrad -0.0115 -0.0300 -0.0125 -0.0078 0.0001 -0.0072
(0.0083) (0.0246) (0.0091) (0.0078) (0.0234) (0.0085)
Grad diploma, grad certificate -0.0244*** -0.0250 -0.0228** -0.0163** 0.0046 -0.0131
(0.0076) (0.0187) (0.0090) (0.0072) (0.0158) (0.0083)
Bachelor or honours -0.0187*** -0.0173 -0.0191*** -0.0143** -0.0108 -0.0144**
(0.0065) (0.0152) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0115) (0.0065)
Adv diploma, diploma -0.0153** 0.0057 -0.0140* -0.0108* 0.0222 -0.0086
(0.0069) (0.0179) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0147) (0.0071)
Cert III or IV -0.0227*** -0.0014 -0.0212*** -0.0165*** 0.0152 -0.0145**
(0.0058) (0.0148) (0.0065) (0.0055) (0.0116) (0.0058)
Cert I or II -0.0075 0.0174 -0.0083 -0.0031 0.0266 -0.0025
(0.0168) (0.0479) (0.0228) (0.0170) (0.0477) (0.0221)
Cert not defined -0.0050 -0.0148 -0.0045 -0.0320*** -0.0950** -0.0395***
(0.0268) (0.0954) (0.0334) (0.0060) (0.0465) (0.0110)
Year 11 and below -0.0220*** 0.0165 -0.0182*** -0.0166*** 0.0344** -0.0131**
(0.0059) (0.0169) (0.0068) (0.0055) (0.0149) (0.0061)
No Partner Info -0.0664*** -0.0198 -0.0656*** -0.0576*** -0.0092 -0.0563***
(0.0142) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0117) (0.0164) (0.0148)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0078 -0.0072 -0.0054 -0.0088 -0.0067 -0.0076
(0.0097) (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0088)
Not in LF 0.0013 0.0100 0.0031 0.0023 0.0087 0.0033
(0.0045) (0.0085) (0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0085) (0.0050)
No Partner Info 0.0334** 0.0094 0.0341* 0.0340*** 0.0141 0.0345**
(0.0137) (0.0148) (0.0190) (0.0111) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Religion
Buddisim -0.0028 -0.0112 -0.0004 -0.0053 -0.0175 -0.0045
(0.0059) (0.0150) (0.0069) (0.0049) (0.0129) (0.0054)
Hinduism -0.0055 0.0653 0.0055 -0.0074 0.0824 0.0001
(0.0136) (0.0591) (0.0182) (0.0122) (0.0719) (0.0170)
Judaism -0.0143 -0.1221 -0.0155 -0.0161 0.0051 -0.0184**
(0.0121) (0.1311) (0.0131) (0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0086)
Islam -0.0111 0.0065 -0.0104 -0.0060 0.0111 -0.0059
(0.0093) (0.0112) (0.0089) (0.0100) (0.0088) (0.0087)
Other Religion -0.0141*** -0.0205 -0.0146*** -0.0083* -0.0098 -0.0081
(0.0043) (0.0144) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0110) (0.0052)
No Religion -0.0042** -0.0016 -0.0033 -0.0028 0.0011 -0.0021
(0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0021)
Refused Religious Response -0.0078* -0.0041 -0.0076* -0.0056 -0.0022 -0.0057
(0.0041) (0.0068) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0040)
Constant 0.0780*** 0.2611*** 0.0882*** 0.0593*** 0.2189*** 0.0648***
(0.0101) (0.0461) (0.0113) (0.0098) (0.0412) (0.0107)
Observations 30,435 30,435 30,435 27,990 27,990 27,990
R-squared 0.0387 0.0738 0.0320 0.0688
Number of HH 5,941 5,941 5,646 5,646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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The results of the instrumental variables methodology are summarised in Table
4.4 & Table 4.5. There are three reported models; the first reports the IV regression
results using lagged unemployment as the instrument, the second table reports the
results using redundancy and the third uses both instruments in the estimation.31
As shown in Table 4.4 using lagged unemployment results in a large variance be-
tween the fixed effects and random effects specifications where the coefficient on the
fixed effects is almost triple the coefficient found using random effects. The coeffi-
cient for the pooled OLS model is very similar to the random effects model. The
lagged unemployment instrument implies a significant negative relationship between
unemployment and the fertility decision. Again we find similar outcomes for other
explanatory covariates as seen in the linear probability model in Table 4.3.
When using redundancy as the instrumental variable in the regression, we find
a somewhat similar result to the coefficients reported in the specification where we
instrument unemployment with lagged unemployment. Although, the use of redun-
dancy as an instrument resulted in the coefficient on unemployment being insignif-
icant. We also note that the that the coefficients in the redundancy estimation are
not as large as the specification instrumenting with lagged unemployment. This may
be due to the high correlation between unemployment and lagged unemployment.
When using both instrumental variables in the analysis does provide similar results
as the other two specifications. Therefore, we can observe that unemployment has a
significant negative effect on the probability of having a child.
31The First stage regressions can be found in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 in the appendix of this
chapter.
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Table 4.4: Unemployment IV Estimation
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployed -0.0805*** -0.2250*** -0.0852*** -0.0697 -0.0048 -0.0482 -0.0785*** -0.1197*** -0.0776***
(0.0188) (0.0624) (0.0237) (0.0432) (0.0661) (0.0378) (0.0178) (0.0339) (0.0153)
General Covars
Age -0.0012*** -0.0198*** -0.0017*** -0.0011*** -0.0187*** -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0193*** -0.0017***
(0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0006)
AgeSq -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000* -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0176*** 0.0559*** 0.0190*** 0.0177*** 0.0556*** 0.0194*** 0.0176*** 0.0558*** 0.0192***
(0.0037) (0.0065) (0.0043) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0077) (0.0049)
Defacto 0.0194*** 0.0282*** 0.0179*** 0.0194*** 0.0289*** 0.0179*** 0.0194*** 0.0285*** 0.0179***
(0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0078) (0.0048)
No.Children 0.0124*** 0.1481*** 0.0159*** 0.0124*** 0.1467*** 0.0161*** 0.0124*** 0.1475*** 0.0161***
(0.0008) (0.0121) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0088) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0126) (0.0014)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0263*** 0.0748*** 0.0320*** 0.0263*** 0.0753*** 0.0323*** 0.0263*** 0.0750*** 0.0322***
(0.0060) (0.0192) (0.0071) (0.0060) (0.0164) (0.0071) (0.0060) (0.0178) (0.0073)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0180*** 0.0585*** 0.0207*** 0.0180*** 0.0567*** 0.0209*** 0.0180*** 0.0576*** 0.0208***
certificate (0.0046) (0.0162) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0128) (0.0056) (0.0046) (0.0116) (0.0067)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0164*** 0.0327*** 0.0169*** 0.0165*** 0.0329*** 0.0170*** 0.0165*** 0.0328*** 0.0169***
(0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0066) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0057) (0.0034)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0148*** 0.0225*** 0.0164*** 0.0149*** 0.0235*** 0.0166*** 0.0148*** 0.0230*** 0.0165***
(0.0038) (0.0081) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0053)
Cert III or IV 0.0032 0.0012 0.0027 0.0032 -0.0007 0.0027 0.0032 0.0003 0.0027
(0.0030) (0.0081) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0077) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0080) (0.0034)
Cert I or II -0.0047 -0.0154 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0190 -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0171 -0.0048
(0.0060) (0.0186) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0214) (0.0099) (0.0060) (0.0269) (0.0072)
Cert not defined -0.0007 0.0495 0.0037 -0.0008 0.0468 0.0034 -0.0007 0.0482 0.0037
(0.0118) (0.0588) (0.0213) (0.0119) (0.0829) (0.0188) (0.0118) (0.0618) (0.0181)
Year 11 and below -0.0061** -0.0285*** -0.0072*** -0.0062** -0.0292*** -0.0074** -0.0062** -0.0288*** -0.0073**
(0.0024) (0.0052) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0030)
Occupation
Managers 0.0029 -0.0063 0.0016 0.0032 -0.0039 0.0025 0.0030 -0.0052 0.0018
(0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0058)
Professionals 0.0007 -0.0093 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0061 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0078 -0.0000
(0.0038) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0084) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0059) (0.0056)
Technicians and 0.0081 -0.0081 0.0065 0.0084 -0.0039 0.0074 0.0082 -0.0061 0.0066
Trades Workers (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0104) (0.0065) (0.0055) (0.0072) (0.0067)
Community and -0.0024 -0.0061 -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0032 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0047 -0.0029
Personal Services (0.0035) (0.0054) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0079) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0043)
Sales Workers 0.0004 -0.0098 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0080 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0089* -0.0004
(0.0032) (0.0065) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0088) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0053) (0.0043)
Clerical and Admin -0.0044 -0.0084 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0064 -0.0035 -0.0043 -0.0075 -0.0041
Workers (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0037) (0.0076) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0058) (0.0052)
Machinery Operators 0.0050 0.0123 0.0066 0.0053 0.0144 0.0076 0.0050 0.0133 0.0069
& Drivers (0.0080) (0.0128) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0119) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0135) (0.0123)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.0978*** 0.2139*** 0.1019*** 0.0876** 0.0167 0.0672* 0.0959*** 0.1196*** 0.0947***
Response (0.0191) (0.0571) (0.0205) (0.0413) (0.0602) (0.0376) (0.0181) (0.0283) (0.0164)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Unemployment IV Estimation cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0111 -0.0267 -0.0117 -0.0111 -0.0302 -0.0121 -0.0111 -0.0284 -0.0118
(0.0083) (0.0196) (0.0092) (0.0083) (0.0239) (0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0304) (0.0100)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0239*** -0.0211 -0.0228** -0.0240*** -0.0252 -0.0229*** -0.0239*** -0.0231 -0.0228***
certificate (0.0076) (0.0138) (0.0090) (0.0076) (0.0210) (0.0068) (0.0076) (0.0235) (0.0049)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0183*** -0.0160 -0.0186** -0.0184*** -0.0174 -0.0188*** -0.0183*** -0.0167 -0.0186***
(0.0065) (0.0117) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0184) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0168) (0.0063)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0150** 0.0084 -0.0141** -0.0151** 0.0056 -0.0142* -0.0150** 0.0070 -0.0141***
(0.0068) (0.0176) (0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0195) (0.0077) (0.0068) (0.0255) (0.0048)
Cert III or IV -0.0222*** 0.0007 -0.0211*** -0.0223*** -0.0015 -0.0213*** -0.0222*** -0.0003 -0.0211***
(0.0058) (0.0088) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0181) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0194) (0.0052)
Cert I or II -0.0070 0.0188 -0.0077 -0.0071 0.0173 -0.0080 -0.0070 0.0181 -0.0078
(0.0167) (0.0363) (0.0211) (0.0167) (0.0486) (0.0306) (0.0167) (0.0463) (0.0264)
Cert not defined -0.0039 -0.0250 -0.0031 -0.0040 -0.0142 -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0198 -0.0032
(0.0266) (0.0869) (0.0500) (0.0266) (0.1113) (0.0414) (0.0266) (0.1490) (0.0271)
Year 11 and below -0.0215*** 0.0164 -0.0187*** -0.0216*** 0.0166 -0.0188*** -0.0215*** 0.0165 -0.0187***
(0.0059) (0.0147) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0176) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0220) (0.0056)
No Partner Info -0.0676*** -0.0205 -0.0674*** -0.0675*** -0.0198 -0.0667*** -0.0676*** -0.0202 -0.0672***
(0.0139) (0.0208) (0.0189) (0.0139) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0139) (0.0225) (0.0210)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0050 -0.0048 -0.0031 -0.0054 -0.0074 -0.0044 -0.0051 -0.0060 -0.0033
(0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0067) (0.0083) (0.0096) (0.0079) (0.0084)
Not in LF 0.0017 0.0106 0.0031 0.0017 0.0100 0.0029 0.0017 0.0103 0.0031
(0.0045) (0.0086) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0077) (0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0096) (0.0053)
No Partner Info 0.0349*** 0.0115 0.0358* 0.0347*** 0.0093 0.0350* 0.0349*** 0.0105 0.0356*
(0.0134) (0.0166) (0.0186) (0.0134) (0.0162) (0.0193) (0.0134) (0.0163) (0.0205)
Religion
Buddisim -0.0026 -0.0123 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0111 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0117 -0.0007
(0.0059) (0.0150) (0.0088) (0.0059) (0.0152) (0.0084) (0.0059) (0.0137) (0.0070)
Hinduism -0.0061 0.0637 0.0016 -0.0060 0.0654 0.0024 -0.0061 0.0645 0.0020
(0.0136) (0.1434) (0.0146) (0.0136) (0.0565) (0.0203) (0.0136) (0.0677) (0.0243)
Judaism -0.0140 -0.1219 -0.0147 -0.0141 -0.1221 -0.0149 -0.0140 -0.1220 -0.0148
(0.0121) (0.1322) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.1425) (0.0147) (0.0121) (0.2291) (0.0128)
Islam -0.0107 0.0222*** -0.0101 -0.0108 0.0056 -0.0104 -0.0107 0.0142* -0.0102
(0.0093) (0.0080) (0.0115) (0.0093) (0.0161) (0.0078) (0.0093) (0.0080) (0.0099)
Other Religion -0.0128*** -0.0168 -0.0129*** -0.0130*** -0.0207 -0.0137** -0.0128*** -0.0186 -0.0131**
(0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0153) (0.0062) (0.0044) (0.0167) (0.0056)
No Religion -0.0040** -0.0018 -0.0034 -0.0040** -0.0015 -0.0035* -0.0040** -0.0017 -0.0034
(0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0056) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0056) (0.0023)
Refused Religious -0.0073* -0.0046 -0.0072* -0.0074* -0.0041 -0.0074** -0.0073* -0.0043 -0.0073*
Response (0.0041) (0.0073) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0084) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0043)
Constant 0.0845*** 0.2878*** 0.0920*** 0.0835*** 0.2595*** 0.0890*** 0.0843*** 0.2743*** 0.0916***
(0.0103) (0.0537) (0.0124) (0.0110) (0.0502) (0.0131) (0.0103) (0.0475) (0.0125)
Observations 30,435 30,435 30,435 30,435 30,435 30,435 30,435 30,435 30,435
R-squared 0.0363 0.0369 0.0364
Number of HH 5,941 5,941 5,941 5,941 5,941 5,941
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Exploring the relationship between stability and fertility using the instruments
leads to the results summarised in Table 4.5. The three specifications all show a
positive impact of stability on fertility. Using redundancy as an instrument suggests
that if a woman believes her job is relatively stable, there is an increase in the
probability of having a child of approximately 4-7 per cent, statistically significant
at a 10% level in the pooled estimation. These coefficients for stability are much
higher when using an instrumental variable to estimate the relationship than in
the linear probability model reported in Table 4.3. Similarly, the results show that
using lagged unemployment results in high estimates of the impact of stability on
the fertility decision. In this case the results may also be significantly bias as using
both instruments reduces the coefficient for stability significantly. This suggests that
the impact of employment stability on fertility is significantly underestimated in the
standard OLS model, which is significant in specification (1) and (3). The results
also show that as age increases, there is a decreased probability of having a child.
Furthermore, those women who already have children have an increased likelihood
of having an additional child.
Overall, we find a significant negative effect of unemployment on the probability
of having a child and a significantly positive effect of an individual’s self-assessed
employment stability. Additionally, the results show that job stability is more im-
portant for the decision to bear children than unemployment.
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Table 4.5: Stability IV Estimation
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Stability 0.1377*** 0.3923 0.1377*** 0.0383* 0.0690 0.0358 0.0666*** 0.1358* 0.0678***
(0.0268) (0.2443) (0.0299) (0.0202) (0.0923) (0.0357) (0.0162) (0.0718) (0.0212)
General Covars
Age -0.0020*** -0.0243*** -0.0020*** -0.0012*** -0.0185*** -0.0016*** -0.0014*** -0.0197*** -0.0017***
(0.0005) (0.0042) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0032) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0005)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0128*** 0.0370*** 0.0128** 0.0141*** 0.0412*** 0.0151*** 0.0137*** 0.0403*** 0.0144***
(0.0038) (0.0130) (0.0051) (0.0036) (0.0081) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0085) (0.0043)
Defacto 0.0195*** 0.0271*** 0.0195*** 0.0201*** 0.0283*** 0.0190*** 0.0199*** 0.0281*** 0.0190***
(0.0041) (0.0090) (0.0046) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0065) (0.0056)
No.Children 0.0112*** 0.1470*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.1388*** 0.0135*** 0.0111*** 0.1405*** 0.0131***
(0.0009) (0.0118) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0081) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0100) (0.0016)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0340*** 0.0544** 0.0340*** 0.0271*** 0.0589*** 0.0304*** 0.0291*** 0.0580** 0.0319***
(0.0066) (0.0218) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0204) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0227) (0.0098)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0139*** 0.0526*** 0.0139*** 0.0131*** 0.0531*** 0.0150*** 0.0133*** 0.0530*** 0.0148**
certificate (0.0045) (0.0145) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0125) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0156) (0.0059)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0145*** 0.0249* 0.0145*** 0.0132*** 0.0304*** 0.0137*** 0.0135*** 0.0293*** 0.0140***
(0.0035) (0.0129) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0074) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0071) (0.0045)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0143*** 0.0234 0.0143*** 0.0121*** 0.0199*** 0.0131*** 0.0127*** 0.0206*** 0.0135***
(0.0039) (0.0168) (0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0071) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0073) (0.0044)
Cert III or IV 0.0038 -0.0035 0.0038 0.0034 0.0007 0.0026 0.0035 -0.0002 0.0029
(0.0031) (0.0156) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0057) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0089) (0.0042)
Cert I or II -0.0037 -0.0247 -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0142 -0.0046 -0.0039 -0.0163 -0.0043
(0.0062) (0.0367) (0.0081) (0.0057) (0.0270) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0254) (0.0076)
Cert not defined 0.0156 0.1047 0.0156 0.0044 0.0811 0.0057 0.0076 0.0859 0.0088
(0.0126) (0.1137) (0.0196) (0.0114) (0.0965) (0.0159) (0.0115) (0.0710) (0.0174)
Year 11 and below -0.0038 -0.0201* -0.0038* -0.0044* -0.0227*** -0.0052* -0.0042* -0.0222*** -0.0048
(0.0025) (0.0116) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0030)
Occupation
Managers -0.0083 -0.0340 -0.0083* 0.0020 -0.0104 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0152 -0.0023
(0.0051) (0.0233) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0097) (0.0068) (0.0044) (0.0100) (0.0047)
Professionals -0.0104** -0.0277 -0.0104*** -0.0004 -0.0087 -0.0008 -0.0032 -0.0126 -0.0039
(0.0047) (0.0210) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0093) (0.0034)
Technicians and 0.0041 -0.0200 0.0041 0.0096* -0.0032 0.0085 0.0080 -0.0066 0.0068
Trades Workers (0.0059) (0.0145) (0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0117) (0.0048)
Community and -0.0062 -0.0206 -0.0062 -0.0014 -0.0086* -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0111 -0.0036
Personal Services (0.0038) (0.0159) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0080) (0.0030)
Sales Workers -0.0091** -0.0259* -0.0091** -0.0015 -0.0115* -0.0020 -0.0037 -0.0145 -0.0043
(0.0038) (0.0154) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0033) (0.0106) (0.0029)
Clerical and Admin -0.0069* -0.0177 -0.0069* -0.0034 -0.0080 -0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0100 -0.0045
Workers (0.0039) (0.0123) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0071) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0078) (0.0033)
Machinery Operators 0.0019 0.0337* 0.0019 0.0049 0.0172 0.0068 0.0041 0.0206* 0.0057
& Drivers (0.0083) (0.0194) (0.0093) (0.0076) (0.0161) (0.0095) (0.0077) (0.0125) (0.0104)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.0309 0.0353 0.0309 0.0229 0.0289 0.0224 0.0252 0.0302 0.0246
Response (0.0255) (0.0284) (0.0227) (0.0246) (0.0431) (0.0240) (0.0247) (0.0405) (0.0236)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Stability IV Estimation cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0008 0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0061 0.0005 -0.0058 -0.0046 0.0010 -0.0043
(0.0081) (0.0273) (0.0089) (0.0079) (0.0230) (0.0092) (0.0079) (0.0245) (0.0090)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0144* 0.0116 -0.0144 -0.0158** 0.0057 -0.0132 -0.0154** 0.0069 -0.0132*
certificate (0.0075) (0.0252) (0.0096) (0.0072) (0.0224) (0.0098) (0.0073) (0.0157) (0.0073)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0090 -0.0035 -0.0090 -0.0130** -0.0097 -0.0131* -0.0119* -0.0084 -0.0118*
(0.0063) (0.0181) (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0136) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0117) (0.0068)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0083 0.0167 -0.0083 -0.0102 0.0213 -0.0085 -0.0097 0.0204 -0.0083
(0.0066) (0.0225) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0169) (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0133) (0.0066)
Cert III or IV -0.0161*** 0.0041 -0.0161*** -0.0164*** 0.0134 -0.0148** -0.0163*** 0.0115 -0.0151**
(0.0056) (0.0161) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0121) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0159) (0.0059)
Cert I or II -0.0045 0.0284 -0.0045 -0.0035 0.0269 -0.0028 -0.0038 0.0272 -0.0032
(0.0171) (0.0585) (0.0260) (0.0169) (0.0493) (0.0276) (0.0169) (0.0415) (0.0227)
Cert not defined -0.0428*** -0.0692 -0.0428*** -0.0347*** -0.0908* -0.0401*** -0.0370*** -0.0864 -0.0413***
(0.0087) (0.0671) (0.0156) (0.0064) (0.0547) (0.0114) (0.0068) (0.0643) (0.0100)
Year 11 and below -0.0137** 0.0272 -0.0137** -0.0159*** 0.0332** -0.0131** -0.0152*** 0.0320 -0.0130**
(0.0057) (0.0202) (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0130) (0.0067) (0.0056) (0.0202) (0.0066)
No Partner Info -0.0801*** -0.0896 -0.0801*** -0.0632*** -0.0222 -0.0616*** -0.0680*** -0.0361 -0.0671***
(0.0116) (0.1560) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0354) (0.0182) (0.0113) (0.0379) (0.0165)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0043 -0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0077 -0.0062 -0.0069 -0.0067 -0.0056 -0.0061
(0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0093) (0.0123) (0.0074)
Not in LF 0.0019 0.0063 0.0019 0.0022 0.0083 0.0030 0.0021 0.0079 0.0027
(0.0047) (0.0118) (0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0046)
No Partner Info 0.0620*** 0.0990 0.0620*** 0.0409*** 0.0278 0.0406** 0.0469*** 0.0425 0.0472***
(0.0116) (0.1660) (0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0398) (0.0159) (0.0111) (0.0339) (0.0142)
Religion
Buddisim -0.0033 -0.0257 -0.0033 -0.0048 -0.0188 -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0202 -0.0038
(0.0055) (0.0206) (0.0069) (0.0050) (0.0126) (0.0075) (0.0051) (0.0149) (0.0053)
Hinduism -0.0028 0.0899 -0.0028 -0.0063 0.0836 -0.0002 -0.0053 0.0849 -0.0003
(0.0137) (0.1159) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0831) (0.0216) (0.0128) (0.0752) (0.0209)
Judaism 0.0005 -0.0443 0.0005 -0.0120 -0.0029 -0.0141 -0.0085 -0.0115 -0.0097
(0.0115) (0.1473) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0282) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0647) (0.0104)
Islam -0.0027 -0.0454 -0.0027 -0.0052 0.0020 -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0078 -0.0045
(0.0112) (0.1637) (0.0087) (0.0101) (0.0535) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0993) (0.0073)
Other Religion -0.0041 -0.0240 -0.0041 -0.0073 -0.0121 -0.0074 -0.0064 -0.0146 -0.0065
(0.0055) (0.0199) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0108) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0118) (0.0049)
No Religion -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0024 0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0020 0.0007 -0.0017
(0.0021) (0.0055) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0058) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0061) (0.0030)
Refused Religious -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0045 -0.0020 -0.0048 -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0039
Response (0.0043) (0.0079) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0070) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0088) (0.0038)
Constant -0.0294 0.0780 -0.0294 0.0374** 0.1962*** 0.0438 0.0184 0.1717*** 0.0216
(0.0206) (0.1570) (0.0215) (0.0169) (0.0665) (0.0275) (0.0147) (0.0421) (0.0195)
Observations 27,990 27,990 27,990 27,990 27,990 27,990 27,990 27,990 27,990
R-squared 0.0248 0.0069
Number of HH 5,646 5,646 5,646 5,646 5,646 5,646
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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We estimate the propensity scores for women to adjust for potential selection
effects cause by differences in the observed characteristics between women who are
employed and those who are unemployed. We delegate the treatments as unem-
ployment, stability and redundancy respectively. We use redundancy as a treatment
since using either unemployment or stability may not result in unbiased results, as
there may still be an endogenous effect of these variables on the fertility decision,
which may go unaddressed in the estimation of the propensity scores,. The results
for the propensity scores are summarised in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Propensity Score Results
Pooled White-Collar Blue-Collar
Unemployed Coeff 0.0086 0.0109 0.0109
St Error (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0079)
Stability Coeff 0.0098*** 0.0038 0.0150***
St Error (0.0028) (0.004) (0.0033)
Redundancy Coeff 0.0000 -0.0029 0.0000
St Error (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0115)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
We match on age, agesq, marital status, number of children
religion and partner’s labour force status.32
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
When estimating the propensity score, we match on age, age squared, marital
status, education, partners labour force status and religion. We are unable to match
on partners education as it is highly correlated with partners labour force status due
to the number of missing values. Furthermore, the common support is not satisfied
in the instances where we are able to match on both. However, literature shows that
32We do not match on partner’s education as the common support is not met when included.
However this is not concerning as the literature thus far suggest that labour force status plays the
critical role. See Pailhe & Solaz (2012); Vignoli et al. (2012); Schmitt (2012). This may be due
to the fact that education is highly correlated with labour force status, and therefore we can only
match on one of these variables.
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partners labour force status is more important in determining fertility decisions as
it is an indicator of overall economic stability of a family (see for example Pailhe &
Solaz, 2012; Vignoli et al., 2012; Schmitt, 2012).
The results for unemployment are surprising. The propensity score matching
method suggests to us a positive relationship between unemployment and fertility in
the pooled sample, although the result is insignificant. Stability shows the expected
sign and significance suggesting the impact of stability on fertility choices is positive.
However, the magnitude for stability slightly higher than the result reported for
unemployment. The results also show that redundancy has no impact on the fertility
choice, but is insignificant. The results for redundancy also suggest that there may
still be some bias in the results for unemployment as redundancy is an exogenous
shock to the woman’s employment status.
Additionally, we compare those women in the unemployed category to those
women in white-collar jobs and blue-collar jobs in a similar analysis to Del Bono
et al. (2011) who emphasised the role of job displacement on the fertility outcomes
of white and blue collar workers. The results show that those women who are un-
employed are more likely to have a child than those in the white-collar category. We
also see that for unemployed vs white collar workers, there is a decreased probability
of having a child if made redundant, which is the directional effect we expect. There
is also an observed positive relationship between stability and fertility for both white
collar workers and blue collar workers.
Additionally, we stratify the sample by age categories to consolidate our findings.
Stratification forces the nearest neighbour match for both the treatment and control
to be selected from the specified category or strata. In this case we expect women
to have differing fertility preferences given their age category. For example, women
between the ages of 18-25 will have a significantly different fertility response based on
the matching covariates than those in the 30-35 year old age category. We implement
stratified matching by age and estimate the average treatment on the treated. The
results for the stratified propensity scores are summarised in Table 4.7. These results
94
show a negative effect of unemployment on fertility. Additionally, we find that an
unemployed woman is less likely 1.31 percent less to have a child than an employed
woman. Stability has a strong positive significant effect on the probability of having
a child, which is consistent with the results thus far, although the magnitude is not
as large. Finally, redundancy has a positive significant effect on the fertility decision.
The magnitude of redundancy is not as large as the result for unemployment, but
the coefficients are fairly similar. This suggests there may still be some bias in the
estimates when using unemployment to estimate the propensity scores and therefore
unemployment may be a weak treatment to use when analysing the fertility decision.
Table 4.7: Propensity Score Matching Results with Stratification
Stratification
Unemployment Stability Redundancy
Coeff -0.0131*** 0.0126*** -0.0127***
St Error (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
Note: age is not used as a matching covariate when using a a
sample stratified by age as it may have confounding effetcs.
We do not match on partner’s education for reasons previously
stated.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.4.1 Incorporating the Transition to NILF due to Fertility
The methodology we have selected and implemented above restricts our sample to
women actively participating in the labour force. If a woman was participating in
the labour force and subsequently had a child resulting in their decision to remove
themselves from the labour force, they would be removed from the data set if we drop
all NILF responses. However, we can perform a robustness check by adjusting our
analysis to include those women who exit the labour force as a result from having a
child. To solve this potential bias, we reintroduce women who transition from active
participation to non-participation (NILF) as a direct result of observed fertility. We
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identify these women by observing their labour market status 2 years prior to having
the a child, and their labour market status after having the child.33 For women who
are observed leaving the labour forces, we set their employment status equal to obser-
vation reported before the child was born for all subsequent reports of NILF.34 So if
a woman reported her employment status as employed, had a child and consequently
left the labour market, all subsequent values where she reports NILF, the observation
be reported as employed. Women who report NILF in all years are dropped from
the sample.35 Again, we use the control covariates previously identified in Section
4.3 which includes age, age squared, relationship status, education, occupation (or
prior occupation if unemployed), partner’s education, partner’s labour force status
and religion. When we implement this adjustment, we find the sample size increases
to 32,053 observations in the unemployment specification and 28,098 observations
for the stability specification. The results for the IV specification are summarised in
Table 4.8.36
Table 4.8 shows that including women who transition to non-participation in the
labour force actually causes the coefficients on both unemployment and stability to
increase significantly in comparison to Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, where these women
were not accounted for. However, both estimations with and without the transitional
NILF women indicate a negative impact of unemployment on fertility and a positive
impact of stability.
33We selected 2 years to account for the lag in child birth that may not allow for full observation
of the transition from employment/unemployment to NILF.
34Unless there is a self-reported change in participation. Therefore, we only do this adjustment
for those women who have a child and subsequently report their status as NILF.
35This reduces sample selection bias that would be introduced by dropping all NILF responses.
36Full specifications can be found in 7.11 the appendix of this chapter.
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Table 4.8: Unemployment IV Estimation
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployment -0.2467*** -0.4271*** -0.2582*** -0.2192*** -0.2245*** -0.2157*** -0.2445*** -0.3448*** -0.2547***
(0.0170) (0.0555) (0.0201) (0.0373) (0.0577) (0.0431) (0.0162) (0.0443) (0.0215)
Stability 0.1750*** 0.4380 0.1750*** 0.0467** 0.0960 0.0461* 0.0850*** 0.1608** 0.0875***
(0.0373) (0.4312) (0.0476) (0.0208) (0.0594) (0.0278) (0.0179) (0.0708) (0.0188)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.9: Propensity Score Results with Women Transitioning to NILF
Pooled White-Collar Blue-Collar
Unemployed Coeff 0.0177 0.0389*** 0.0429***
St Error (0.0108) (0.0090) (0.0097)
Stability Coeff 0.0089*** 0.0046 0.0128***
St Error (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0035)
Redundancy Coeff -0.0032 -0.0085 0.0048
St Error (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0127)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
We match on age, agesq, marital status, number of children
religion and partner’s labour force status.37
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
37We do not match on partner’s education as the common support is not met when included. However this is
not concerning as the literature thus far suggest that labour force status plays the critical role. See Pailhe & Solaz
(2012); Vignoli et al. (2012); Schmitt (2012). This may be due to the fact that education is highly correlated with
labour force status, and therefore we can only match on one of these variables.
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In addition to the results from the IV estimation results, when implementing both
propensity score matching method to the NILF sample, we find very similar results
to the sample that excludes the NILF responses. Table 4.8 shows that stability
still makes a positive significant effect on the probability of having a child in the
pooled sample. In this case, when we compare it to the results in Table 4.6 we
find that the coefficient of stability is not as large with a difference between the two
estimations of 0.9%. Furthermore, we can confirm the results in Table 4.9 suggests
that unemployment as a treatment group for matching may also be overestimating
the effect of unemployment on fertility as redundancy, an exogenous shock to fertility
provides a negative coefficient.
Finally in the stratified sample, we find that implementing the stratification by
age the coefficients on all three specifications actually increase in magnitude. The
results in Table 4.10 show that if a woman in is unemployed she is approximately 2%
less likely to have a child. A similar result is found for redundancy, which suggests
being made redundant decreases the probability of having a child by 3%. Both of
these results are statistically significant at a 1% level. With respect to employment
stability, we find a positive significant effect on fertility which is also larger than the
coefficient reported in Table 4.7.
Overall when we analyse the data including women who transition to a NILF
status after experiencing fertility, we find similar results to the specifications that
exclude them from the sample. However, we emphasise that these results are larger
in magnitude. This suggests that when we dropped them from the sample, we specif-
ically found the lower bound of the relationship between unemployment, employment
stability and redundancy on the fertility choices of Australian women.
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Table 4.10: Propensity Score Matching Results with Stratification Including
Women Transitioning to NILF
Stratification
Unemployment Stability Redundancy
Coeff -0.0215*** 0.0143*** -0.0300***
St Error (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
Note: age is not used as a matching covariate when using a a
sample stratified by age as it may have confounding effetcs.
We do not match on partner’s education for reasons previously
stated.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.4.2 The Importance of Employment Stability for Immigrants and Na-
tives
This section explores the difference between immigrant and natives subpopulations
within the HILDA data. Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 report the coefficients for the IV
estimations of unemployment and stability respectively. Table 4.11 shows a negative
significant impact for both immigrants and natives when using the lag of unemploy-
ment as an instrument. The pure employment status specification suggests an 8-22%
decreased probability of having a child across the three IV specifications. Further-
more, Panel A suggests a 25-45% decrease in the probability of having a child for
a native who is unemployed if we include the women who transition to NILF as a
result of fertility. A very similar result is found for immigrants when using lagged
unemployment to potentially address the endogeneity issue. However, the use of
redundancy as an instrument for unemployment shows no significant effect on either
natives or immigrants. Overall, we find that immigrants and natives have very sim-
ilar outcomes for unemployment, as shown in Table 4.11. However, the results for
immigrants are only statistically significant in the specification which includes the
NILF women.
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Table 4.11: Unemployment IV Estimation by Immigrant Status
Panel A: Natives
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Emp. Only
Coeff -0.0879*** -0.2113** -0.0901*** -0.0684 -0.0323 -0.0518 -0.0840*** -0.1136** -0.0814***
St Error (0.0204) (0.0929) (0.0249) (0.0466) (0.0655) (0.0342) (0.0193) (0.0511) (0.0189)
With NILF
Coeff -0.2471*** -0.4456*** -0.2583*** -0.2090*** -0.2241*** -0.2045*** -0.2438*** -0.3461*** -0.2538***
St Error (0.0186) (0.0724) (0.0197) (0.0413) (0.0601) (0.0382) (0.0178) (0.0527) (0.0155)
Panel B: Immigrants
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Emp. Only
Coeff -0.0506 -0.2137*** -0.0799 -0.0816 0.0942 -0.0113 -0.0545 -0.1460** -0.0732
St Error (0.0471) (0.0688) (0.0508) (0.1141) (0.3088) (0.1378) (0.0451) (0.0720) (0.0602)
With NILF
Coeff -0.2444*** -0.3415*** -0.2582*** -0.2659*** -0.2665*** -0.2760** -0.2459*** -0.3214*** -0.2595***
St Error (0.0417) (0.1027) (0.0427) (0.0887) (0.0733) (0.1188) (0.0401) (0.1026) (0.0558)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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The impact of stability on fertility is also very similar between the native and
immigrant populations, as seen in Table 4.12. However, if we compare Table 4.11
and Table 4.12, we find job stability has a stronger impact on fertility when instru-
menting with lagged unemployment. This effect is much smaller in the specification
which implements both instruments in the regression. Again, using the redundancy
instrument, we find a positive effect on individual fertility outcomes, however it is
only significant for natives in specification (1). In the case where we implement both
instruments, we find a positive significant effect of stability for natives at a 1% level,
however that effect is diminished for immigrants.
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Table 4.12: Stability IV Estimation by Immigrant Status
Panel A: Natives
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Emp. Only
Coeff 0.1489*** 0.3903 0.1489*** 0.0400* 0.1041** 0.0390 0.0664*** 0.1583*** 0.0672***
St Error (0.0345) (0.5280) (0.0474) (0.0226) (0.0471) (0.0250) (0.0188) (0.0262) (0.0123)
With NILF
Coeff 0.1846*** 0.4485* 0.1846*** 0.0489** 0.1274 0.0490 0.0842*** 0.1819*** 0.0854***
St Error (0.0466) (0.2476) (0.0434) (0.0231) (0.0967) (0.0342) (0.0205) (0.0535) (0.0189)
Panel B: Immigrants
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Emp. Only
Coeff 0.1194*** 0.3617 0.1254* 0.0325 -0.0696 0.0098 0.0729** 0.0721 0.0793*
St Error (0.0390) (21.7307) (0.0754) (0.0471) (0.4138) (0.0443) (0.0302) (0.1017) (0.0441)
With NILF
Coeff 0.1493*** 0.3385*** 0.1691*** 0.0327 -0.0549 0.0197 0.0865** 0.0773 0.1014*
St Error (0.0534) (0.0905) (0.0636) (0.0474) (0.4375) (0.0607) (0.0337) (0.1446) (0.0519)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Finally, we also apply stratified PSM to the immigrant and native subsamples.
The results are reported in Table 4.13. This table highlights a key difference between
the immigrant and native subsamples: unemployment has a small positive effect on
fertility for immigrants, however it has a smaller negative effect on fertility for natives.
This suggests that if an immigrant is unemployed, they have a 2.5% chance of having
a child, significant at a 1% level. Furthermore, we find a positive effect of stability for
natives, but not for immigrants. Therefore, a native has a 0.54% increased probability
of having a child if the individual feels stable in their job. Redundancy is found to
have a negative impact on fertility for natives, which is approximately half the size
of the redundancy coefficient for unemployment that is observed for immigrants.
The signs of the coefficients shown Table 4.13 are consistent for the employment
specification and the specification that incorporates the women who transition to
non-participation. Overall we find a positive effect of stability on the fertility levels
of women. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter provides evidence to suggest
the relationship between fertility and unemployment may be overestimated when
matching within age strata. This suggests that age plays a key role in the fertility
decision.
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Table 4.13: Stratified Propensity Score Matching Results by Immigrant Status
Employment Only Specification
Natives Immigrants
Unemployment Stability Redundancy Unemployment Stability Redundancy
Coeff -0.018*** 0.0076*** -0.0120*** 0.0248*** -0.0048*** -0.0387***
St Error (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0021)
Stratification With Transition NILF Women Included
Natives Immigrants
Unemployment Stability Redundancy Unemployment Stability Redundancy
Coeff -0.0315*** 0.0090*** -0.0336*** 0.0364*** 0.0192*** -0.0256***
St Error (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0020)
Bootstrapped standard errors (500 reps) reported in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.5 Conclusion
This study explored the effect of unemployment and stability on the fertility decision.
Using both instrumental variables and propensity score matching, we found that un-
employment has a positive effect on the fertility decision of Australian women in the
pooled sample, however when using stratified propensity score matching this effect
is reversed. Additionally, stability is shown to have a positive significant effect on
the probability of having a child, suggesting that stability contributes significantly
to the child bearing decision of women. These results extend to those women who
transition to non-participation in the labour force as a consequence of fertility. This
effect of stability on fertility is also found to be positively significant when analysing
the immigrant and native subpopulations of women in the HILDA. We find a posi-
tive significant effect of stability measured by perceived job security in the stratified
propensity score matching results. Unemployment is found to have a negative effect
on both native and immigrant fertility when stratifying the sample. Furthermore,
the result of this study show the use of redundancy as an exogenous measure of
unemployment results in reduced estimates of the impact of unemployment on fertil-
ity and therefore provides evidence unemployment as a treatment overestimates the
fertility decision.
The main contribution of this study is to highlight the role of job stability and
perceived job security in the fertility decision. The literature has focused on the role
of unemployment on fertility decisions, with very few studies addressing the observed
relationship reversal exhibited in developed countries. The results of this study
have significant implications for policymakers, as increase perceived job security may
encourage women to have children. In addition, this study highlights the important
role of policy to assist with the participation and re-entry of women into the workforce
post-child bearing/rearing.
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Chapter 5 Study 3: The Quality Quan-
tity Trade-off - Evidence In Australia
5.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters analysed two main factors involved in the decision to have
children for individuals and families. These studies have significant policy implica-
tions for governments and decision makers. However, the determinants of the fertility
decision are not limited to monetary incentives and employment stability. Within
the field of population economics, the quality-quantity trade-off theory has success-
fully rationalised the issue surrounding the changes in family preferences driving the
decrease in total fertility rates in many developed countries.
In recent times, the fertility literature has had a strong focus on explaining deci-
sions relating to investing in child quality versus increasing the quantity of children
in a family. Although the economic theory of this quality-quantity trade-off is sound
there is very little evidence to support the theory outside of the US and Europe.
This has led to debate over the legitimacy of the theory in a broader context. This
study aims to provide evidence of the quality-quantity trade-off in Australia.
The quality-quantity trade-off theory describes the decision for families to have
additional children, or increase expenditure on current children to improve child
‘quality’ (Becker, 1992; Becker & Tomes, 1976; Becker et al., 1960). Improved child
quality refers to parental investment, used to enhance a child’s outcomes and poten-
tially provide a better future for their offspring. Enhanced child outcomes include
(but are not limited to) improved employment, health, and educational outcomes.
Potential parents make their decision to have additional children or to invest in
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existing children, based on the utility derived from the fertility decision.
There are many ways the outcomes of each child can be improved through invest-
ment. The investment in each individual child can range from spending on education
though private schooling or tutoring, to providing a child with extra curricula activ-
ities or individual space. Investment in child quality can also include the additional
effort or parental time given by either parent. Although higher quality does not
necessarily mean superior, children who are considered higher quality tend to have
improved educational and labour market outcomes than those children considered
lower quality (Heckman et al., 2006).
As seen in the literature review in Chapter 2, there are two core areas in which the
quality-quantity trade-off literature is focused; (1) the expected negative association
between family size and investment in children, and (2) the effect of additional births
on the cognitive development or schooling outcomes of children in the family. This
study has a strong focus on the second point, where evidence is highly mixed and
a research gap can be filled using Australian data. This study explores the quality-
quantity trade-off experienced by Australian families, specifically focusing on health
and educational outcomes, adding to the literature through the use of a distributional
analysis.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Introduction
This study uses the Longitudinal Survey of Australian Children (LSAC) to analyse
the impact of ‘sibship’ size on the health and educational outcomes of children.38
The LSAC is a survey that follows the progression and development of approximately
10,000 children and families in Australia. The LSAC commenced in 2004 with two
cohorts; families with 4-5 year old children (Cohort K) and families with 0-1 year
old infants (Cohort B). The study child (SC) is the focus of the survey as the aim
38Sibship size refers to the number of siblings in the household.
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of the LSAC is to follow the development of the SC over time. Furthermore, there
is only one study child per household in the survey. Hence, this analysis focuses on
the impact the presence of siblings has on the SC.
The analysis in this study requires two key variables to test the existence of
the quality- quantity trade-off. Firstly we require a measure of child quality. This
study uses four outcome measures as proxies for child quality, since quality cannot be
directly measured. These measures of child outcomes include the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test (PPVT), the ‘Who am I?’ test (WAI), weight-for-height, and Body
Mass Index (BMI) Percentile. PPVT and WAI are measures of a child’s cognitive
ability and development,39 while weight-for-height percentile, and BMI Percentile
are measures of health outcomes.
PPVT and WAI measure the cognitive development of children and can be used in
a similar manner to IQ tests and standardised test scores which have been the focal
point for the quality-quantity trade-off literature. However, measures of cognitive
development provide a better measure of ability for young children in this scenario.
Moreover, this study examines both PPVT and WAI which are developed to measure
different cognitive outcomes, thereby providing a check for the consistency of this
analysis. The literature shows that weight-for-height is a good measure for the overall
indicator of health as it reflects chronic nutrition issues (see for example Linnemayr &
Alderman, 2011; Onis et al., 2007; Cogill, 2003; Waterlow et al., 1977). The analysis
of BMI percentile is included as a robustness check.
The measure for child quantity is the number of children in the household in-
cluding the study child. We also create a latent variable in the form of a binary
indicator (Two Plus), which takes a value of 1 if there are two or more children in
the household (including the study child) and 0 otherwise. This is necessary for the
methodologies we implement in this study, which will be discussed further below.
39The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) is a receptive vocabulary test, which provides
an estimate of verbal ability and aptitude of a child. PPVT is conducted in Standardized American
English. The ‘Who am I?’ test is a direct assessment measure that requires children to copy shapes
(e.g. circle, triangle, square etc.) and write numbers, letters, words and sentences which is assessed
using Rasch Modelling used to score a child on a scale of 1 to 100.
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This study contributes to the gap in research through the use of a distributional
analysis using instrumental variables. This allows for comprehensive analysis of the
quality-quantity trade-off beyond the average effects that mask important differences
elsewhere in the distribution. Furthermore, this analysis will help develop the lit-
erature, as the confounding results currently observed within the quality-quantity
trade-off literature may be due to the econometric analysis focusing on the aver-
age child. Although these methods are not new to the literature (see Millimet &
Wang, 2011), applications of distributional analysis on child outcomes are few and
far between. Furthermore, this method has not been applied within the context of
Australia, although the effects have been investigated on the average in the past year
(see Cobb-Clark & Moschion, 2013).
We motivate the use of a distributional analysis from the potential for hetero-
geneity in the effect of family size on child outcomes. The heterogeneity originates
from the unobserved ability of the child. For instance; consider two children, one has
a high level of ability and one has a low level of ability, but in all other ways these
children are the same. The child with the high level of ability may be affected in
a different manner than the low ability child, when an additional child is added to
their family. This may be through numerous factors such as the loss of parental time
investment, or the loss of physical or monetary investment. Furthermore, parents
may choose to invest more or less in a child given the innate child quality.
Assuming that returns to investment in child quality are concave; if a low ability
child is significantly compensated by parents in an attempt to increase their perceived
quality, then the marginal effect on a child with a high level of ability may be larger
(shown by a negative impact at the high end of the distribution for the high ability
child). If parents choose not to compensate low ability children, then the impact
of an increase in the number of children in the household will negatively impact
those children at the low end of the distribution of outcomes. This is similar to the
argument in Winterhalder & Leslie (2002). It remains to be seen which impact will
be observed. Therefore, we expect children within the tails of the distribution (low
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or high level of innate ability) to be negatively affected by an increase in family size.
The relationship between child quality (Qi), and the number of children in the
household (Ni) can be expressed as:
Qi = α + γNi + βXi + i (1)
where Qi is represented in our analysis by the child’s test score or health outcome.
Xi is a vector of control covariates including; year, cohort, the age, sex, indigenous
status of the study child, mother and father, in addition to the labour force sta-
tus, immigrant status and educational qualifications of the parents (see Table 5.1
for a full description of the variables included as covariates in this analysis). Em-
pirically testing this trade-off between child quality (Qi) and child quantity (Ni) is
difficult because the family size decision for child quality and child quantity may
be determined simultaneously implying an endogeneity issue (Angrist et al., 2005).
Furthermore, not only is there a negative causal relationship between investment in
quality or quantity, there may also be interaction between the covariates and the
quality-quantity decision (Angrist et al., 2010; Angrist & Evans, 1998).
Therefore we employ the use of instrumental variables to address the endogeneity
issue. For this we use two instruments previously outlined in the literature: (1) a
twin or multiple birth dummy indicator for second births, and (2) a sex composition
indicator (see Angrist et al., 2010; Angrist & Evans, 1998).
A twin birth or multiple births causes an exogenous deviation from the desired
family size. Exploiting this exogenous deviation allows for the identification of the
causal effect of family size on child outcomes. This instrument has been used fre-
quently in the fertility literature (see Angrist & Evans, 1998; Angrist et al., 2010;
Conley & Glauber, 2006; Lee, 2008). Twins or multiple births represent an exogenous
shock to fertility, which can change planned parental investment to compensate for
an additional child. The instrument we use is an indicator as a twin for the second
birth in a family. Therefore the instrument for twins takes a value of 1 if the second
birth is a twin or multiple births and 0 otherwise.
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Additionally, sex composition is used as an instrument because it allows for a
wider generalisation of results beyond twin/multiple birth families, extending to
families with 2 or more children. Among others, Angrist & Evans (1998) introduced
the use of sex composition when analysing the effects of family size on labour market
outcomes of adults. There is an inherent preference in developed countries towards
having one male and one female child within the family. Angrist & Evans (1998)
showed that parents with two male, or two female children as the first and second
born, were approximately six per cent more likely to have a third child. More recently
Conley & Glauber (2006) applied this instrument in their paper to the same end.
For this analysis in this study, we create a sex composition indicator which takes a
value of 1 if the first two births in a family are children of the same gender and 0
otherwise.
5.2.2 Instrumental Variables (IV) approach
This study analyses the impact of additional children in the household on a single
child in the family, known as the study child. The focus of the analysis is the impact
of the existence of siblings on the health and educational outcomes of the study child.
We begin by estimating the first stage regression to predict the number of children
in the household for each of the individual instruments, twins as the second birth
and sex composition of the first two births in a family, denoted as (Zi):
Nˆi = α + γZi + βXi + νi (2)
The predicted values for the number of siblings in the household (Nˆi) is then used
in the second stage regression:
Qi = α + γNˆi + βXi + i (3)
This gives the IV estimation of the relationship between fertility and child outcomes
for the average child. As the twin or multiple births cause an exogenous increase in
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the number of children, we are able to exploit the reaction in the predicted family
size to estimate the causal effect of fertility on child quality, removing the bias caused
by the endogeneity of quality and quantity.
We also estimate the results for equation (2) using the binary indicator, ‘Two
Plus’ which takes a value of 1 if there are two or more children in the household
(including the study child) and zero otherwise. We estimate both the individual IV
specifications and a combined IV specification.
5.2.3 Quantile Regression (QR) approach
As the relevant literature has strongly focuses on the use of instrumental variables to
explore the quality-quantity trade-off, the interpretation of results have been strongly
focused on the effect of an increase in family size on the average child. However, chil-
dren are heterogeneous, and therefore an increase in family size can impact on high
quality and low quality children differently. Furthermore, policymakers are intrinsi-
cally interested in distributional analysis of child health and education performance
due to the long-term implications on the future labour force. This may result in
the true impact of the quality-quantity trade-off being masked as both positive and
negative impacts of additional children in the family on the outcomes of children are
average across all children, regardless of ability. Using quantile regression (QR), we
evaluate the quality-quantity trade-off across the distribution of child quality indi-
cators. We use the model for quantile regression based on Koenker & Bassett Jr
(1978).
We define the outcome variable Qi to have a distribution function F (qi) such that
F (qi) = Prob(Qi ≤ qi) (4)
Within this distribution of outcomes, it can be said that a child is in the τth
quantile if the child performs better than τ but worse than (1− τ) where 0 < τ < 1
(Koenker & Bassett Jr, 1978). At the median (τ = 0.50), half of the children perform
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better and half perform worse (Koenker & Bassett Jr, 1978). In most cases the
interest lies in how the child in the τth quantile is affected by the relevant covariates
in the analysis. Assuming linearity, the distribution can be described as:
Quantτ (Qi|Xi) = α(τ) + γ(τ)Ni + β(τ)Xi (5)
α(τ), β(τ) and γ(τ) are obtained by minimising
argmin
∑
ρτ (Qi − αi − βiXi − γNi) (6)
where:
ρτ =
 τ if Qi − αi − βiXi − γNi ≤ 0(1− τ) if Qi − αi − βiXi − γNi > 0
In this case the coefficients α(τ), β(τ) and γ(τ) are dependent on the quantile being
investigated (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). We estimate the results QR (6) using the
binary indicator, ‘Two Plus’ in place of the number of siblings for ease of comparison
between models.
Unfortunately QR does not successfully address the issue of endogeneity in the
quality-quantity trade-off model. The estimates obtained through the use of QR
will be biased, as the interaction between child quality and child quantity is not
addressed. Therefore, we also apply quantile regression with instrumental variables.
5.2.4 Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression (IV-QR)
It is possible to extend the application of instrumental variables in the context of QR
to address the bias caused by the endogeneity issue through the use of instrumental
variable quantile regression (IV-QR). We follow the application of IV-QR used in
Chernozhukov & Hansen (2008). We adjust the quantile regression as follows:
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Qi = α(U) + γ(U)Ni + β(U)Xi, U |X, Z ∼ Uniform(0, 1) (7)
where U is a rank variable that incorporates the unobserved heterogeneity from each
child’s level of ability, and Zi a vector of instruments (twin/multiple births and sex
composition) that are correlated with Ni but uncorrelated with Qi.
Again we estimate this model using the binary indicator for Ni which takes a
value of 1 if the family has two or more children (including the study child) and 0
otherwise.40 Ni is then defined as:
Ni = δ(X,Z, V ) (8)
where V consists of unobserved random variables that are correlated with U . This
is the selection assumption outlined in Chernozhukov & Hansen (2008).
Conditional on Xi and Z, the linear quantile equation becomes:
Quantτ (Qi|Xi) = α(τ) + γ1(τ)Ni + β(τ)Xi = α(τ) + γ2(τ)Zi + β(τ)Xi (9)
To find a solution, we again take the argument of the minimum with respect to
the above equation (see Kwak, 2010), as follows:
argmin
∑
ρτ [Qi − (αi(τ) + βi(τ)Xi + γ(τ)Zi)] (10)
IV-QR allows for the analysis of the effect on all children that experience in
the treatment, in this case the treatment is two or more children in the household.
This implies the treatment is the existence of siblings. The major limitation of the
implementation of IV-QR is that it does not allow the treatment assignment to vary
across the distribution of outcomes (Millimet & Wang, 2011). As the existence of
siblings may depend on a number of characteristics, this is a significant limitation as
40This is the ‘Two Plus’ binary indicator outlined previously.
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we are unable to isolate those who drive the effect by switching from no treatment
to treatment.
5.2.5 Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) approach
Due to the limitations of the IV-QR discussed above we apply quantile treatment
effects (QTE). Quantile treatment effects allow for the identification of a treatment
on a subpopulation known as “compliers”. Compliers are those who respond to
the implementation of a treatment or policy by switching. In addition to compliers
there are always- and never-takers who do not respond to the implementation of the
treatment (Abadie et al., 2002). The assignment of treatment status is therefore de-
termined by the instrument. The treatment effect can be identified for the compliers
as N1 > N0. In the application of QTE, we are only able to utilise one instrument for
the assignment of treatment status, unlike the IV and IV-QR estimation methods.
Following Abadie et al. (2002) we define a the binary endogenous treatment we
analyse, in this case as before, we use having two or more children as the treatment
(Ni). We also define a binary instrumental variable Z (as before) which is used to
identify the compliers to the treatment in an exogenous manner:
Quantτ (Qi|Xi, N,N1 > N0) = α(τ) + γ(τ)N + β(τ)Xi (11)
where Quantτ (Qi|Xi, N,N1 > N0) denotes the τth quantile of Qi given X and N for
the compliers. The conditional quantile function is then solved by
argmin
∑
ρτ [(Qi − αi(τ)− βi(τ)Xi − γ(τ)Zi)|N1 > N0] (12)
with ρτ defined as in equation (12). Abadie et al. (2002) identify the following inverse
propensity score weighting matrix which is used to find the compliers in the analysis.
Therefore, equation (12) is adjusted as follows:
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κ(N,Z,X) = 1− N(1− Z)
1− pi0(X) −
(1−N)Z
pi0(X)
(13)
where pi0(X) = P (Z = 1|X) and 0 otherwise, and κ=1 when N = Z. Therefore,
E(Z|X) is estimated and plugged into κ to identify the compliers for the treatment
in an exogenous manner. This makes the conditional quantile function:
argmin
∑
κρτ (Qi − βi(τ)Xi − γ(τ)Ni) (14)
This gives the conditional quantile treatment effects.
Unconditional Quantile Treatment Effects
In addition, this study also estimates the unconditional endogenous QTE from
Froelich & Melly (2013). Unconditional QTEs are useful when analysing the impact
if treatments on the distribution of the unconditional outcome variable. The uncon-
ditional QTE has two advantages over the conditional QTE: (1) including covariates
that are independent from the treatment can change the limit of the estimated condi-
tional QTE, and (2) unconditional effects can be estimated consistently at the rate of√
n without any parametric restrictions (Froelich & Melly, 2013). Therefore, QTEs
are entirely non-parametric which removes the restrictive assumption for QTE to be
the same, independent from the value of X.
Froelich & Melly (2013) define the unconditional QTE for the τth quantile as:
∆τ = QuantτQ1 −QuantτQ0 (15)
The quantile function becomes:
argmin
∑
φiρτ (Qi − α−∆Ni) (16)
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where:
φi =
ZiPr(Z = 1|Xi)
Pr(Z = 1|Xi)[1− Pr(Z = 1|X − 1)](2Ni − 1) (17)
This weighting estimator is equivalent to using two univariate weighted quantile
regressions separately for N = 1 and N = 0.
In this case, the quantile function is not conditioned upon X. This is why this
application is considered an ‘unconditional’ quantile treatment effect. However, when
identifying compliers using the weighting function recommended by Froelich & Melly
(2013), we do condition upon X with the treatment on the observed characteristics,
as these drive compliance to the treatment.
Overall, the methodologies used in this study, whilst extensive should shed light
on the quality-quantity trade-off in Australia. IV, QR, IV-QR and QTE all con-
tribute to this analysis, but QTE reveals the most information on the existence of
the quality-quantity trade-off due to the analysis of compliers as compliers are the
most effective target for policy implementation as they do not participate in the
treatment if ineligible but do participate if eligible. Therefore, if a policy specifically
targeted compliers, it would be effective.
5.2.6 Data
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, to implement our analysis we use the data from the
LSAC. The LSAC tracks the development of Australian children and families. The
LSAC commenced in 2004 with two cohorts; families with 4-5 year old children
(Cohort K) and families with 0-1 year old infants (Cohort B). PPVT were collected
in 2004, 2006, 2008 for Cohort K and 2008, 2010 and 2012 for Cohort B. WAI scores
were collected in 2004 for Cohort K and 2008 for Cohort B. BMI is collected during
every major wave for each child.41 However, weight-for-height is collected in 2004
41BMI is measured in every major wave which occurs ever second year: 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,
2012
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for Cohort K and in 2006 and 2008 for Cohort B.42 We use a panel format where
possible in the IV estimations, but due to WAI tests being conducted once per cohort,
and weight-for-height being collected only once for Cohort K, the analysis of these
outcomes is cross sectional. A pooled analysis is conducted for the QR, IV-QR and
QTE analyses. We use Panelwhiz (see Haisken-DeNew & Hahn, 2010) in conjunction
with Stata 12 for this analysis.
42The analysis was also conducted on weight-for-age which is collected in every major wave.
Similar results were found, however as weight-for-height is an indicator of chronic health issues we
focus on it as the main indicator for child health.
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Table 5.1: Variable Description
Variable Type Description
Age Continuous Age of the SC
Sex Discrete Sex of the SC (0) Male (1) Female
Indigenous status of SC Discrete Indigenous status of the SC (0) Not Indigenous
(1) Aboriginal (2) Torres Strait Islander (3) Both
SC’s number of siblings Continuous Number of children present in SC’s Household
Two or more children in SC Discrete Two or more children present in Study Child’s
household household (0) No (1) Yes (derived)
Covariates for SC’s mother
Age Continuous Age of the SC’s mother
Immigrant status Discrete Immigrant status of SC’s mother (0) Native,
(1) Immigrant
Labour force status Discrete Labour force status of SC’s mother (0) Employed
(1) Unemployed (2) Not in Labour Force (NILF)
(3) Refused/ Not stated/ Not Present
Educational qualification Discrete Highest Qualification of SC’s mother (1) Postgraduate
degree (2) Graduate diploma/cert (3) Bachelor degree
inc hons (4) Advanced diploma/diploma (5) Trade
Certificate/Certificate (6) Other (7) High School
(reference) (8) < High School (9) Refused/Not stated
Indigenous status Discrete Indigenous status of the SC’s mother (0) Not Indigenous
(1) Aboriginal (2) Torres Strait Islander (3) Both
Covariates for SC’s father
Age Continuous Age of the SC’s father
Immigrant status Discrete Immigrant status of SC’s father (0) Native,
(1) Immigrant
Labour force status Discrete Labour force status of SC’s father (0) Employed
(1) Unemployed (2) Not in Labour Force (NILF)
(3) Refused/ Not stated/ Not Present
Educational qualification Discrete Highest Qualification of SC’s father (1) Postgraduate
degree (2) Graduate diploma/cert (3) Bachelor degree
inc hons (4) Advanced diploma/diploma (5) Trade
Certificate/Certificate (6) Other (7) High School
(reference) (8) < High School (9) Refused/Not stated
Indigenous status Discrete Indigenous status of the SC’s father (0) Not Indigenous
(1) Aboriginal (2) Torres Strait Islander (3) Both
Dependent Variables
SC PPVT Score Continuous SC Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) score
SC WAI Score Continuous SC Who am I? (WAI) test score
SC BMI percentile Continuous SC Body Mass Index (BMI) as a percentile based on
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
growth charts.
SC Weight for Height Percentile Continuous SC Weight for Height percentile based on
CDC growth charts.
Instruments
Second birth was a twin or Discrete Second birth in family was a twin or multiple birth,
multiple birth (0) No (1) Yes
Sex composition dummy Discrete First two children were the same gender (0) No (1) Yes
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Descriptive Statistics
A description of the variables used in this analysis can be found in Table 5.1. De-
scriptive statistics for study child characteristics and parental characteristics can be
found in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 respectively. It can be seen that approximately
49% of children in the analysis are females. The average household has between
1.3 and 1.5 children including the SC. The average unconditional PPVT, WAI, BMI
percentile and weight-for-height is lower for the older cohort (Cohort K). There is
approximately a two per cent chance that a family has a twin or multiple birth as
the second birth in the household. Sex composition suggests almost 11 per cent of
families have two children of the same gender for the first and second birth in the
household.
Table 5.3 shows the average age of a mother is between 35 and 39 years. Father’s
are slightly older than mothers. There are more immigrant parents in Cohort K.43
Over one third of mothers are not in the labour force (NILF) in the younger cohort
whereas 26% of mothers in the older cohort are NILF. Education and indigenous
status are fairly similar across both cohorts.
43Immigrant status is derived from the country of birth information reported in the survey. If
the country of birth is not Australia, then the individual is classed as an immigrant
120
Table 5.2: Child Characteristics
Cohort B K
Age of the Study Child 4.061 8.072
(2.950) (2.946)
Sex of the study child 0.487 0.490
(0.500) (0.500)
Aboriginal 0.033 0.029
(0.178) (0.168)
Torres Strait Islander 0.003 0.002
(0.055) (0.039)
Both 0.003 0.002
(0.051) (0.044)
No. of Children in HH 1.368 1.583
(1.058) (1.061)
Two or more children in SC HH 0.450 0.573
(0.497) (0.495)
Child Outcomes
SC PPVT score 72.788 72.043
(7.914) (8.030)
SC WAI score 65.488 64.024
(8.557) (8.070)
SC BMI percentile 63.457 62.163
(27.600) (27.708)
SC Weight-for-Height 64.971 63.861
(27.234) (25.689)
Instruments
Second birth was a twin or multiple birth 0.025 0.022
(0.157) (0.145)
Sex composition dummy 0.109 0.107
(0.312) (0.309)
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Table 5.3: Parent Characteristics
Cohort Cohort
Mother’s Characteristics B K Father’s Characteristics B K
Age 35.116 38.714 Age 37.719 41.342
(6.145) (6.083) (6.712) (6.799)
Immigrant status 0.294 0.402 Immigrant status 0.213 0.242
(0.455) (0.490) (0.409) (0.428)
Labour force status Labour force status
Employed 0.626 0.702 Employed 0.897 0.88
(0.484) (0.457) (0.304) (0.325)
Unemployed 0.026 0.029 Unemployed 0.018 0.015
(0.160) (0.167) (0.132) (0.122)
NILF 0.346 0.264 NILF 0.037 0.041
(0.476) (0.441) (0.189) (0.199)
Not present/Not stated/ 0.001 0.005 Not present/Not stated/ 0.048 0.063
Refused (0.037) (0.069) Refused (0.215) (0.243)
Educational Educational
qualification qualification
Postgraduate degree 0.080 0.072 Postgraduate degree 0.073 0.078
(0.272) (0.258) (0.261) (0.268)
Graduate diploma/cert 0.071 0.074 Graduate diploma/cert 0.057 0.054
(0.257) (0.261) (0.231) (0.227)
Bachelor degree inc hons 0.203 0.165 Bachelor degree inc hons 0.145 0.130
(0.402) (0.371) (0.352) (0.336)
Advanced diploma/ 0.103 0.096 Advanced diploma/ 0.081 0.075
diploma (0.304) (0.295) diploma (0.272) (0.263)
Trade Certificate/ 0.268 0.277 Trade Certificate/ 0.319 0.309
Certificate (0.443) (0.448) Certificate (0.466) (0.462)
Other 0.015 0.016 Other 0.029 0.022
(0.120) (0.126) (0.168) (0.146)
High School 0.167 0.169 High School 0.104 0.102
(0.373) (0.375) (0.305) (0.303)
< High School 0.088 0.118 < High School 0.070 0.081
(0.284) (0.322) (0.255) (0.272)
Refused/Not stated 0.004 0.013 Refused/Not stated 0.122 0.150
(0.065) (0.113) (0.327) (0.357)
Indigenous status Indigenous status
Aboriginal 0.023 0.021 Aboriginal 0.013 0.011
(0.151) (0.142) (0.111) (0.103)
Torres Strait Islander 0.002 0.002 Torres Strait Islander 0.002 0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.031)
Both 0.001 0.001 Both 0.001 0.001
(0.023) (0.027) (0.029) (0.023)
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5.3 Result
In this section we discuss the results for the methodologies outlined in Section 5.2.
Table 5.4 reports the medians for the child quality proxies; PPVT, WAI, weight-
for-height percentile and BMI percentile. The median shows the observation at
the middle of the distribution, where half of the observations lie below the median
and the other half lie above the median. This can be useful in comparisons to
the means reported in Table 5.2. For example, half of the children in this analysis
have a PPVT test score below 71.95. This shows the median and average are fairly
similar for PPVT score and WAI scores. But for weight-for-height percentile and
BMI percentile there is an approximate 4 point difference between the mean and the
median (comparing to Table 5.2 ). The results from the application of instrumental
variables are summarised in Table 5.5 to 5.12. We report the results for both the twin
instrument and sex composition specifications and then the combined instrument
specification, as a robustness check.
Table 5.4: Medians of outcome variables
PPVT WAI Weight BMI
For Height Percentile
Percentile
Median 71.955 65.000 70.34 67.996
St. Err. (0.093) (0.063) (0.309) (0.221)
Obs. 25460 9076 13733 38491
The results for educational outcomes are reported inTable 5.5 and Table 5.6 for
PPVT scores, and Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 reports the results for WAI scores. Weight-
for-height results are reported in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10. BMI percentile results
are Table 5.11 and Table 5.12.
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As the LSAC follows a panel format, where possible we estimate the instrumental
variable fixed and random effects models. The use of a panel data format allows for
us to control for unobservable characteristics, caused by individual heterogeneity.
Fixed effects accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, allowing for individual specific
effects to be correlated with the covariates. The random effects model requires the as-
sumption that the individual specific effects to be uncorrelated with the independent
variables. Specification (1) shows the pooled IV results, specification (2) reports the
fixed effects (FE) and specification (3) reports the random effects (RE) results when
using the twin or multiple births instrument. Specification (4) shows the pooled IV
results, specification (5) reports the fixed effects (FE) and specification (6) reports
the random effects (RE) results when using sex composition as the instrument in
the regression. Table 5.5 shows the results for instrumenting using twins (or mul-
tiple births) and sex composition on the PPVT scores of the study child. Panel A
reports the coefficients for when the fertility measure is the number of siblings in the
household. Panel B shows the results when using the binary indicator of ‘Two Plus’.
This second estimation is reported to ensure comparability with the other selected
methodologies used in this analysis.
The results in specification (1) of Panel A shows that as the number of siblings
in the household increases, there is a negative impact on the SC’s PPVT scores of
approximately 1.5 points for each additional sibling, which is both economically and
statistically significant when instrumenting using the twin instrument. This negative
effect is shown in all specifications for Panel A, but is insignificant for the FE models.
Specifications (1) and (3) are consistent and approximately the same magnitude for
the impact of additional children on the SC’s PPVT scores. Additionally, in Panel A,
shows that using sex composition reduces the negative impact of additional children
on the SC given the increase in the number of siblings in the household compared to
using the twin instrument (specifications (1-3)).
124
T
ab
le
5.
5:
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
V
ar
ia
b
le
E
st
im
at
io
n
fo
r
P
P
V
T
S
co
re
s
P
A
N
E
L
A
P
A
N
E
L
B
N
U
M
B
E
R
O
F
S
IB
L
IN
G
S
T
W
O
O
R
M
O
R
E
C
H
IL
D
R
E
N
IN
H
O
U
S
E
H
O
L
D
T
w
in
In
st
ru
m
en
t
S
ex
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
In
st
ru
m
en
t
T
w
in
In
st
ru
m
en
t
S
ex
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
In
st
ru
m
en
t
P
o
o
le
d
IV
F
E
R
E
P
o
o
le
d
IV
F
E
R
E
P
o
o
le
d
IV
F
E
R
E
P
o
o
le
d
IV
F
E
R
E
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
N
o
.
S
ib
li
n
g
s
-1
.5
3
0
8
*
*
*
-3
5
.2
9
8
9
-1
.5
9
3
2
*
*
-0
.9
9
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
9
9
-1
.0
2
1
1
*
*
*
(0
.4
7
3
3
)
(9
2
.6
1
5
5
)
(0
.6
2
4
9
)
(0
.1
2
1
2
)
(0
.2
2
8
6
)
(0
.1
3
4
5
)
T
w
o
P
lu
s
-3
.1
6
2
5
*
*
*
-1
4
3
.6
4
6
9
-3
.2
8
8
5
*
*
*
-1
.7
8
5
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
5
8
-1
.8
6
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.9
4
3
2
)
(2
3
3
.7
4
9
5
)
(0
.9
0
1
7
)
(0
.2
1
6
4
)
(0
.9
6
3
1
)
(0
.2
0
7
6
)
C
o
h
o
rt
7
.3
3
7
0
*
*
*
-0
.1
6
5
1
7
.5
4
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.2
5
5
5
*
*
*
7
.1
3
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
6
7
7
.4
8
4
4
*
*
*
-0
.2
6
9
8
*
*
*
(0
.5
1
7
0
)
(0
.1
4
0
3
)
(0
.4
2
8
3
)
(0
.0
8
8
8
)
(0
.5
2
1
4
)
(0
.1
2
6
4
)
(0
.4
2
8
2
)
(0
.0
8
6
9
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
2
,0
3
3
1
2
,0
3
3
1
2
,0
3
3
1
8
,3
2
6
1
8
,3
2
6
1
8
,3
2
6
1
2
,0
3
3
1
2
,0
3
3
1
2
,0
3
3
1
8
,3
2
6
1
8
,3
2
6
1
8
,3
2
6
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.5
7
8
9
0
.5
8
4
5
0
.5
7
4
8
0
.5
8
3
1
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
H
H
4
,6
0
2
4
,6
0
2
6
,9
7
8
6
,9
7
8
4
,6
0
2
4
,6
0
2
6
,9
7
8
6
,9
7
8
W
e
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
y
ea
r,
co
h
o
rt
,
th
e
a
g
e,
se
x
,
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s
st
a
tu
s
o
f
th
e
st
u
d
y
ch
il
d
,
m
o
th
er
a
n
d
fa
th
er
,
in
a
d
d
it
io
n
to
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
st
a
tu
s,
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
q
u
a
li
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
p
a
re
n
ts
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
125
T
ab
le
5.
6:
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
V
ar
ia
b
le
E
st
im
at
io
n
fo
r
P
P
V
T
S
co
re
s
w
it
h
T
w
o
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
P
A
N
E
L
A
N
U
M
B
E
R
O
F
S
IB
L
IN
G
S
T
W
O
O
R
M
O
R
E
C
H
IL
D
R
E
N
IN
H
O
U
S
E
H
O
L
D
P
o
o
le
d
IV
F
E
R
E
P
o
o
le
d
IV
F
E
R
E
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
N
o
.
S
ib
li
n
g
s
-0
.9
1
9
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
9
8
9
-0
.9
3
3
6
*
*
*
(0
.1
4
7
0
)
(0
.4
7
6
0
)
(0
.1
6
8
7
)
T
w
o
P
lu
s
-1
.5
5
6
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
8
0
-1
.6
0
4
2
*
*
*
(0
.2
4
6
8
)
(0
.9
8
7
0
)
(0
.2
4
3
0
)
C
o
h
o
rt
7
.3
2
7
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
3
8
7
.1
9
3
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
4
1
(0
.5
6
4
3
)
(0
.1
6
9
3
)
(0
.5
6
3
1
)
(0
.1
0
9
7
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
9
,7
8
3
9
,7
8
3
9
,7
8
3
9
,7
8
3
9
,7
8
3
9
,7
8
3
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.5
8
3
8
0
.5
8
3
8
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
H
H
3
,7
5
9
3
,7
5
9
3
,7
5
9
3
,7
5
9
W
e
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
y
ea
r,
co
h
o
rt
,
th
e
a
g
e,
se
x
,
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s
st
a
tu
s
o
f
th
e
st
u
d
y
ch
il
d
,
m
o
th
er
a
n
d
fa
th
er
,
in
a
d
d
it
io
n
to
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
st
a
tu
s,
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
q
u
a
li
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
p
a
re
n
ts
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
126
Panel B suggests that using the binary indicator to estimate the relationship
between child quantity and child quality results in the estimates diverge further into
the negatives on the SC (in comparison to Panel A). The results in Panel B for Table
5.5 suggest that the study child loses between 1.8 to 3.2 point on their PPVT scores.
Therefore, both Panel A and Panel B suggest that the presence of additional siblings
in the household has a negative significant impact on the study child’s PPVT scores
on the average.
Table 5.6 shows the results for IV with the use of both the twin and sex composi-
tion. The impact of additional children on the study child is similar to the findings in
Table 5.5, however the magnitude is generally not as large. However, that negative
impact may be overestimated when using one instrument in the regression. This
suggests that the existence of other children in the household has an negative im-
pact on the study child. Additionally, we find that the coefficients from using both
instruments are closer to the coefficients report for the sex composition IV results.
The results for the IV for WAI are reported in Table 5.7. Panel A reports the
coefficients for when the fertility measure is the number of siblings in the household
and Panel B shows the results when using the binary indicator of ‘Two Plus’. In
this case as WAI scores are only collected once for each child, unlike PPVT, hence
we use a cross sectional analysis. In this case WAI shows very similar results for the
pooled estimations as those found in Table 5.5. We also analyse the effects by cohort
separately.
127
T
ab
le
5.
7:
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
V
ar
ia
b
le
E
st
im
at
io
n
fo
r
W
A
I
S
co
re
s
P
A
N
E
L
A
P
A
N
E
L
B
N
U
M
B
E
R
O
F
S
IB
L
IN
G
S
T
W
O
O
R
M
O
R
E
C
H
IL
D
R
E
N
IN
H
O
U
S
E
H
O
L
D
T
w
in
In
st
ru
m
en
t
S
ex
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
In
st
ru
m
en
t
T
w
in
In
st
ru
m
en
t
S
ex
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
In
st
ru
m
en
t
P
o
o
le
d
IV
C
o
h
o
rt
K
C
o
h
o
rt
B
P
o
o
le
d
IV
C
o
h
o
rt
K
C
o
h
o
rt
B
P
o
o
le
d
IV
C
o
h
o
rt
K
C
o
h
o
rt
B
P
o
o
le
d
IV
C
o
h
o
rt
K
C
o
h
o
rt
B
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
N
o
.
S
ib
li
n
g
s
-1
.9
9
5
2
*
*
-1
.9
7
7
9
*
-1
.6
1
5
2
-1
.0
8
5
9
*
*
*
-0
.6
4
2
9
*
*
-1
.6
8
9
8
*
*
*
(0
.9
0
8
0
)
(1
.1
6
9
2
)
(1
.3
1
7
5
)
(0
.2
0
7
0
)
(0
.2
6
8
3
)
(0
.3
2
6
2
)
T
w
o
P
lu
s
-3
.9
3
8
5
*
*
-4
.1
5
7
2
*
-3
.0
1
3
2
-1
.8
8
5
7
*
*
*
-1
.1
3
7
5
*
*
-2
.8
5
3
5
*
*
*
(1
.7
8
5
1
)
(2
.4
2
7
4
)
(2
.4
6
3
1
)
(0
.3
5
8
2
)
(0
.4
7
4
9
)
(0
.5
4
4
6
)
C
o
h
o
rt
-1
.1
7
7
7
*
*
*
-1
.3
4
4
2
*
*
*
-1
.2
0
9
6
*
*
*
-1
.3
5
9
2
*
*
*
(0
.2
4
5
9
)
(0
.1
9
8
9
)
(0
.2
4
7
1
)
(0
.1
9
9
2
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
4
,4
2
4
2
,3
2
6
2
,0
9
8
6
,6
4
0
3
,5
4
6
3
,0
9
4
4
,4
2
4
2
,3
2
6
2
,0
9
8
6
,6
4
0
3
,5
4
6
3
,0
9
4
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
0
0
7
0
.1
9
4
7
0
.2
2
5
2
0
.2
1
3
5
0
.1
9
8
6
0
.2
2
1
3
0
.1
9
0
7
0
.1
7
8
3
0
.2
2
0
1
0
.2
1
1
2
0
.1
9
7
3
0
.2
1
7
0
W
e
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
y
ea
r,
co
h
o
rt
,
th
e
a
g
e,
se
x
,
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s
st
a
tu
s
o
f
th
e
st
u
d
y
ch
il
d
,
m
o
th
er
a
n
d
fa
th
er
,
in
a
d
d
it
io
n
to
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
st
a
tu
s,
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
q
u
a
li
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
p
a
re
n
ts
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
128
T
ab
le
5.
8:
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
V
ar
ia
b
le
E
st
im
at
io
n
fo
r
W
A
I
S
co
re
s
w
it
h
T
w
o
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
P
A
N
E
L
A
N
U
M
B
E
R
O
F
S
IB
L
IN
G
S
T
W
O
O
R
M
O
R
E
C
H
IL
D
R
E
N
IN
H
O
U
S
E
H
O
L
D
P
o
o
le
d
IV
C
o
h
o
rt
K
C
o
h
o
rt
B
P
o
o
le
d
IV
C
o
h
o
rt
K
C
o
h
o
rt
B
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
N
o
.
S
ib
li
n
g
s
-1
.3
5
0
2
*
*
*
-0
.7
8
6
4
*
*
-2
.0
0
1
2
*
*
*
(0
.2
6
6
5
)
(0
.3
4
8
7
)
(0
.4
1
2
9
)
T
w
o
P
lu
s
-2
.2
1
7
5
*
*
*
-1
.3
3
4
1
*
*
-3
.1
5
8
7
*
*
*
(0
.4
3
5
6
)
(0
.5
8
5
4
)
(0
.6
4
7
8
)
C
o
h
o
rt
-1
.3
8
1
0
*
*
*
-1
.4
1
2
6
*
*
*
(0
.2
7
0
9
)
(0
.2
7
1
8
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
3
7
.7
5
2
3
*
*
*
3
4
.9
7
0
8
*
*
*
4
0
.1
8
6
3
*
*
*
3
6
.7
5
9
5
*
*
*
3
4
.3
1
2
4
*
*
*
3
8
.8
5
3
6
*
*
*
(1
.9
0
2
8
)
(2
.6
5
5
3
)
(2
.7
0
4
3
)
(1
.8
4
8
9
)
(2
.5
4
2
0
)
(2
.6
7
0
7
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
,5
5
5
1
,8
6
0
1
,6
9
5
3
,5
5
5
1
,8
6
0
1
,6
9
5
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
1
3
7
0
.2
1
4
6
0
.2
1
8
9
0
.2
0
9
2
0
.2
1
1
9
0
.2
1
2
4
W
e
co
n
tr
o
l
fo
r
y
ea
r,
co
h
o
rt
,
th
e
a
g
e,
se
x
,
in
d
ig
en
o
u
s
st
a
tu
s
o
f
th
e
st
u
d
y
ch
il
d
,
m
o
th
er
a
n
d
fa
th
er
,
in
a
d
d
it
io
n
to
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
st
a
tu
s,
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
q
u
a
li
fi
ca
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
p
a
re
n
ts
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
129
Panel A of Table 5.7 suggests that as the number of siblings in the household
increases, the study child loses between 0.6 and 2 points on average on their WAI
score. The effect is more significant when using sex composition as the instrument
(specifications (4-6) in Panel A). Similar results are shown for ‘Two Plus’ in Panel
B, with the magnitude of the effect being larger. Table 5.7 also shows that cohort
plays an important role in the WAI scores when using sex composition in either
model specification. The results shown in Table 5.7 are consistent with the results
in Table 5.5. In both cases, an increase in the number of siblings in the household
has a negative impact on the study child’s educational outcomes. Again, Table 5.8
shows the regression results using both the twin and sex composition instrument. The
coefficients found for the number of siblings is similar in magnitude to the coefficients
for sex composition, suggesting that the twin instrument may be bias. The results
for two or more children are also similar as those reported in Table 5.7.
Weight-for-height percentile shows mixed results in Table 5.9. Panel A shows a
negative significant effect for both the twin and sex composition instruments. When
separating the sample by cohort, we find there is a almost a one percent difference in
the weight-for-height percentile. However, the cohort who gains a percent switches
based on the choice of instrument for the total number of siblings in the household.
This suggests that the presence of siblings decreases the study child’s weight-for-
height percentile. Panel B shows inconsistent results when using the two or more
children in the household measure for the number of children in the household. We
find that the sign and significance changes between the specifications. However, it is
important to note that the twin instrument is likely overestimates the relationship
between an exogenous increase in family size, as weight measures are potentially
endogenous for twin and multiple births (Angrist et al., 2010). The use of sex com-
position as an instrument leads to coefficients that are much smaller than those
reported for the twin instrument.
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Finally, with respect to weight-for-height percentile, Table 5.10 reports the the
results from using both instrumental variables. We find the coefficients for both
two plus and number of siblings are smaller than in the case with using only the
twin instrument and much closer in magnitude to the specifications that use the
sex composition instrument. Again, the sign switches, making it difficult to draw
conclusions as to the effect of additional children on health outcomes
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As the results in Table 5.9 are conflicting, we should analyse the results for BMI
percentile in Table 5.11 before drawing any conclusions, with respect to the impact
of the number of siblings on the study child. BMI also shows fairly inconsistent
results depending on the instrument used. Compared to Table 5.9 the results for
BMI percentile in Table 5.11 show a smaller overall effect on the health outcomes of
the study child. Within Table 5.11, it can be seen in Panel A that the pooled IV in
specification (4) has a positive significant effect on the study child’s BMI percentile
when instrumenting with sex composition. The results for using the twin instrument
in Panel A is fairly consistent with Panel A Table 5.9, the difference being the
magnitude of the effect. In the model with two or more children (‘Two Plus’) the
result for BMI are again inconsistent, switching signs and significance. Therefore, we
find mixed positive and negative effect of the additional children on the study child’s
weight-format and BMI measure.44 However, it is important to note that there may
be a birth order effect that is confounding the estimates.45
Finally, the instrumental variable result for BMI percentile using both the twin
instrument and sex composition instrument are reported in Table 5.12. We observe
much smaller coefficients when both the twin and sex composition variables are used
to instrument sibling size. Furthermore the results in Table 5.12 reiterate the results
observed in Table 5.10, suggesting that using a twin instrument may impact on
the coefficient for family size due to the interrelationship between twinning/multiple
births and health outcomes.
Overall we can see from the instrumental variable regressions discussed above,
there is a negative impact of additional children on the study child’s outcomes and
therefore provides evidence that there is a quality-quantity trade-off occurring at the
average.
44Weight-for-age percentile is also a measure which could be used in this analysis instead of BMI
as it can show long term health issues in children when used in conjunction with weight-for-height.
We explored weight-for-age and the results were similar.
45Birth order effects cannot be controlled for, as the questionnaire does not provide adequate
information on the age of the study childs siblings.
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5.3.1 Quantile Regression Results
Table 5.13 shows the results for the quantile regression at the median (τ = 0.5),
including all covariates used in our analysis at the median using quantile regression.
Specification (1) reports the results for PPVT scores, (2) reports the results for
WAI score, (3) reports the weight-for-height percentile results and (4) reports the
BMI percentile against the ‘Two Plus’ indicator for two of more children in the
household. In this instance we are not instrumenting to adjust for bias, so true
inference is not possible. It can be seen that QR also exhibits a negative relationship
between an increase in the number of siblings in the household and the outcomes of
the study child for PPVT and WAI. Weight-for-height shows a positive significant
effect. However when looking at the BMI percentile specification we find a negative
coefficient, leading to conflicting results.
Furthermore, we also report the QR for the deciles with robust standard errors
in Table 5.14. In this table it can be seen that the effect of an increase in the number
of siblings on the study child is different depending on where in the distribution
of outcomes the child lies. For example, we can see from the robust QR for WAI
that there is a monotonic negative impact on the outcome of the child as we move
along the distribution. This suggests that those children at the higher end of the
distribution are affected more negatively by the presence of siblings than those at the
low end of the distribution. However, WAI also shows a consistent negative impact
on test scores due to the existence of siblings in the household.
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Table 5.13: Quantile Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPVT WAI Weight for Height BMI Percentile
Two Plus -1.0619*** -1.1602*** 1.5584** -0.4565
(0.0938) (0.2168) (0.7617) (0.5015)
Year
2006 3.2689*** 0.2656 -4.8680***
(0.1789) (1.8882) (0.8675)
2008 1.6681*** 0.9493*** 0.8523 -1.5882*
(0.1586) (0.2318) (0.9419) (0.9107)
2010 3.8465*** -3.7046***
(0.1796) (1.0236)
2012 2.5434*** -2.1311*
(0.2261) (1.1887)
Study Child Controls
Age of SC 2.8148*** 5.3547*** -1.6747* -1.2776***
(0.0378) (0.2622) (0.8671) (0.1353)
Sex of SC -0.1750* 5.1180*** -3.1267*** -0.9565**
(0.0916) (0.2101) (0.7234) (0.4879)
Indigenous status
Aboriginal -0.3553 -0.2127 6.5623 1.3158
(0.6702) (1.5143) (5.1251) (3.5850)
Torres Strait Islander -1.4630 1.5913 24.2742 14.5170
(2.5185) (5.7794) (17.2220) (12.3291)
Both -4.1476** -4.7711 -0.1377 -6.6090
(2.1017) (4.6942) (14.8872) (11.3192)
Mother’s Controls
Age 0.1053*** 0.0008 0.0055 0.1187*
(0.0126) (0.0288) (0.1002) (0.0673)
Immigrant Status -1.3705*** 0.9980*** -4.0785*** -3.3968***
(0.1253) (0.2875) (0.9949) (0.6673)
Labour Force Status
Unemployed -0.7061** -0.6759 -5.9917** -3.0440*
(0.3207) (0.7253) (2.5480) (1.7213)
NILF -0.1835* -0.5890** -2.4060*** -1.4793**
(0.1078) (0.2326) (0.7935) (0.5811)
Educational Qualifications
Postgraduate degree 1.7313*** 1.9069*** 0.3756 -0.7759
(0.2112) (0.4808) (1.6656) (1.1312)
Graduate diploma/cert 0.8908*** 1.4772*** 0.4793 0.5548
(0.2084) (0.4651) (1.6331) (1.1108)
Bachelor degree inc hons 1.2412*** 1.7203*** -1.1855 -0.9876
(0.1638) (0.3500) (1.2289) (0.8867)
Advanced diploma/diploma 0.5559*** 0.8049** -0.5897 -1.5821
(0.1881) (0.4096) (1.4306) (1.0099)
Trade Certificate/Certificate -0.2009 0.5028 0.9487 1.1959
(0.1482) (0.3066) (1.0979) (0.8044)
Other 0.3435 1.8221** 0.4759 1.3651
(0.3746) (0.9084) (3.0737) (1.9985)
< High School -0.5774*** -1.4354*** 0.0068 3.5465***
(0.1938) (0.5552) (1.6421) (1.0188)
Refused/Not stated 0.0232 0.4132 -12.4042 9.2121
(1.1659) (3.2228) (10.3690) (5.8096)
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Table 5.13: Quantile Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPVT WAI Weight for Height BMI Percentile
Indigenous status
Aboriginal -0.9364 -1.6927 -2.8461 -0.0759
(0.6224) (1.3747) (4.6211) (3.3492)
Torres Strait Islander -0.5123 -5.0990 -4.3785 8.9967
(1.7460) (3.9387) (12.8562) (9.1427)
Both 6.3999* 3.6352 -2.1091 9.5551
(3.6083) (5.9537) (20.3384) (17.0217)
Father’s Controls
Age -0.0124 -0.0100 0.0766 0.0343
(0.0105) (0.0239) (0.0836) (0.0561)
Immigrant Status -0.7141*** 1.0296*** 0.9442 0.9144
(0.1226) (0.2816) (0.9727) (0.6524)
Labour Force Status
Unemployed -0.8011** 0.1900 -1.2605 0.5628
(0.3934) (0.8790) (3.0323) (2.0866)
NILF -0.5195** -0.8108 -0.5200 1.1265
(0.2537) (0.5658) (1.9729) (1.3207)
Educational Qualifications
Postgraduate degree 2.0831*** 1.3714*** -2.8580* -3.3419***
(0.2196) (0.4834) (1.7238) (1.1799)
Graduate diploma/cert 0.8990*** 0.6417 -2.3742 -1.3296
(0.2317) (0.5053) (1.7830) (1.2469)
Bachelor degree inc hons 1.5869*** 1.6059*** -2.1224 -2.1966**
(0.1889) (0.3943) (1.4076) (1.0243)
Advanced diploma/diploma 0.5194** 0.6551 -2.6392* -2.3008**
(0.2097) (0.4505) (1.6039) (1.1355)
Trade Certificate/Certificate -0.2871* -0.2392 0.0085 2.0586**
(0.1621) (0.3188) (1.1641) (0.8851)
Other 0.1307 0.2756 3.0373 2.6682*
(0.3004) (0.6760) (2.2703) (1.6177)
< High School -0.8643*** -0.8874 2.6173 3.5671***
(0.2165) (0.5892) (1.7887) (1.1462)
Refused/Not stated -0.8867** -0.0785 -4.5225 -2.5806
(0.4145) (0.9134) (3.1561) (2.2142)
Indigenous status
Aboriginal -0.1117 -0.4247 -6.1935 3.7608
(0.6081) (1.3482) (4.5211) (3.2009)
Torres Strait Islander 0.6220 -2.6590 -10.7493 -9.6027
(2.3097) (5.1040) (15.1673) (11.0385)
Both 3.1044 0.1488 -25.5653 -0.1143
(2.4607) (4.8472) (16.8379) (13.1596)
Constant 49.9657*** 33.8496*** 79.1424*** 74.4709***
(0.4172) (1.3981) (4.7426) (2.1509)
Observations 20,555 7,503 11,395 30,825
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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PPVT scores show a similar impact on the children at the higher end of the
distribution. This suggests that children who have a higher level of ability are affected
in a significantly negative manner when they have a sibling. Although the bottom
tail also experiences a significant loss in reported test scores.
The results for weight-for-height suggest that if the study child is at the tails of
the distribution they the child will be impacted more negatively by the presence of
siblings. This is similar to the result found for BMI percentile, although the values
are less negative for BMI and are consistent across the distribution in comparison to
weight-for-height percentile. The results for all outcomes measures are displayed in
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. These graphs add additional emphasis for this analysis
of the distribution of child outcomes. As can be seen, the outcomes for the study
child vary significantly based on where in the distribution the child lies. This is
particularly noticeable along the entire distribution for our educational outcomes
shown in Figure 5.1.
(a) PPVT (b) WAI
Figure 5.1: QR Educational Outcomes
141
(a) Weight-for-Height Percentile (b) BMI Percentile
Figure 5.2: QR Health Outcomes
5.3.2 IV-QR Results
Table 5.15 and Table 5.16 show the results of the implementation of IV-QR using
the twin and sex composition instruments respectively.46 The results for Table 5.15
are similar to that of Table 5.14 for PPVT but for WAI the results are starkly
different. We no longer see the negative impact of additional children on test scores
increasing as we move to the higher end of the distribution. In fact, those children
who experience the most significant impact of additional children in the household
are now at the low end of the distribution of the WAI test distribution when using
the twin instrument. Table 5.16 shows a similar result for PPVT and WAI to the QR
specification when instrumenting with sex composition. The results for educational
outcomes in Table 5.16 are significantly more consistent with Table 5.14, than the
results for education in Table 5.15. However, both specifications show that there is
a negative impact of an increase in the number of siblings on the cognitive skills of
the study child.
46This study uses the -cqiv- command in Stata, implementing an uncensored version to obtain
the IV-QR or “qiv”.
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The health outcome results shown in Table 5.15 and Table 5.16 are conflicting.
Using the twins instrument, we find a significantly negative impact of an additional
child on weight-for-height percentile and BMI percentile, whereas the sex composi-
tion instrument suggests a mild positive effect in the middle of the distribution for
weight-for-height and a mildly positive effect for BMI (at a 10% significance level).
However, this is only significant for BMI. The coefficients between for weight-for-
height percentile and BMI percentile have a similar magnitude in this case. Again,
the lack of consistent coefficient estimate between the two specifications in Table
5.15 and Table 5.16 may be due to the existing relationship between twin/multiple
births and weight, or potential birth order effects. Moreover, we may not be seeing
an impact due to health outcomes not contributing to the quality-quantity trade-off
in developed countries like Australia where healthcare is provided predominantly by
the government.
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Finally, the results for IV-QR using both the twin and sex composition instru-
ments is summarised in Table 5.17. We find no significant effect for health outcomes,
which helps consolidate our findings in Table 5.15 and Table 5.16. Similarly, for ed-
ucational outcomes we find a negative significant effect of the presence of additional
children in the household on the cognitive outcomes of the study child.
5.3.3 Quantile Treatment Effects
This section outlines the results for both the conditional and unconditional treatment
effects. As seen in Section 5.2.5, the application of quantile treatment effects limits
the instrumental variable choice to one instrument per estimation. We report the
twin or multiple birth and sex composition specifications separately.
Conditional QTE
For PPVT scores the results of the Abadie, Angrist & Imbens (2002) method for
conditional QTE are summarised in Table 5.18. In this model of QTEs, both the
weighting matrix and the estimation of the quantile function are conditioned on the
control variables. As can be seen the results for both the twin instrument (Panel
A) and the sex composition instrument (Panel B) show consistently negative results
for all quantiles. The effects are highest at the 60th percentile. Additionally, Table
5.18 reports covariates including year, age and sex of the study child. It can be seen
that as age increases, the PPVT score of the study child increases. Both Panel A
and Panel B shows that sex is only important at the tails of the distribution for
PPVT. Yearly indicators are almost always significant across the distribution, with
the exception of a few at the ends of the distribution.
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Table 5.19 shows the conditional QTE for WAI scores. In this case the twin
instrument in Panel A shows a significant effect of an additional sibling on the study
child in the middle of the distribution but the coefficients are negative and significant.
The second panel of Table 5.19 shows a similar result for WAI to those seen using the
sex composition instrument in Table 5.16. Those children at the higher end of the
distribution experience a loss of 1-2 points when there is a sibling in the household.
The covariates in this specification are also significant across the distribution. Age
has a positive effect on the study childs WAI score, but in magnitude it is smallest
at the 10th percentile. The sex indicator is also positive implying if the study child
is female the WAI score will be between a 4-5 points higher than male children.
We can conclude from this analysis there is evidence that additional children reduce
the educational outcomes of the study child, specifically with respect to cognitive
development. This is in comparison to the results found in Cobb-Clark & Moschion
(2013), who found no effect of additional children on the average Australian child
when analysing NAPLAN scores.
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The conditional QTE for health outcomes are summarised in Table 5.20 and
Table 5.21. Both tables show a fairly consistent result across the distribution when
estimating the conditional QTE using the twin instrument (Panel A). The results
show that the children in the middle of the distribution have the largest negative
effect in terms of magnitude. Sex composition proves to be inconsistent. In Table
5.20, sex composition shows no effect on the weight-for-height percentile of the study
child, whereas Table 5.21 shows a positive significant effect on BMI percentile on
the lower half of the distribution. Additionally the coefficients for age and sex are
inconsistent. Furthermore, the results in Table 5.20 show a negative significant effect
for both age and sex. The BMI specification shows age and sex being significant at
the top end of the distribution in Panel A when using the twin instrument, but sex
composition in Panel B suggests that age is important across the whole distribution.
Overall, these results suggest that there may not be a trade-off in terms of health
outcomes.
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(a) PPVT (b) WAI
Figure 5.3: Conditional QTE Educational Outcomeswith Twin Instrument
(a) Weight-for-Height Percentile (b) BMI Percentile
Figure 5.4: Conditional QTE Health Outcomes with Twin Instrument
A graphical representation of all conditional QTE result can be seen in Figure
5.3 and Figure 5.4 for the specifications which use the twin/multiple birth instru-
ment and in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 for sex composition. Figure 5.3 shows the
distribution of education outcomes is spread further at the tails of the distribution,
and Figure 5.4 shows a ‘U’ shape to the distribution of health outcomes. Figure 5.5
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(a) PPVT (b) WAI
Figure 5.5: Conditional QTE Educational Outcomes with Sex Composition Instru-
ment
(a) Weight-for-Height Percentile (b) BMI Percentile
Figure 5.6: Conditional QTE Health Outcomes with Sex Composition Instrument
shows a similar effect on the distribution as Figure 5.3. The difference being that
Figure 5.5 is centred more around zero. Figure 5.6 (a) shows more consistent results
observed in Figure 5.2.
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Unconditional QTE
Finally, the unconditional treatment effects are summarised in Table 5.22. Uncon-
ditional QTE relax the assumptions imposed when using the conditional QTE (see
Section 5.3.3). When using the twin instrument to estimate the effects of additional
children on PPVT scores, the results show that the compliers who are affected nega-
tively affected by the addition of a sibling are those at the low end of the distribution.
Using the sex composition instrument, we find a negative significant effect along the
entire distribution affecting those in the bottom 10% most.
WAI results show little to no effect on the study child’s educational outcomes
from the presence of an additional child when using the twin treatment, but sex
composition shows a fairly consistent negative effect that is stronger at the tails of
the distribution. This suggests that in the larger pool of compliers, those at both
the high end and the low end of the distribution are impacted by the presence of
siblings in the household. Again sex composition proves to be a better instrument as
it is more consistent and allows for the analysis of QTE to extend to a larger sample
than using twins as an instrument (see Angrist et al., 2010; Angrist & Evans, 1998).
The results for health outcomes are fairly consistent on the sample that uses the
twins as an instrument (see specifications (3) and (4) in the first panel), the results
for the compliers is not consistent between the twin and sex composition instruments.
Weight-for-height is not affected in the sex composition estimation, whereas when
using the twins instrument it is significant at the lower tail of the distribution. This
result may be driven by the fact that twins share the same space when developing in
the womb, leading to decreased birth weight and other health indicators. Therefore,
it is more likely there is no effect of additional births on weight-for-height percentile.
However, it can be seen that BMI is very similar between both estimations.
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5.4 Immigrant versus Native Analysis
This study highlighted the role of the quality-quantity trade-off for Australian fami-
lies. Whist it would make this thesis coherent in theme to investigate immigrant and
native differences, the LSAC does not include immigrant children. All study chil-
dren are required to be born in Australia. Analysis of parent immigrant background
and composition is possible, but would be lengthy (both immigrant parents versus
one immigrant parent). Due to time constraints we do not explore this relationship.
However, this is a research question we have posed for future work.
5.5 Investment in Private Schooling
This study thus far has shown the effects of an additional child in the household on
the educational outcomes of young Australians. This section explores the comple-
mentary question of investment in child quality. We do this through the analysis of
two investment decisions; (1) investigating the probability of the study child being
enrolled in private schooling (see for example Caceres-Delpiano, 2006) and; (2) time
spent reading or being read to for leisure with the parent.47
Furthermore, we investigate the expected negative association with family size
and investment in children by applying the IV estimation techniques to the proba-
bility of private school enrolments of the children in the LSAC. This analysis allows
us to further investigate the presence of the quality quantity trade off in terms of
parental choice to invest in child quality. The relationship we estimate is as follows:
Privatei = α + β1Xi + β2Ni + i (18)
where Privatei is equal to 1 if the study child attends a private or independent
school and 0 otherwise. In this case we use the previously outlined instruments and
estimate the first stage regression as previously outlines in Section 5.2.2. We then
47This question comes from the more recent emphasis on the effects of parental time investment
(see for example Hanushek, 1992). Particularly on educational activities.
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use these fitted values in the estimation of equation (18).
Additionally, the analysis of reading time is used as an indicator of parental
effort per child. Additional time spent parenting via educational activities can be an
example of effort made to improve child quality. When there are more children in
the household, parenting time may be split between children. Therefore, there is an
expectation that with an increase in the number of siblings in the household there will
be less time spent on such activities with each child. We estimate this relationship
using instrumental variables as previously outlined in this study. In this case we are
using Time Use Data (TUD) where our measure of parental effort or time investment
is the main activity done with the child. The LSAC TUDs precoded ‘light’ diaries
used to collect information on a child’s activity patterns in blocks of 15 minutes
throughout the day for one weekday and one weekend. Specifically, we use reading
or being read to as the main activity as an indicator for increasing child quality as it
is well known that reading to children helps child development. If the main activity is
reading then the dependent variable takes a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. TUDs from
the LSAC is only sufficiently available for Cohort K in 2010 and 2012 due to data
issues. This is a significant limitation to the analysis of parental effort investment
through reading.
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5.5.1 Results
The results for the estimation of private schooling are reported in Table 5.23. As can
be seen there is no significant impact on the probability of private schooling. There
is a small decrease in the probability of attending private school for the fixed effects
instrumental variables regression with sex composition being used as an instrument.
However, this effect diminishes when we implement both instruments in the regres-
sion. Overall we do not find adequate evidence to suggest that an exogenous increase
in family size decrease the probability of attendance to private schooling for primary
aged students. In this instance there may be additional factors that lead to the de-
cision to enrol a child in private school, as seen in Table 5.23 that are not observed
within the LSAC dataset. This may be due to a higher importance being placed on
private schooling for secondary students over primary students.
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Time spent in educational reading activities is not impacted by an exogenous
increase in family size in any specificat. Table 5.25 shows no significant positive or
negative outcomes on the probability of time spent with the study child. Addition-
ally, when implementing both the twin and sex composition instruments, we still
observe no effect as shown in Table 5.26 This null result may be due to the lack of
information contained in the specified TUDs used for this analysis. There are very
few observations in total, which is a significant limitation to this analysis.
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Overall we do not find evidence to suggest that investment in child quality de-
creases when family size increases. Therefore, although there is evidence to suggest
that the quality-quantity trade-off exists in educational outcomes in Australia, we
are unable to provide evidence to suggest investment in child education decreases
when the number of siblings in the household increases.
5.6 Conclusion
This study aimed to provide evidence and contribute to the literature on the quality-
quantity trade-off in Australia using a distributional analysis. We apply various
econometric estimation techniques to provide a comparison of methodologies. We
find sufficient evidence to suggest that educational outcomes are significantly im-
pacted by an increase in family size. We provide evidence to suggest a heterogeneous
impact of an increase in family size on children with different levels of ability. This
effect is found to be consistent for PPVT scores, especially when sex composition is
used as an instrumental variable in an QTE framework, across the entire distribution.
Similar results are found for WAI at the higher end of the distribution. Therefore
children with a high level of ability have their educational outcomes diminished when
additional children are present in the household.
The analysis of health outcomes is inconclusive. This may be due to the universal
healthcare system provided by the Australian government which may result in no
adverse effect on a child given an increase in the number of children in the household
or the relationship between twinning/multiple births and birth order effects which
cannot be accounted for.
The shift from child quantity to child quality can help explain the decrease in
the total fertility rate. There is a significant amount of discussion on whether we
should encourage women to have more children or invest more. Moreover, this study
has significant long term implications. Whilst families are choosing to invest in child
quality, the population is ageing. Although it is important to encourage this in-
vestment as human capital is a driver of growth, issues arise from having an ageing
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population that will require long-term structural reforms to help support the com-
munity. Essentially, Australia is facing its own quality-quantity trade-off; increase
the population or increase human capital to sustain economic growth.
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Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusions
6.1 Discussion
This thesis explored various issues surrounding the fertility literature. The aim was to
provide an analysis of key policies and issues surrounding demographic composition
and fertility. The results of this thesis provided relevant theoretical and empirical
analyses for policymakers, which can potentially be used in the development of fu-
ture population policies. From the determinants of those who bear children, to how
to encourage families to have more or less children, the fertility decision is highly
complex and provided significant scope for extensive analysis within this thesis. How-
ever, this thesis investigated three specific, increasingly important aspects of fertility
economics in the context of Australia, which had yet to been explored within the
literature. Firstly, the response of women to monetary incentives aimed at increasing
the total fertility rate was investigated. Secondly, the relationship between fertility
and the labour market, focusing on the role of job stability in the childbearing deci-
sion was explored. Finally, the quality-quantity trade-off to determine if the trade-off
exists for Australian children with respect to health and educational outcomes was
examined.
This thesis began by developing a theoretical model which highlighted the ob-
served fertility differences between immigrants and natives. We found a positive
impact of the baby bonus on the fertility decision of both groups. However, we
noted than the response was heterogeneous across immigrants and natives. We then
investigated the response of women to monetary incentives aimed at increasing the
total fertility rate, in an empirical framework. Specifically, a natural experiment in-
volving the baby bonus was used to analyse revealed fertility preferences. The results
showed women with a low level of education (below high school) were the primary
respondents to the introduction of the baby bonus and a treatment was developed
to explore the impact of the baby bonus on the individual level of fertility. We then
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incorporated this information into our analysis of the baby bonus. As a result, we
used both a difference-in-difference and semiparametric difference-in-difference anal-
ysis to analyse the fertility response of women immigrant and native women within
the HILDA survey. Difference-in-difference analysis was selected as the economet-
ric method in this study as it has wide applications in the literature to evaluate
the implementation of public policy, such as monetary incentives. As difference-in-
difference requires both the treatment and control groups to follow a common trend
before the implementation of a policy, we found this assumption hard to verify within
our data. Consequently, we implemented semiparametric difference-in-difference to
address this potential flaw in the common trend assumption.
The results of this study provided key insights into the likely respondents to
Australia’s pro-natal policy incentives. The results show that the implementation of
the baby bonus led to an increase in the fertility rate of women with low levels of
human capital. The response of immigrant women with low levels of human capital
was found to be larger than their native counterparts, but both groups exhibited a
statistically significant positive impact on fertility. Therefore, this study showed that
although the total fertility rate increased there may have be unintended consequences
of the policy in the long-run through the incentivisation of women with low levels of
human capital. As women with low levels of human capital are more reliant on the
government, there may have been a strain on government resources, which may have
been reflected in the removal of the policy in 2014.
The second study focused on unemployment and job stability and their respective
impacts on the fertility decision. This study was motivated by the pro-cyclical rela-
tionship observed between unemployment and fertility in many developed economies.
This analysis explored the issue of low participation rates in the labour market for
women with children and identified the key labour market determinants which drive
the fertility decision. We postulated that job stability and perceived job stability con-
tributes significantly to the decision to have children. The analysis implemented in
this study focused on instrumental variable estimation and propensity score match-
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ing to address the endogeneity issue observed between the labour market and fertility
decision. Using IV estimation, we found that forced redundancy worked well as an in-
strument for both unemployment and stability. The use of propensity score matching
allowed for the analysis of the effect on fertility given the treatments: unemployment,
stability and redundancy respectively.
A major contribution of the second study is through the provision of empirical
evidence which highlighted the importance of job stability in the fertility decision. We
found evidence of the pro-cyclical theory of fertility within the context of Australia.
Perceived job stability was found to have a significant on the fertility decision. We
also provided evidence which suggested the role of unemployment on the fertility
decision of Australian women is over estimated. We found using unemployment
both as an instrument and a treatment leads to an overestimation of its effect on
the fertility decision. When we used redundancy in place of unemployment we found
a large decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient. Finally, this study emphasised
the role of age in the fertility decision. We found using an age-stratified sample
for propensity score matching results in a more consistent estimated coefficient for
unemployment. The overall results found in this analysis have significant policy
implications, as increase perceived job security could be used to increase fertility.
The last study contributed to the literature by providing evidence of the quality-
quantity in Australia. Furthermore, this study adds to the limited empirical evidence
and overall lack of consensus on the issue both internationally and in the Australian
context. We explore the impact of family size on the distribution of child outcomes.
We compared and contrasted four different econometric techniques to address the
confounding results observed within the literature. Specifically we used instrumental
variables (IV), quantile regression (QR), instrumental variables quantile regression
(IV-QR) and quantile treatment effects (QTE) in this analysis. The application of IV
was conducted to provide comparison to the current literature, which predominantly
uses this estimation technique. However, these techniques specifically focus on the
effect of an increase in family size on the average child. Quantile regression was
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used to determine if the impact of an increase in family size was uniform across the
distribution of child outcomes, the results suggested it is not consistent across the
distribution. This leads to the use of IV-QR and QTE. IV-QR combines IV and QR
in the same analysis as it allows for the use of quantile regression when an endogenous
variable is present. QTE uses the instruments to determine the assignment of the
treatment, in this case the number of children. Using QTE allowed for the analysis
of a subpopulation known as compliers, who switch their behaviour based on the
treatment assignment. In this case we found consistent results across both methods.
However, we lean towards the use of QTE due to the ability to determine the effect
of those who switch their decision based on the exogenous shock to fertility.
The final study found a significant effect of the number of children in the house-
hold on the educational outcomes of children. Our investigations into health out-
comes and investment in child quality were inconclusive. However, we found evidence
of the quality-quantity trade-off exhibited in reduced test scores for educational out-
comes. We also found this impact on educational outcomes is not uniform across the
distribution, suggesting analysis on the average effect may be why the literature has
yet to reach a consensus.
6.2 Future Work
There are many potential ways to build on the foundation of this thesis. The first
study used the HILDA, which is a significantly large longitudinal dataset. It may be
useful to analyse other subpopulations within the HILDA to determine their response
to both the baby bonus and other public policies implemented by the Australian
government. Furthermore, the semiparametric framework we implement in the first
study has yet to be applied in empirically within economic literature. This method
of estimation can be used to address potential flaws within datasets where com-
mon trend assumption may be hard to verify. As the application of semiparametric
difference-in-difference allows for the relaxation of this assumption, this methodology
provides significant scope for the application in both natural and field experiments.
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The second study could be developed to incorporate alternative instruments in the
analysis such as persistent unemployment. However, a limitation to the persistence
of unemployment may be sample size. Additionally, it may be of interest to explore
the role of firm specific human capital for those women, which was not possible in
the HILDA data. This study could also be extended to an analysis of paid maternity
leave under the most recent government changes as future waves of data are released.
The third study has a significant scope for future work. Firstly, we can expand
the theoretical model developed in the first study to incorporate dual norms into
the quality quantity trade-off (see equations (9) and (11) in Section 3.2). This
would incorporate heterogeneous fertility norms into the choice of child quality and
quantity. Secondly, as the children in cohort K of the LSAC ages, we can investigate
the private schooling choice to determine if the decision for investment choice for
private schooling changes as children approach secondary school. Thirdly, this study
does not analyse happiness, life satisfaction and affection that children receive from
their parents. Although children may be able to achieve higher educational outcomes
when there are no additional siblings in the household, children may be happier if
there are. We cannot determine this effect from the analysis provided in this thesis.
However, it may be possible to analyse child happiness and family size. The time-use
data for the LSAC also provides a significant amount of data for the development
of research questions based on the quality-quantity trade-off. Finally, as previously
discussed, it is possible to empirically analyse the impact of parental immigrant
status on the quality-quantity trade-off.
6.3 Final Conclusion
All three of these studies are strongly interrelated and play an important role, in
informing population and demographic policy. For example, the observed decreasing
total fertility rates may be a result of the quality-quantity trade-off and a shift
towards investment in child quality for many nations. Furthermore, the baby bonus
was an attempt to incentivise potential parents to choose to have an additional child
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by reducing the direct and indirect cost associated with having a child. Another
factor that contributes significantly to the fertility decision is job stability. The
findings in this thesis showed if women perceived themselves as economically stable,
they are more likely to have children. It is important for policymakers to understand
the relationship between these three aspects of fertility economics and how they are
related to population economics and policy.
Finally, when looking back upon the findings of this thesis, we observe signifi-
cant differences between subpopulations. To avoid unintended consequences, policy-
makers need to be aware of the groups they incentivising when implementing poli-
cies. This is especially important for immigrant and native subpopulations as shown
throughout this thesis, and may also be important for many other subpopulations
within a country.
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Chapter 7 Appendices
7.1 Study 1 Appendices
Table 7.1: Value of Baby Bonus Payments Over Time
Year Month Value
2004 July $3,000
2004 September $3,042
2005 March $3,079
2005 September $3,119
2006 March $3,166
2006 July $4,000
2006 September $4,100
2007 March $4,133
2007 July $4,133
2007 September $4,187
2008 March $4,258
2008 July $5,000
2009 July $5,185
2010 July $5,294
2011 July $5,437
2012 September $5,000
2013 July $5000 paid fortnightly for the first child only
$3000 for each additional child
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7.1.1 Region of birth breakdown
Table 7.2: Countries by Region
Region Included Countries
Other Oceanic New Zealand Fiji
Papua New Guinea Samoa
Nauru Tonga
Cook Islands
North West Europe United Kingdom Switzerland
Ireland Denmark
Austria Finland
Belgium Iceland
France Norway
Germany Sweden
Netherlands
Southern And Eastern Italy Federal Republic of
Europe Malta Yugoslavia
Portugal Czech Republic
Spain Estonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Hungary
Bulgaria Lithuania
Croatia Poland
Cyprus Russian Federation
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Slovakia
Greece Ukraine
Romania Belarus
North Africa And Egypt Israel
The Middle East Libya Kuwait
Sudan Lebanon
Iran Turkey
Iraq
South-East Asia Burma (Myanmar) Indonesia
Cambodia Malaysia
Laos Philippines
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Table 7.2: Countries by Region
Region Included Countries
South-East Asia Thailand Singapore
Vietnam East Timor
Brunei Darussalam
North-East Asia China (excludes SARs and Taiwan) Japan
Hong Kong (SAR of China) Democratic People’s
Taiwan Republic of Korea
Republic of (South) Korea
Southern And Central Asia Bangladesh Sri Lanka
India Afghanistan
Nepal Azerbaijan
Pakistan
Americas Canada Peru
United States of America Uruguay
Argentina Venezuela
Brazil South America, nec
Chile Jamaica
Colombia Trinidad and Tobago
Ecuador
Sub-Saharan Africa Congo Mozambique
Congo, Democratic Republic of Somalia
Liberia South Africa
Nigeria Tanzania
Eritrea Zambia
Ethiopia Zimbabwe
Kenya Southern and East Africa
Mauritius
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7.1.2 Difference-in-Difference Analysis
Difference-in-Difference: Treatment and Time Interaction
Fi,t = α0 + α1Xi,t + β1τi,t + β2Ti,t + β3(τi,t × Ti,t) + i,t (19)
Taking the difference-in-difference gives:
DID =[E(Fi,t|τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 1)− E(Fi,t|τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 1)]
− [E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 0)− E(Fi,t|τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 0)]
(20)
The difference in difference estimator is:
E(Fi,t|τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 1) = α0 + α1 + β1 + β2 + β3
E(Fi,t|τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 1) = α0 + α1 + β2
E(Fi,t|τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 0) = α0 + α1 + β1
E(Fi,t|τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 0) = α0 + α1
This is the difference between an individual in the treatment group compared to an
individual in the control group, adjusted for differences over time.
DID = [(α0 + α1 + β1 + β2 + β3)− (α0 + α1 + β2)]− [(α0 + α1 + β1)− (α0 + α1)]
= β3
(21)
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Triple Interaction Difference-in-Difference: Immigrant, Treatment, and
Time interaction.
Fi,t = α0+α1Xi,t+β1Ii,t+β2τi,t+β3Ti,t+β4(Ii,t×τi,t)+β5(Ii,t×Ti,t)+β6(τi,t×Ti,t)+γ1(Ii,t×τi,t×Ti,t)+i,t
(22)
In this case, taking the difference-in-difference of Ii,t and τi,t first, holding time con-
stant, then take the difference of this over time, Ti,t gives the following:
DID =[E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 1)− E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 1)]
− [E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 1)− E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 1)]
− [E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 0)− E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 0)]
− [E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 0)− E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 0)]
(23)
The same analysis described above is then used to obtain the following:
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 1) = α0 + α1 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β6 + γ1
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 1) = α0 + α1 + β2 + β3 + β6
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 1)) = α0 + α1 + β1 + β3 + β5
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 1) = α0 + α1 + β3
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 0) = α0 + α1 + β1 + β2 + β4
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 1, Ti,t = 0) = α0 + α1 + β2
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 1, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 0) = α0 + α1 + β1
E(Fi,t|Ii,t = 0, τi,t = 0, Ti,t = 0) = α0 + α1
The difference in difference estimator is therefore
DID =[(α0 + α1 + β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β6 + γ1)− (α0 + α1 + β2 + β3 + β6)]
− [(α0 + α1 + β1 + β3 + β5)− (α0 + α1 + β3)]− [(α0 + α1 + β1 + β2 + β4)
− (α0 + α1 + β2)]− [(α0 + α1 + β1)− (α0 + α1)]
(24)
This simplifies to
DID = (β1 + β4 + β5 + γ1)− (β1 + β5)− (β1 + β4)− (β1) = γ1 (25)
Where γ1 is the difference-in-difference estimator of interest in this study. It shows
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the difference of fertility between immigrants compared to natives in the treatment
group, accounting for the change in means for the immigrants in the control group
and natives in the treatment group.
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Table 7.3: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment A: < HS < 25 Control Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 25 Control 2 < HS ≥ 25 < 40 Control 3 < HS ≥ 25
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0438 0.0060 -0.0195***
(0.0386) (0.0105) (0.0029)
Agesq -0.1264 -0.0259 0.0174***
(0.0933) (0.0164) (0.0031)
Unemployed -0.0156 -0.0111 -0.0187*
(0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0096)
Not in LF 0.0587*** 0.1010*** 0.0510***
(0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0052)
Married/Defacto 0.0407** 0.0637** 0.0310***
(0.0168) (0.0279) (0.0107)
Number of Children 0.2497*** 0.0328*** 0.0114***
(0.0182) (0.0055) (0.0018)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0094 -0.0522 -0.0232
(0.0065) (0.0508) (0.0195)
Hinduism -0.0062 -0.1116*** -0.0956***
(0.0112) (0.0307) (0.0201)
Islam 0.1362** 0.1744* 0.0776
(0.0627) (0.0965) (0.0506)
Judaism 0.0092 -0.0101 -0.0162
(0.0106) (0.0220) (0.0152)
Other Religion -0.0169 -0.0042 -0.0033
(0.0243) (0.0369) (0.0168)
No Religion 0.0011 0.0019 0.0047
(0.0069) (0.0123) (0.0056)
Refused Response -0.0125 -0.0289 -0.0035
(0.0145) (0.0241) (0.0138)
Partner’s Qualification
Postgrad - masters or doctorate -0.0393 -0.0031 0.0212
(0.0264) (0.0966) (0.0306)
Grad diploma, grad certificate -0.0341* -0.0532 -0.0237
(0.0204) (0.0530) (0.0191)
Bachelor or honours -0.0308 -0.0265 -0.0180
(0.0255) (0.0457) (0.0152)
Adv diploma, diploma -0.0036 -0.0189 -0.0117
(0.0473) (0.0438) (0.0139)
Cert III or IV -0.0017 -0.0085 -0.0083
(0.0258) (0.0312) (0.0129)
Cert I or II -0.0892*** -0.0814* -0.0392*
(0.0297) (0.0473) (0.0231)
Cert not defined 0.1399 0.7708*** 0.0812
(0.2030) (0.0514) (0.0780)
Year 11 and below -0.0062 -0.0133 -0.0095
(0.0303) (0.0316) (0.0130)
Undetermined/ No Partner in HH -0.0191 -0.0152 -0.0093
(0.0250) (0.0379) (0.0153)
Partners Labour Force Status
Unemployed 0.0554 0.0557 0.0314
(0.0554) (0.0503) (0.0266)
Not in the LF -0.0737 -0.0290 -0.0166**
(0.0501) (0.0331) (0.0069)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.4: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment B: < HS < 30 Control Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 30 Control 2 < HS ≥ 30 < 40 Control 3 < HS ≥ 30
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0020 0.0130* -0.0074**
(0.0141) (0.0076) (0.0030)
Agesq -0.0193 -0.0360*** 0.0045
(0.0308) (0.0136) (0.0032)
Unemployed 0.0064 -0.0113 -0.0185*
(0.0120) (0.0130) (0.0097)
Not in LF 0.1205*** 0.1007*** 0.0539***
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0053)
Married/Defacto 0.0410*** 0.0634** 0.0319***
(0.0156) (0.0278) (0.0107)
Number of Children 0.1194*** 0.0330*** 0.0122***
(0.0087) (0.0055) (0.0018)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0077 -0.0498 -0.0232
(0.0168) (0.0508) (0.0194)
Hinduism 0.0248 -0.1110*** -0.0774***
(0.0384) (0.0299) (0.0148)
Islam 0.0474 0.1737* 0.0728
(0.0534) (0.0965) (0.0496)
Judaism 0.0234* -0.0041 -0.0144
(0.0130) (0.0197) (0.0182)
Other Religion -0.0122 -0.0055 -0.0058
(0.0225) (0.0368) (0.0170)
No Religion 0.0016 0.0016 0.0041
(0.0067) (0.0123) (0.0056)
Refused Response -0.0184 -0.0302 -0.0079
(0.0147) (0.0238) (0.0138)
Partner’s Qualification
Postgrad - masters or doctorate -0.0510 -0.0045 0.0164
(0.0367) (0.0966) (0.0308)
Grad diploma, grad certificate 0.0030 -0.0542 -0.0255
(0.0390) (0.0528) (0.0191)
Bachelor or honours -0.0127 -0.0263 -0.0223
(0.0206) (0.0456) (0.0152)
Adv diploma, diploma 0.0227 -0.0183 -0.0133
(0.0304) (0.0440) (0.0140)
Cert III or IV -0.0088 -0.0086 -0.0103
(0.0197) (0.0311) (0.0129)
Cert I or II -0.1192** -0.0817* -0.0421*
(0.0486) (0.0475) (0.0237)
Cert not defined 0.3017 0.7714*** 0.0758
(0.2279) (0.0507) (0.0774)
Year 11 and below -0.0307 -0.0135 -0.0111
(0.0236) (0.0315) (0.0130)
Undetermined/ No Partner in HH 0.0056 -0.0150 -0.0112
(0.0433) (0.0378) (0.0154)
Partners Labour Force Status
Unemployed -0.0200 0.0548 0.0307
(0.0416) (0.0504) (0.0265)
Not in the LF -0.0514 -0.0294 -0.0150**
(0.0369) (0.0332) (0.0070)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.5: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment C: < HS < 35 Control Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 35 Control 2 < HS ≥ 35 < 40 Control 3 < HS ≥ 35
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0110 0.0145 -0.0007
(0.0072) (0.0098) (0.0024)
Agesq -0.0311** -0.0392** -0.0015
(0.0142) (0.0189) (0.0025)
Unemployed 0.0199* -0.0111 -0.0185*
(0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0097)
Not in LF 0.1531*** 0.1017*** 0.0518***
(0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0052)
Married/Defacto 0.0598*** 0.0657** 0.0310***
(0.0140) (0.0279) (0.0106)
Number of Children 0.0689*** 0.0329*** 0.0118***
(0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0018)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0154 -0.0487 -0.0202
(0.0195) (0.0510) (0.0197)
Hinduism -0.0105 -0.1108*** -0.0851***
(0.0404) (0.0314) (0.0219)
Islam 0.0110 0.1745* 0.0717
(0.0458) (0.0959) (0.0498)
Judaism -0.0047 -0.0076 -0.0101
(0.0253) (0.0176) (0.0158)
Other Religion -0.0215 -0.0039 -0.0073
(0.0208) (0.0369) (0.0169)
No Religion -0.0068 0.0017 0.0039
(0.0064) (0.0123) (0.0056)
Refused Response -0.0152 -0.0308 -0.0095
(0.0143) (0.0237) (0.0137)
Partner’s Qualification
Postgrad - masters or doctorate 0.0387 -0.0052 0.0168
(0.0318) (0.0970) (0.0307)
Grad diploma, grad certificate 0.0190 -0.0588 -0.0255
(0.0311) (0.0537) (0.0189)
Bachelor or honours -0.0075 -0.0248 -0.0171
(0.0178) (0.0458) (0.0152)
Adv diploma, diploma -0.0036 -0.0172 -0.0127
(0.0240) (0.0440) (0.0139)
Cert III or IV -0.0144 -0.0086 -0.0097
(0.0168) (0.0311) (0.0129)
Cert I or II -0.1094*** -0.0809* -0.0408*
(0.0415) (0.0477) (0.0235)
Cert not defined 0.2250 0.7771*** 0.0812
(0.1903) (0.0503) (0.0788)
Year 11 and below -0.0398** -0.0143 -0.0094
(0.0190) (0.0315) (0.0129)
Undetermined/ No Partner in HH -0.0947*** -0.0141 -0.0100
(0.0319) (0.0378) (0.0153)
Partners Labour Force Status
Unemployed -0.0206 0.0538 0.0301
(0.0346) (0.0503) (0.0266)
Not in the LF -0.0396 -0.0303 -0.0162**
(0.0288) (0.0330) (0.0069)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.6: Treatment and Time Interaction τi,t × T
Treatment D: < HS < 40 Control Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Control 1 ≥ HS < 40 Control 2 < HS ≥ 40 Control 3 ≥ HS ≥ 40
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.0250*** -0.0055*** -0.0042**
(0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Agesq -0.0523*** 0.0041** 0.0028*
(0.0069) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Unemployed 0.0187* -0.0199** -0.0219***
(0.0100) (0.0097) (0.0070)
Not in LF 0.1613*** 0.0510*** 0.0488***
(0.0091) (0.0052) (0.0050)
Married/Defacto 0.0619*** 0.0301*** 0.0177**
(0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0075)
Number of Children 0.0406*** 0.0117*** 0.0090***
(0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0014)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0015 -0.0204 0.0118
(0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0099)
Hinduism -0.0247 -0.0903*** -0.0146**
(0.0325) (0.0135) (0.0058)
Islam 0.0090 0.0798 0.0886**
(0.0377) (0.0496) (0.0429)
Judaism 0.0438 -0.0118 -0.0010
(0.0692) (0.0139) (0.0042)
Other Religion -0.0201 -0.0046 0.0033
(0.0177) (0.0168) (0.0102)
No Religion -0.0013 0.0048 0.0086**
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0041)
Refused Response -0.0216* -0.0070 -0.0069
(0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0092)
Partner’s Qualification
Postgrad - masters or doctorate 0.0286 0.0205 0.0027
(0.0259) (0.0307) (0.0105)
Grad diploma, grad certificate -0.0031 -0.0255 -0.0103
(0.0229) (0.0192) (0.0093)
Bachelor or honours -0.0043 -0.0191 -0.0057
(0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0091)
Adv diploma, diploma -0.0053 -0.0114 0.0001
(0.0191) (0.0140) (0.0104)
Cert III or IV -0.0257* -0.0079 0.0004
(0.0140) (0.0130) (0.0096)
Cert I or II -0.0870** -0.0386 -0.0283
(0.0342) (0.0237) (0.0209)
Cert not defined 0.2695 0.0832 0.0750
(0.1961) (0.0777) (0.0623)
Year 11 and below -0.0361** -0.0096 -0.0011
(0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0101)
Undetermined/ No Partner in HH -0.1006*** -0.0099 -0.0019
(0.0251) (0.0154) (0.0109)
Partners Labour Force Status
Unemployed -0.0006 0.0307 0.0470*
(0.0301) (0.0265) (0.0281)
Not in the LF -0.0413** -0.0158** -0.0126*
(0.0207) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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7.2 Study 2 Appendices
7.2.1 Correlation for instrument validity
Table 7.8: Correlation Matrix
Fertility Unemployed Stability Lagged Unemployment Redundancy
Fertility 1
Unemployed 0.01 1
Stability 0.02 -0.04 1
Lagged Unemployment -0.01 0.55 -0.07 1
Redundancy -0.01 0.17 -0.09 0.07 1
185
7.2.2 First Stage Regressions
Table 7.9: First Stage Regressions for Unemployment
Dependent variable is Unemployment
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Instruments
Lagged Unemployment 0.1824*** 0.0873*** 0.1408*** 0.1807*** 0.0875*** 0.1412***
(0.0113) (0.0038) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0037) (0.0105)
Redundancy 0.0996*** 0.0855*** 0.0918*** 0.0957*** 0.0857*** 0.0928***
(0.0103) (0.0039) (0.0106) (0.0096) (0.0038) (0.0102)
General Covars
Age -0.0020*** -0.0036*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0049*** -0.0036*** -0.0020*** -0.0035*** -0.0024***
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0005)
AgeSq 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married -0.0046* 0.0003 -0.0049 -0.0063** 0.0017 -0.0055 -0.0034 0.0007 -0.0041
(0.0025) (0.0052) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0052) (0.0030)
Defacto -0.0012 -0.0038 -0.0019 -0.0031 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0023
(0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0032)
No.Children 0.0008 0.0044* 0.0017** 0.0019*** 0.0063*** 0.0034*** 0.0011* 0.0044* 0.0020***
(0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0007)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0009 -0.0031 0.0003 0.0028 -0.0021 0.0022 0.0011 -0.0030 0.0012
(0.0030) (0.0112) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0112) (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0111) (0.0036)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0001 0.0075 0.0010 0.0010 0.0064 0.0021 0.0002 0.0056 0.0013
certificate (0.0023) (0.0090) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0090) (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0089) (0.0030)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0022) (0.0060) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0060) (0.0035) (0.0022) (0.0059) (0.0029)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0028 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0008
(0.0021) (0.0081) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0081) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0080) (0.0026)
Cert III or IV -0.0008 0.0088 0.0012 0.0009 0.0106* 0.0041 -0.0007 0.0107** 0.0015
(0.0023) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0054) (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0054) (0.0031)
Cert I or II -0.0028 0.0165 0.0018 0.0033 0.0197 0.0105 -0.0037 0.0200 0.0017
(0.0060) (0.0152) (0.0093) (0.0064) (0.0152) (0.0117) (0.0060) (0.0150) (0.0093)
Cert not defined 0.0055 0.0283 0.0081 0.0158 0.0109 0.0178* 0.0071 0.0271 0.0098
(0.0121) (0.0368) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0368) (0.0107) (0.0121) (0.0364) (0.0104)
Year 11 and below -0.0013 0.0008 0.0007 0.0026 0.0078 0.0068* -0.0000 0.0052 0.0023
(0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0031)
Occupation
Managers -0.0187*** -0.0103** -0.0190*** -0.0257*** -0.0088* -0.0215*** -0.0169*** -0.0083* -0.0172***
(0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0051)
Professionals -0.0181*** -0.0136*** -0.0202*** -0.0245*** -0.0128*** -0.0233*** -0.0160*** -0.0117*** -0.0181***
(0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0053)
Technicians and -0.0171*** -0.0177*** -0.0205*** -0.0241*** -0.0173*** -0.0247*** -0.0158*** -0.0156*** -0.0189***
Trades Workers (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0060)
Community and -0.0172*** -0.0126*** -0.0189*** -0.0215*** -0.0115*** -0.0207*** -0.0158*** -0.0109** -0.0174***
Personal Services (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0062) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0055)
Sales Workers -0.0143*** -0.0077* -0.0155*** -0.0211*** -0.0064 -0.0185*** -0.0137*** -0.0062 -0.0147***
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0053)
Clerical and Admin -0.0144*** -0.0084* -0.0153** -0.0187*** -0.0081* -0.0175*** -0.0137*** -0.0074* -0.0144**
Workers (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0067) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0059)
Machinery Operators -0.0207*** -0.0101 -0.0201** -0.0242*** -0.0076 -0.0191** -0.0192*** -0.0084 -0.0185**
& Drivers (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0067) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0084)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.8500*** 0.8777*** 0.8652*** 0.9388*** 0.8875*** 0.9088*** 0.8433*** 0.8695*** 0.8578***
Response (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0107) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0089) (0.0097) (0.0054) (0.0106)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.9: First Stage Regressions for Unemployment Cont.
Dependent variable is Unemployment
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0040 0.0110 0.0059* 0.0070*** 0.0153 0.0106*** 0.0043 0.0105 0.0064*
(0.0028) (0.0115) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0116) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0114) (0.0034)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0035 0.0148 0.0060* 0.0077** 0.0187* 0.0113*** 0.0048 0.0147 0.0071**
certificate (0.0030) (0.0108) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0108) (0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0106) (0.0033)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0034* 0.0045 0.0049* 0.0056*** 0.0052 0.0072** 0.0040* 0.0034 0.0053*
(0.0021) (0.0086) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0086) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0085) (0.0028)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0026 0.0136 0.0045* 0.0035 0.0116 0.0054 0.0025 0.0126 0.0043
(0.0023) (0.0100) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0100) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0099) (0.0027)
Cert III or IV 0.0055*** 0.0088 0.0072** 0.0072*** 0.0098 0.0092*** 0.0061*** 0.0086 0.0077***
(0.0020) (0.0075) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0075) (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0074) (0.0027)
Cert I or II 0.0032 0.0047 0.0040 0.0053 0.0026 0.0073 0.0022 0.0003 0.0027
(0.0103) (0.0167) (0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0100) (0.0165) (0.0109)
Cert not defined 0.0155 -0.0525 0.0092 0.0179 -0.0538 0.0049 0.0167 -0.0571* 0.0091
(0.0195) (0.0328) (0.0264) (0.0192) (0.0328) (0.0291) (0.0198) (0.0325) (0.0273)
Year 11 and below 0.0058** -0.0003 0.0076** 0.0072*** -0.0009 0.0089** 0.0061** -0.0004 0.0077**
(0.0024) (0.0085) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0085) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0084) (0.0032)
No Partner Info -0.0103 0.0001 -0.0080 -0.0136 0.0021 -0.0085 -0.0070 0.0052 -0.0037
(0.0092) (0.0774) (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0774) (0.0114) (0.0083) (0.0766) (0.0102)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed 0.0303*** 0.0121* 0.0262** 0.0383*** 0.0127* 0.0287** 0.0283*** 0.0131* 0.0260**
(0.0111) (0.0069) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0069) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0069) (0.0110)
Not in LF 0.0033 0.0032 0.0042 0.0062* 0.0037 0.0066 0.0037 0.0038 0.0048
(0.0032) (0.0049) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0049) (0.0038)
No Partner Info 0.0129 0.0053 0.0124 0.0193 0.0041 0.0161 0.0101 -0.0007 0.0084
(0.0093) (0.0772) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0772) (0.0114) (0.0085) (0.0764) (0.0103)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0027 -0.0068 0.0032 0.0045 -0.0040 0.0052 0.0038 -0.0056 0.0039
(0.0043) (0.0095) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0042) (0.0094) (0.0053)
Hinduism -0.0080*** -0.0021 -0.0072** -0.0067*** -0.0131 -0.0066** -0.0067** -0.0076 -0.0068**
(0.0029) (0.0260) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0261) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0258) (0.0026)
Judaism -0.0021 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0013 0.0013 0.0100 -0.0045 -0.0002 -0.0006
(0.0088) (0.0472) (0.0114) (0.0090) (0.0472) (0.0145) (0.0090) (0.0467) (0.0114)
Islam 0.0039 0.0691 0.0084 0.0018 0.0569 0.0092 -0.0004 0.0503 0.0039
(0.0097) (0.0451) (0.0130) (0.0087) (0.0451) (0.0128) (0.0093) (0.0447) (0.0094)
Other Religion 0.0149* 0.0173* 0.0185* 0.0178** 0.0194** 0.0225** 0.0134* 0.0188* 0.0178*
(0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0112) (0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0096)
No Religion 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0023 0.0026* -0.0005 0.0025 0.0021 0.0005 0.0024
(0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0032) (0.0017)
Refused Religious 0.0059 -0.0017 0.0033 0.0068* -0.0018 0.0032 0.0053 -0.0013 0.0031
Response (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0039)
Constant 0.0609*** 0.0716*** 0.0871*** 0.0989*** 0.0554*** 0.0660***
(0.0085) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0124) (0.0084) (0.0101)
Observations 30,435 29,701 30,435 30,435 29,701 30,435 30,435 29,701 30,435
R-squared 0.7402 0.6419 0.7179 0.6412 0.7466 0.6490
Number of HH 5,207 5,941 5,207 5,941 5,207 5,941
The reported first stage for the random effects model comes from implementing a manual IV regression,
saving the first stage. The output reported in the main text is from implementing the xtivreg command in Stata 13.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.10: First Stage Regressions for Stability
Dependent variable is Stability
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Instruments
Lagged Unemployment -0.1287*** -0.0440*** -0.0849*** -0.1198*** -0.0405*** -0.0800***
(0.0180) (0.0153) (0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0153) (0.0174)
Redundancy -0.2056*** -0.0806*** -0.1288*** -0.2000*** -0.0789*** -0.1255***
(0.0193) (0.0148) (0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0148) (0.0194)
General Covars
Age 0.0072*** 0.0177*** 0.0093*** 0.0077*** 0.0180*** 0.0098*** 0.0072*** 0.0176*** 0.0093***
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0019)
AgeSq -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0125 0.0133 0.0176 0.0119 0.0128 0.0173 0.0106 0.0132 0.0167
(0.0107) (0.0176) (0.0139) (0.0107) (0.0176) (0.0139) (0.0107) (0.0176) (0.0139)
Defacto 0.0044 0.0041 0.0095 0.0052 0.0044 0.0101 0.0043 0.0047 0.0098
(0.0105) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0157) (0.0134)
No.Children -0.0014 -0.0250*** -0.0054* -0.0021 -0.0251*** -0.0060* -0.0018 -0.0246*** -0.0056*
(0.0021) (0.0087) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0087) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0087) (0.0032)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0683*** 0.0148 -0.0522** -0.0703*** 0.0130 -0.0553** -0.0688*** 0.0138 -0.0541**
(0.0138) (0.0374) (0.0222) (0.0137) (0.0374) (0.0221) (0.0137) (0.0374) (0.0220)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0063 0.0016 -0.0089 -0.0083 0.0018 -0.0103 -0.0073 0.0020 -0.0096
certificate (0.0099) (0.0298) (0.0144) (0.0099) (0.0298) (0.0143) (0.0099) (0.0298) (0.0143)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0123 0.0173 -0.0065 -0.0138* 0.0164 -0.0085 -0.0130 0.0167 -0.0078
(0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0118) (0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0117) (0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0117)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0221** -0.0120 -0.0140 -0.0238*** -0.0118 -0.0151 -0.0233*** -0.0129 -0.0152
(0.0088) (0.0273) (0.0130) (0.0088) (0.0273) (0.0130) (0.0088) (0.0273) (0.0129)
Cert III or IV -0.0022 0.0122 0.0052 -0.0037 0.0116 0.0038 -0.0026 0.0108 0.0045
(0.0079) (0.0187) (0.0115) (0.0079) (0.0187) (0.0115) (0.0079) (0.0187) (0.0114)
Cert I or II 0.0024 0.0313 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0290 -0.0041 0.0034 0.0280 -0.0008
(0.0198) (0.0568) (0.0296) (0.0198) (0.0568) (0.0294) (0.0197) (0.0568) (0.0292)
Cert not defined -0.1080*** -0.0791 -0.0916 -0.1147*** -0.0753 -0.0960 -0.1105*** -0.0809 -0.0940
(0.0403) (0.1323) (0.0652) (0.0398) (0.1323) (0.0637) (0.0402) (0.1323) (0.0648)
Year 11 and below -0.0044 -0.0075 -0.0122 -0.0077 -0.0109 -0.0153 -0.0064 -0.0103 -0.0139
(0.0072) (0.0166) (0.0105) (0.0072) (0.0166) (0.0104) (0.0072) (0.0166) (0.0104)
Occupation
Managers 0.0990*** 0.0722*** 0.0955*** 0.1010*** 0.0720*** 0.0969*** 0.0971*** 0.0712*** 0.0944***
(0.0121) (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0168) (0.0149)
Professionals 0.0960*** 0.0579*** 0.0882*** 0.0974*** 0.0581*** 0.0896*** 0.0935*** 0.0571*** 0.0870***
(0.0115) (0.0163) (0.0147) (0.0115) (0.0163) (0.0147) (0.0115) (0.0163) (0.0147)
Technicians and 0.0511*** 0.0511** 0.0626*** 0.0533*** 0.0507** 0.0637*** 0.0498*** 0.0498** 0.0612***
Trades Workers (0.0150) (0.0201) (0.0185) (0.0151) (0.0201) (0.0184) (0.0150) (0.0201) (0.0184)
Community and 0.0462*** 0.0364** 0.0501*** 0.0463*** 0.0363** 0.0504*** 0.0444*** 0.0355** 0.0489***
Personal Services (0.0116) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0116) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0115) (0.0156) (0.0145)
Sales Workers 0.0731*** 0.0440*** 0.0710*** 0.0758*** 0.0438*** 0.0727*** 0.0728*** 0.0434*** 0.0708***
(0.0107) (0.0157) (0.0138) (0.0107) (0.0157) (0.0138) (0.0107) (0.0157) (0.0138)
Clerical and Admin 0.0336*** 0.0292* 0.0400*** 0.0340*** 0.0291* 0.0406*** 0.0322*** 0.0285* 0.0390***
Workers (0.0120) (0.0156) (0.0147) (0.0120) (0.0156) (0.0147) (0.0120) (0.0156) (0.0147)
Machinery Operators 0.0291 -0.0512* -0.0045 0.0277 -0.0517* -0.0056 0.0267 -0.0519* -0.0056
& Drivers (0.0241) (0.0303) (0.0349) (0.0242) (0.0303) (0.0348) (0.0241) (0.0303) (0.0346)
Missing/Refused Occ -0.0442 -0.0186 -0.0252 -0.0751 -0.0164 -0.0363 -0.0421 -0.0154 -0.0229
Response (0.0647) (0.0546) (0.0622) (0.0623) (0.0545) (0.0613) (0.0628) (0.0545) (0.0611)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.10: First Stage Regressions for Stability
Dependent variable is Stability
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0522*** -0.0049 -0.0395* -0.0537*** -0.0084 -0.0421* -0.0527*** -0.0063 -0.0410*
(0.0146) (0.0391) (0.0223) (0.0146) (0.0390) (0.0222) (0.0146) (0.0390) (0.0222)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0137 -0.0169 -0.0254 -0.0169 -0.0185 -0.0277 -0.0161 -0.0173 -0.0268
certificate (0.0130) (0.0361) (0.0200) (0.0130) (0.0361) (0.0199) (0.0130) (0.0361) (0.0199)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0399*** -0.0186 -0.0382** -0.0416*** -0.0188 -0.0394** -0.0413*** -0.0184 -0.0392**
(0.0106) (0.0289) (0.0155) (0.0106) (0.0289) (0.0154) (0.0106) (0.0289) (0.0154)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0185 0.0148 -0.0160 -0.0192* 0.0143 -0.0165 -0.0189* 0.0146 -0.0163
(0.0115) (0.0338) (0.0167) (0.0114) (0.0338) (0.0167) (0.0114) (0.0338) (0.0166)
Cert III or IV -0.0029 0.0293 0.0013 -0.0044 0.0288 -0.0000 -0.0043 0.0293 0.0001
(0.0092) (0.0251) (0.0129) (0.0091) (0.0251) (0.0129) (0.0091) (0.0251) (0.0128)
Cert I or II 0.0129 -0.0030 -0.0040 0.0130 -0.0015 -0.0046 0.0151 -0.0001 -0.0024
(0.0296) (0.0572) (0.0389) (0.0289) (0.0572) (0.0389) (0.0290) (0.0572) (0.0388)
Cert not defined 0.0797** -0.0662 0.0291 0.0770** -0.0668 0.0286 0.0753* -0.0662 0.0283
(0.0391) (0.1220) (0.0502) (0.0392) (0.1220) (0.0503) (0.0391) (0.1220) (0.0498)
Year 11 and below -0.0214** 0.0186 -0.0219 -0.0220** 0.0178 -0.0226 -0.0220** 0.0179 -0.0225
(0.0104) (0.0289) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0288) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0288) (0.0148)
No Partner Info 0.1665*** 0.2056 0.1585* 0.1633*** 0.2081 0.1599** 0.1600*** 0.2053 0.1554*
(0.0207) (0.2510) (0.0812) (0.0203) (0.2509) (0.0789) (0.0195) (0.2509) (0.0793)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0306 -0.0093 -0.0175 -0.0327 -0.0094 -0.0194 -0.0295 -0.0098 -0.0181
(0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0221) (0.0256) (0.0246) (0.0223) (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0223)
Not in LF 0.0032 0.0061 0.0043 0.0033 0.0066 0.0045 0.0037 0.0065 0.0047
(0.0119) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0119) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0169) (0.0142)
No Partner Info -0.2080*** -0.2165 -0.1941** -0.2067*** -0.2192 -0.1972** -0.2029*** -0.2158 -0.1919**
(0.0212) (0.2503) (0.0809) (0.0209) (0.2502) (0.0785) (0.0201) (0.2502) (0.0790)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0139 0.0220 -0.0079 -0.0163 0.0210 -0.0097 -0.0155 0.0215 -0.0087
(0.0169) (0.0316) (0.0215) (0.0168) (0.0316) (0.0214) (0.0169) (0.0316) (0.0214)
Hinduism -0.0344 -0.0188 -0.0625 -0.0355 -0.0127 -0.0603 -0.0352 -0.0124 -0.0604
(0.0331) (0.0889) (0.0461) (0.0330) (0.0888) (0.0457) (0.0330) (0.0888) (0.0456)
Judaism -0.1234*** 0.1287 -0.1155* -0.1225*** 0.1280 -0.1172* -0.1208*** 0.1285 -0.1154*
(0.0381) (0.1623) (0.0599) (0.0381) (0.1623) (0.0600) (0.0381) (0.1622) (0.0598)
Islam -0.0234 0.1549 -0.0088 -0.0208 0.1617 -0.0078 -0.0197 0.1692 -0.0060
(0.0381) (0.1659) (0.0550) (0.0373) (0.1658) (0.0543) (0.0376) (0.1658) (0.0552)
Other Religion -0.0307 0.0365 -0.0104 -0.0293 0.0359 -0.0109 -0.0282 0.0356 -0.0102
(0.0202) (0.0337) (0.0254) (0.0201) (0.0337) (0.0253) (0.0201) (0.0337) (0.0252)
No Religion -0.0114** 0.0028 -0.0087 -0.0115** 0.0025 -0.0090 -0.0111** 0.0023 -0.0089
(0.0050) (0.0110) (0.0072) (0.0050) (0.0110) (0.0072) (0.0050) (0.0110) (0.0072)
Refused Religious -0.0314*** -0.0031 -0.0178 -0.0310*** -0.0032 -0.0179 -0.0302** -0.0033 -0.0177
Response (0.0118) (0.0145) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0145) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0145) (0.0127)
Constant 0.6891*** 0.6225*** 0.6821*** 0.6148*** 0.6979*** 0.6293***
(0.0285) (0.0383) (0.0284) (0.0382) (0.0284) (0.0381)
Observations 27,990 27,231 27,990 27,990 27,231 27,990 27,990 27,231 27,990
R-squared 0.0198 0.0068 0.0239 0.0078 0.0265 0.0081
Number of HH 4,887 5,646 4,887 5,646 4,887 5,646
The reported first stage for the random effects model comes from implementing a manual IV regression,
saving the first stage. The output reported in the main text is from implementing the xtivreg command in Stata 13.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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7.2.3 NILF Transition Sample Full Specification
Table 7.11: Unemployment IV Estimation with NILF
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployed -0.2467*** -0.4271*** -0.2582*** -0.2192*** -0.2245*** -0.2157*** -0.2445*** -0.3448*** -0.2547***
(0.0170) (0.0555) (0.0201) (0.0373) (0.0577) (0.0431) (0.0162) (0.0443) (0.0215)
General Covars
Age -0.0037*** -0.0355*** -0.0043*** -0.0036*** -0.0349*** -0.0042*** -0.0037*** -0.0353*** -0.0043***
(0.0005) (0.0029) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0026) (0.0005)
AgeSq 0.0000** 0.0003*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0003*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0329*** 0.0857*** 0.0347*** 0.0338*** 0.0886*** 0.0364*** 0.0330*** 0.0869*** 0.0349***
(0.0048) (0.0115) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0048) (0.0108) (0.0053)
Defacto 0.0364*** 0.0469*** 0.0357*** 0.0371*** 0.0496*** 0.0366*** 0.0365*** 0.0480*** 0.0358***
(0.0050) (0.0092) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0089) (0.0054)
No.Children 0.0131*** 0.1400*** 0.0157*** 0.0133*** 0.1473*** 0.0163*** 0.0131*** 0.1430*** 0.0158***
(0.0010) (0.0111) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0121) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0077) (0.0012)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0326*** 0.1182*** 0.0370*** 0.0331*** 0.1254*** 0.0385*** 0.0326*** 0.1211*** 0.0374***
(0.0071) (0.0198) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0187) (0.0079) (0.0071) (0.0237) (0.0074)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0352*** 0.1044*** 0.0376*** 0.0355*** 0.1113*** 0.0386*** 0.0352*** 0.1072*** 0.0379***
certificate (0.0054) (0.0164) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0162) (0.0059) (0.0054) (0.0139) (0.0059)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0230*** 0.0601*** 0.0240*** 0.0233*** 0.0661*** 0.0248*** 0.0230*** 0.0625*** 0.0241***
(0.0043) (0.0093) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0095) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0103) (0.0042)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0154*** 0.0376*** 0.0168*** 0.0156*** 0.0416*** 0.0173*** 0.0154*** 0.0393*** 0.0169***
(0.0045) (0.0079) (0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0123) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0056)
Cert III or IV 0.0027 0.0003 0.0022 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0018 0.0027 0.0002 0.0021
(0.0038) (0.0063) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0125) (0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0078) (0.0039)
Cert I or II 0.0044 -0.0142 0.0054 0.0034 -0.0152 0.0039 0.0043 -0.0146 0.0053
(0.0096) (0.0180) (0.0087) (0.0096) (0.0245) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0211) (0.0125)
Cert not defined -0.0107 0.0645 -0.0082 -0.0132 0.0446 -0.0119 -0.0109 0.0564 -0.0084
(0.0152) (0.0867) (0.0182) (0.0155) (0.0598) (0.0165) (0.0152) (0.0647) (0.0205)
Year 11 and below -0.0137*** -0.0500*** -0.0149*** -0.0142*** -0.0566*** -0.0158*** -0.0138*** -0.0527*** -0.0150***
(0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0056) (0.0039)
Occupation
Managers -0.0120*** -0.0243*** -0.0152*** -0.0116** -0.0320*** -0.0151*** -0.0120*** -0.0274*** -0.0154***
(0.0046) (0.0086) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0112) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0085) (0.0051)
Professionals -0.0174*** -0.0313*** -0.0203*** -0.0173*** -0.0411*** -0.0206*** -0.0174*** -0.0353*** -0.0205***
(0.0045) (0.0090) (0.0063) (0.0044) (0.0118) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0094) (0.0045)
Technicians and -0.0037 -0.0185** -0.0059 -0.0031 -0.0222** -0.0053 -0.0037 -0.0200** -0.0059
Trades Workers (0.0059) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0060) (0.0101) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0100) (0.0060)
Community and -0.0117*** -0.0141* -0.0130** -0.0111*** -0.0175* -0.0124*** -0.0116*** -0.0155* -0.0130***
Personal Services (0.0041) (0.0083) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0093) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0082) (0.0048)
Sales Workers -0.0101*** -0.0245** -0.0127*** -0.0097*** -0.0325*** -0.0124*** -0.0101*** -0.0278*** -0.0128***
(0.0037) (0.0097) (0.0044) (0.0037) (0.0102) (0.0044) (0.0037) (0.0081) (0.0043)
Clerical and Admin -0.0160*** -0.0258** -0.0173*** -0.0154*** -0.0295*** -0.0165*** -0.0160*** -0.0273*** -0.0173***
Workers (0.0041) (0.0105) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0104) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0077) (0.0044)
Machinery Operators -0.0023 0.0184 -0.0009 -0.0015 0.0162 0.0003 -0.0022 0.0175 -0.0007
& Drivers (0.0087) (0.0131) (0.0102) (0.0087) (0.0156) (0.0120) (0.0087) (0.0145) (0.0092)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.3587*** 0.4270*** 0.3665*** 0.3466*** 0.3330*** 0.3475*** 0.3577*** 0.3888*** 0.3650***
Response (0.0134) (0.0273) (0.0138) (0.0195) (0.0325) (0.0224) (0.0132) (0.0235) (0.0144)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.11: Unemployment IV Estimation with NILF Cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0135 -0.0448* -0.0144 -0.0142 -0.0554* -0.0156 -0.0136 -0.0491* -0.0145
(0.0093) (0.0268) (0.0125) (0.0093) (0.0283) (0.0101) (0.0093) (0.0279) (0.0118)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0322*** -0.0671** -0.0322*** -0.0327*** -0.0744*** -0.0330*** -0.0322*** -0.0701*** -0.0322***
certificate (0.0087) (0.0265) (0.0074) (0.0087) (0.0253) (0.0102) (0.0087) (0.0254) (0.0113)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0166** -0.0078 -0.0162** -0.0170** -0.0137 -0.0169** -0.0166** -0.0102 -0.0162*
(0.0073) (0.0164) (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0188) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0176) (0.0083)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0195** -0.0092 -0.0192*** -0.0199** -0.0165 -0.0198** -0.0196** -0.0122 -0.0192**
(0.0077) (0.0224) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0201) (0.0088) (0.0077) (0.0167) (0.0081)
Cert III or IV -0.0198*** 0.0077 -0.0181*** -0.0204*** 0.0038 -0.0189** -0.0198*** 0.0061 -0.0181**
(0.0065) (0.0153) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0171) (0.0076) (0.0066) (0.0161) (0.0088)
Cert I or II -0.0249 -0.0077 -0.0275 -0.0258 -0.0111 -0.0293 -0.0249 -0.0091 -0.0277
(0.0193) (0.0590) (0.0169) (0.0193) (0.0537) (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0374) (0.0203)
Cert not defined -0.0117 -0.0676 -0.0127 -0.0135 -0.0810 -0.0161 -0.0118 -0.0730 -0.0131
(0.0260) (0.0829) (0.0316) (0.0258) (0.1111) (0.0307) (0.0260) (0.0891) (0.0278)
Year 11 and below -0.0234*** 0.0040 -0.0215*** -0.0241*** 0.0002 -0.0225*** -0.0234*** 0.0025 -0.0215***
(0.0067) (0.0174) (0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0185) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0179) (0.0071)
No Partner Info -0.0780*** -0.0241 -0.0774*** -0.0782*** -0.0212 -0.0775*** -0.0780*** -0.0229 -0.0774***
(0.0159) (0.0200) (0.0180) (0.0161) (0.0216) (0.0203) (0.0159) (0.0256) (0.0235)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0131 -0.0102 -0.0125 -0.0150 -0.0133 -0.0150 -0.0133 -0.0114 -0.0127
(0.0138) (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0112) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0146)
Not in LF -0.0058 0.0105 -0.0046 -0.0062 0.0080 -0.0052 -0.0058 0.0095 -0.0046
(0.0060) (0.0132) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0078) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0098) (0.0075)
No Partner Info 0.0456*** 0.0121 0.0463*** 0.0452*** 0.0040 0.0455** 0.0456*** 0.0088 0.0462**
(0.0155) (0.0203) (0.0172) (0.0156) (0.0147) (0.0195) (0.0155) (0.0240) (0.0206)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0034 0.0003 0.0055 0.0035 0.0008 0.0057 0.0034 0.0005 0.0056
(0.0077) (0.0161) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0151) (0.0090) (0.0077) (0.0154) (0.0066)
Hinduism 0.0050 0.0213 0.0058 0.0046 0.0137 0.0053 0.0049 0.0182 0.0058
(0.0171) (0.0584) (0.0200) (0.0171) (0.0651) (0.0140) (0.0171) (0.0487) (0.0140)
Judaism -0.0178 -0.1703 -0.0206 -0.0183 -0.1488 -0.0219 -0.0178 -0.1615 -0.0208
(0.0178) (0.2735) (0.0168) (0.0178) (0.2697) (0.0137) (0.0178) (0.2589) (0.0136)
Islam -0.0127 0.0436*** -0.0127 -0.0134 0.0302*** -0.0138 -0.0128 0.0382*** -0.0128
(0.0111) (0.0102) (0.0132) (0.0112) (0.0082) (0.0151) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0137)
Other Religion -0.0097 0.0084 -0.0076 -0.0104 0.0077 -0.0085 -0.0097 0.0081 -0.0075
(0.0074) (0.0187) (0.0108) (0.0075) (0.0169) (0.0090) (0.0074) (0.0189) (0.0085)
No Religion -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0015 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0014 0.0004 -0.0011
(0.0025) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0068) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0027)
Refused Religious -0.0047 -0.0100 -0.0055 -0.0051 -0.0092 -0.0061 -0.0048 -0.0097 -0.0056
Response (0.0051) (0.0096) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0089) (0.0044)
Constant 0.1454*** 0.6699*** 0.1546*** 0.1424*** 0.6548*** 0.1514*** 0.1451*** 0.6638*** 0.1548***
(0.0123) (0.0644) (0.0138) (0.0130) (0.0519) (0.0162) (0.0123) (0.0498) (0.0132)
Observations 32,053 32,053 32,053 32,053 32,053 32,053 32,053 32,053 32,053
R-squared 0.1935 0.1940 0.1935
Number of HH 6,003 6,003 6,003 6,003 6,003 6,003
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.12: Stability IV Estimation with NILF
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Stability 0.1714*** 0.4378 0.1714*** 0.0457** 0.0960 0.0451** 0.0832*** 0.1608 0.0850***
(0.0369) (0.3756) (0.0460) (0.0207) (0.0664) (0.0216) (0.0178) (0.0985) (0.0263)
General Covars
Age -0.0021*** -0.0264*** -0.0021*** -0.0012*** -0.0201*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0213*** -0.0017***
(0.0005) (0.0061) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0004)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0138*** 0.0408*** 0.0138** 0.0156*** 0.0458*** 0.0165*** 0.0150*** 0.0448*** 0.0156***
(0.0041) (0.0128) (0.0058) (0.0037) (0.0123) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0115) (0.0047)
Defacto 0.0212*** 0.0293*** 0.0212*** 0.0218*** 0.0314*** 0.0210*** 0.0216*** 0.0310*** 0.0210***
(0.0043) (0.0086) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0085) (0.0047)
No.Children 0.0114*** 0.1473*** 0.0114*** 0.0112*** 0.1382*** 0.0131*** 0.0113*** 0.1399*** 0.0126***
(0.0009) (0.0134) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0090) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0107) (0.0015)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0359*** 0.0575 0.0359*** 0.0275*** 0.0621*** 0.0303*** 0.0300*** 0.0612*** 0.0321***
(0.0070) (0.0377) (0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0148) (0.0093) (0.0062) (0.0236) (0.0069)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0143*** 0.0578*** 0.0143*** 0.0135*** 0.0577*** 0.0152*** 0.0138*** 0.0577*** 0.0149***
certificate (0.0047) (0.0195) (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0120) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0142) (0.0047)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0138*** 0.0273** 0.0138*** 0.0123*** 0.0330*** 0.0129*** 0.0128*** 0.0319*** 0.0132***
(0.0037) (0.0136) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0037)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0140*** 0.0250 0.0140*** 0.0113*** 0.0215*** 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.0221** 0.0126***
(0.0040) (0.0275) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0056) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0088) (0.0038)
Cert III or IV 0.0027 -0.0032 0.0027 0.0024 0.0020 0.0017 0.0025 0.0010 0.0019
(0.0033) (0.0174) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0077) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0087) (0.0031)
Cert I or II -0.0072 -0.0215 -0.0072 -0.0073 -0.0102 -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0123 -0.0081
(0.0064) (0.0553) (0.0073) (0.0055) (0.0346) (0.0063) (0.0057) (0.0419) (0.0057)
Cert not defined 0.0156 0.0877 0.0156 0.0015 0.0625 0.0024 0.0057 0.0672 0.0065
(0.0139) (0.0981) (0.0177) (0.0119) (0.0472) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0671) (0.0174)
Year 11 and below -0.0057** -0.0249** -0.0057* -0.0063*** -0.0273*** -0.0072*** -0.0061** -0.0269*** -0.0067**
(0.0027) (0.0097) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0026)
Occupation
Managers -0.0127** -0.0454 -0.0127* 0.0001 -0.0200*** -0.0016 -0.0037 -0.0248* -0.0052
(0.0059) (0.0343) (0.0072) (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0046) (0.0148) (0.0052)
Professionals -0.0153*** -0.0397 -0.0153** -0.0028 -0.0188*** -0.0039 -0.0065 -0.0227* -0.0075*
(0.0055) (0.0302) (0.0071) (0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0131) (0.0039)
Technicians and 0.0011 -0.0314 0.0011 0.0078 -0.0135 0.0063 0.0058 -0.0169 0.0045
Trades Workers (0.0062) (0.0302) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0098) (0.0080) (0.0056) (0.0124) (0.0069)
Community and -0.0092** -0.0277 -0.0092* -0.0032 -0.0140** -0.0042 -0.0049 -0.0166 -0.0059
Personal Services (0.0042) (0.0174) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0069) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0115) (0.0036)
Sales Workers -0.0131*** -0.0354 -0.0131** -0.0034 -0.0194*** -0.0044 -0.0063* -0.0224** -0.0071*
(0.0045) (0.0218) (0.0052) (0.0035) (0.0074) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0103) (0.0041)
Clerical and Admin -0.0089** -0.0253 -0.0089 -0.0045 -0.0140* -0.0048 -0.0058 -0.0161 -0.0062
Workers (0.0042) (0.0166) (0.0057) (0.0036) (0.0075) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0108) (0.0041)
Machinery Operators -0.0001 0.0305 -0.0001 0.0037 0.0140 0.0049 0.0025 0.0171 0.0035
& Drivers (0.0086) (0.0226) (0.0104) (0.0077) (0.0131) (0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0176) (0.0067)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.3378*** 0.3069*** 0.3378*** 0.3334*** 0.3145*** 0.3309*** 0.3347*** 0.3131*** 0.3326***
Response (0.0465) (0.0513) (0.0470) (0.0467) (0.0408) (0.0515) (0.0466) (0.0579) (0.0574)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
192
Table 7.12: Stability IV Estimation with NILF Cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0010 0.0045 -0.0010 -0.0077 0.0024 -0.0072 -0.0057 0.0028 -0.0053
(0.0083) (0.0402) (0.0124) (0.0079) (0.0265) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0218) (0.0083)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0153** 0.0157 -0.0153 -0.0172** 0.0102 -0.0146** -0.0166** 0.0113 -0.0147
certificate (0.0076) (0.0225) (0.0096) (0.0073) (0.0147) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0184) (0.0103)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0069 -0.0015 -0.0069 -0.0120* -0.0080 -0.0118* -0.0105* -0.0068 -0.0102
(0.0065) (0.0168) (0.0082) (0.0062) (0.0095) (0.0067) (0.0062) (0.0119) (0.0079)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0088 0.0159 -0.0088 -0.0110* 0.0212 -0.0094 -0.0104 0.0202 -0.0092
(0.0067) (0.0235) (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0158) (0.0076) (0.0065) (0.0171) (0.0059)
Cert III or IV -0.0153*** 0.0075 -0.0153*** -0.0156*** 0.0179 -0.0139*** -0.0155*** 0.0159 -0.0143**
(0.0057) (0.0133) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0118) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0098) (0.0058)
Cert I or II -0.0107 0.0294 -0.0107 -0.0091 0.0284 -0.0086 -0.0096 0.0286 -0.0092
(0.0176) (0.0486) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0551) (0.0274) (0.0173) (0.0529) (0.0232)
Cert not defined -0.0458*** -0.0687 -0.0458*** -0.0355*** -0.0910 -0.0395*** -0.0385*** -0.0867* -0.0413***
(0.0099) (0.0632) (0.0108) (0.0066) (0.0575) (0.0128) (0.0072) (0.0473) (0.0112)
Year 11 and below -0.0146** 0.0249 -0.0146** -0.0173*** 0.0317** -0.0150** -0.0164*** 0.0304* -0.0148***
(0.0058) (0.0172) (0.0066) (0.0056) (0.0146) (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0172) (0.0053)
No Partner Info -0.0876*** -0.1004 -0.0876*** -0.0663*** -0.0282 -0.0652*** -0.0726*** -0.0419 -0.0721***
(0.0123) (0.1125) (0.0193) (0.0117) (0.0226) (0.0148) (0.0113) (0.0474) (0.0162)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0062 -0.0022 -0.0062 -0.0104 -0.0049 -0.0096 -0.0091 -0.0044 -0.0086
(0.0104) (0.0161) (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0141) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0115) (0.0120)
Not in LF 0.0017 0.0075 0.0017 0.0021 0.0096 0.0028 0.0020 0.0092 0.0025
(0.0050) (0.0101) (0.0062) (0.0046) (0.0072) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0087) (0.0055)
No Partner Info 0.0707*** 0.1128 0.0707*** 0.0442*** 0.0376** 0.0445*** 0.0521*** 0.0519 0.0526***
(0.0127) (0.1219) (0.0188) (0.0116) (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0111) (0.0513) (0.0167)
Religion -0.0033 -0.0312 -0.0033 -0.0052 -0.0244* -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0257 -0.0043
Buddisim
(0.0059) (0.0199) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0140) (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0185) (0.0065)
Hinduism -0.0003 0.0603 -0.0003 -0.0047 0.0552 -0.0003 -0.0034 0.0561 -0.0001
(0.0147) (0.1098) (0.0200) (0.0133) (0.0962) (0.0159) (0.0136) (0.0610) (0.0174)
Judaism 0.0052 -0.0548 0.0052 -0.0114 -0.0116 -0.0123 -0.0064 -0.0198 -0.0067
(0.0141) (0.1451) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0220) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0414) (0.0137)
Islam -0.0024 -0.0523 -0.0024 -0.0055 -0.0026 -0.0055 -0.0045 -0.0120 -0.0045
(0.0118) (0.2082) (0.0075) (0.0101) (0.0368) (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0613) (0.0079)
Other Religion -0.0020 -0.0171 -0.0020 -0.0060 -0.0050 -0.0055 -0.0048 -0.0073 -0.0045
(0.0065) (0.0171) (0.0079) (0.0056) (0.0128) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0171) (0.0083)
No Religion -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0014
(0.0022) (0.0079) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0062) (0.0026)
Refused Religious 0.0007 -0.0030 0.0007 -0.0036 -0.0046 -0.0039 -0.0023 -0.0043 -0.0025
Response (0.0047) (0.0092) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0070) (0.0042)
Constant -0.0520* 0.0974 -0.0520* 0.0327* 0.2177*** 0.0365** 0.0074 0.1949*** 0.0089
(0.0271) (0.1632) (0.0295) (0.0173) (0.0460) (0.0169) (0.0158) (0.0549) (0.0251)
Observations 28,090 28,090 28,090 28,090 28,090 28,090 28,090 28,090 28,090
R-squared 0.0423 0.0144
Number of pid 5,656 5,656 5,656 5,656 5,656 5,656
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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7.2.4 Immigrant Native Analysis Full Specifications
Table 7.13: Unemployment IV Estimation - Native Specification
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployment -0.0879*** -0.2113** -0.0901*** -0.0684 -0.0323 -0.0518 -0.0840*** -0.1136** -0.0814***
(0.0204) (0.0929) (0.0249) (0.0466) (0.0655) (0.0342) (0.0193) (0.0511) (0.0189)
General Covars -0.0011*** -0.0211*** -0.0016*** -0.0011** -0.0203*** -0.0016*** -0.0011*** -0.0207*** -0.0016***
Age -0.0011*** -0.0211*** -0.0016*** -0.0011** -0.0203*** -0.0016*** -0.0011*** -0.0207*** -0.0016***
(0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0005)
AgeSq -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** 0.0002*** -0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0204*** 0.0577*** 0.0213*** 0.0206*** 0.0572*** 0.0217*** 0.0204*** 0.0574*** 0.0214***
(0.0044) (0.0118) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0138) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0109) (0.0049)
Defacto 0.0177*** 0.0277*** 0.0158** 0.0178*** 0.0283*** 0.0158*** 0.0177*** 0.0281*** 0.0158***
(0.0046) (0.0094) (0.0063) (0.0046) (0.0088) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0086) (0.0053)
No.Children 0.0128*** 0.1597*** 0.0162*** 0.0127*** 0.1590*** 0.0163*** 0.0128*** 0.1593*** 0.0163***
(0.0010) (0.0106) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0103) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0083) (0.0014)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0261*** 0.0728*** 0.0325*** 0.0261*** 0.0735*** 0.0328*** 0.0261*** 0.0732*** 0.0328***
(0.0069) (0.0195) (0.0089) (0.0069) (0.0138) (0.0085) (0.0069) (0.0196) (0.0066)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0222*** 0.0531*** 0.0250*** 0.0222*** 0.0529*** 0.0252*** 0.0222*** 0.0530*** 0.0252***
certificate (0.0053) (0.0150) (0.0067) (0.0053) (0.0103) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0125) (0.0057)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0167*** 0.0338*** 0.0177*** 0.0168*** 0.0350*** 0.0179*** 0.0167*** 0.0345*** 0.0178***
(0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0059) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0071) (0.0034)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0140*** 0.0225** 0.0158*** 0.0141*** 0.0244*** 0.0160*** 0.0140*** 0.0235*** 0.0159***
(0.0044) (0.0098) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0081) (0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0042)
Cert III or IV 0.0054 0.0024 0.0051* 0.0054 0.0009 0.0050 0.0054 0.0016 0.0050
(0.0035) (0.0064) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0095) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0040)
Cert I or II -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0006
(0.0070) (0.0234) (0.0103) (0.0070) (0.0241) (0.0090) (0.0070) (0.0149) (0.0100)
Cert not defined 0.0028 0.0585 0.0083 0.0024 0.0561 0.0079 0.0027 0.0572 0.0084
(0.0140) (0.0733) (0.0217) (0.0140) (0.0563) (0.0373) (0.0140) (0.0591) (0.0261)
Year 11 and below -0.0045* -0.0294*** -0.0054** -0.0046* -0.0302*** -0.0056* -0.0045* -0.0298*** -0.0055*
(0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0029)
Occupation
Managers 0.0007 -0.0072 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0048 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0059 -0.0002
(0.0047) (0.0114) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0043)
Professionals 0.0002 -0.0092 -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0075 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0083 -0.0005
(0.0044) (0.0079) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0077) (0.0044)
Technicians and 0.0080 -0.0055 0.0065 0.0085 -0.0024 0.0075 0.0081 -0.0038 0.0067
Trades Workers (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0050) (0.0072) (0.0063) (0.0045) (0.0043)
Community and -0.0034 -0.0059 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0033 -0.0045 -0.0031
Personal Services (0.0040) (0.0084) (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0082) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0053)
Sales Workers 0.0005 -0.0054 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0041 0.0012 0.0006 -0.0047 0.0005
(0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0041)
Clerical and Admin -0.0067* -0.0112* -0.0065 -0.0062 -0.0098 -0.0056 -0.0066* -0.0104* -0.0063
Workers (0.0039) (0.0067) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0069) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0061) (0.0039)
Machinery Operators 0.0050 0.0152 0.0071 0.0056 0.0153 0.0082 0.0051 0.0152 0.0074
& Drivers (0.0087) (0.0134) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0224) (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0133) (0.0081)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.1023*** 0.1996** 0.1042*** 0.0839* 0.0392 0.0685** 0.0986*** 0.1121** 0.0961***
Response (0.0210) (0.0813) (0.0278) (0.0443) (0.0615) (0.0334) (0.0199) (0.0443) (0.0191)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.13: Unemployment IV Estimation - Native Specification Cont
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0199** -0.0474* -0.0219*** -0.0201** -0.0507 -0.0225** -0.0199** -0.0492*** -0.0221**
(0.0101) (0.0250) (0.0062) (0.0102) (0.0344) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0189) (0.0102)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0268*** -0.0303 -0.0257** -0.0269*** -0.0337* -0.0260** -0.0268*** -0.0322 -0.0258**
certificate (0.0092) (0.0198) (0.0101) (0.0092) (0.0181) (0.0127) (0.0092) (0.0244) (0.0100)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0242*** -0.0175 -0.0245*** -0.0243*** -0.0184 -0.0248** -0.0243*** -0.0180 -0.0246***
(0.0078) (0.0155) (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0149) (0.0098) (0.0078) (0.0162) (0.0083)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0258*** 0.0076 -0.0246*** -0.0259*** 0.0059 -0.0246** -0.0258*** 0.0067 -0.0245**
(0.0080) (0.0172) (0.0076) (0.0080) (0.0183) (0.0106) (0.0080) (0.0198) (0.0096)
Cert III or IV -0.0283*** -0.0025 -0.0270*** -0.0284*** -0.0045 -0.0272*** -0.0283*** -0.0036 -0.0270***
(0.0069) (0.0106) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0117) (0.0086) (0.0069) (0.0128) (0.0081)
Cert I or II -0.0070 0.0280 -0.0062 -0.0071 0.0267 -0.0064 -0.0070 0.0273 -0.0062
(0.0190) (0.0349) (0.0218) (0.0190) (0.0363) (0.0272) (0.0190) (0.0520) (0.0296)
Cert not defined -0.0097 -0.0155 -0.0081 -0.0101 -0.0114 -0.0088 -0.0098 -0.0133 -0.0082
(0.0274) (0.0716) (0.0291) (0.0273) (0.0638) (0.0359) (0.0274) (0.1489) (0.0466)
Year 11 and below -0.0257*** 0.0147 -0.0222*** -0.0258*** 0.0145 -0.0223** -0.0257*** 0.0146*** -0.0221***
(0.0071) (0.0144) (0.0081) (0.0071) (0.0183) (0.0105) (0.0071) (0.0043) (0.0081)
No Partner Info -0.0474*** -0.0229 -0.0452*** -0.0467*** -0.0222 -0.0437*** -0.0472*** -0.0225 -0.0448***
(0.0137) (0.0176) (0.0120) (0.0134) (0.0177) (0.0102) (0.0136) (0.0254) (0.0113)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed 0.0006 -0.0042 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0059 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0051 0.0007
(0.0123) (0.0080) (0.0110) (0.0122) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0081) (0.0130)
Not in LF 0.0030 0.0117* 0.0044 0.0029 0.0109 0.0042 0.0029 0.0112 0.0044
(0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0055) (0.0088) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0142) (0.0062)
No Partner Info 0.0103 0.0102 0.0091 0.0095 0.0080 0.0075 0.0102 0.0090 0.0087
(0.0131) (0.0186) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0153) (0.0081) (0.0130) (0.0283) (0.0111)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0057 0.0168 0.0094 0.0056 0.0184** 0.0093 0.0057 0.0176 0.0095
(0.0082) (0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0109) (0.0082) (0.0158) (0.0104)
Hinduism 0.0123 0.3460 0.0249 0.0126 0.3479 0.0262 0.0123 0.3470 0.0256
(0.0438) (0.3758) (0.1086) (0.0438) (0.3348) (0.0550) (0.0438) (0.2636) (0.0583)
Judaism -0.0109 -0.4157 -0.0080 -0.0110 -0.4158 -0.0081 -0.0109 -0.4157 -0.0080
(0.0188) (0.2876) (0.0196) (0.0187) (0.2953) (0.0263) (0.0188) (0.4524) (0.0211)
Islam -0.0094 0.0274*** -0.0087 -0.0093 0.0269*** -0.0085 -0.0094 0.0271*** -0.0086
(0.0124) (0.0049) (0.0086) (0.0124) (0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0124) (0.0069) (0.0168)
Other Religion -0.0119*** -0.0073 -0.0116** -0.0123*** -0.0097 -0.0125** -0.0120*** -0.0086 -0.0118**
(0.0039) (0.0102) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0082) (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0111) (0.0046)
No Religion -0.0032 0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0033 0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0032 0.0006 -0.0026
(0.0022) (0.0059) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0090) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0056) (0.0027)
Refused Religious -0.0065 -0.0029 -0.0062 -0.0067 -0.0017 -0.0064 -0.0065 -0.0022 -0.0062
Response (0.0046) (0.0086) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0086) (0.0044)
Constant 0.0873*** 0.3100*** 0.0944*** 0.0855*** 0.2888*** 0.0912*** 0.0870*** 0.2984*** 0.0939***
(0.0118) (0.0415) (0.0103) (0.0125) (0.0447) (0.0146) (0.0118) (0.0340) (0.0117)
Observations 24,924 24,924 24,924 24,924 24,924 24,924 24,924 24,924 24,924
R-squared 0.0364 0.0376 0.0367
Number of HH 4,879 4,879 4,879 4,879 4,879 4,879
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.14: Unemployment IV Estimation Native Specification (with NILF transition)
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployment -0.2471*** -0.4456*** -0.2583*** -0.2090*** -0.2241*** -0.2045*** -0.2438*** -0.3461*** -0.2538***
(0.0186) (0.0779) (0.0210) (0.0413) (0.0479) (0.0562) (0.0178) (0.0485) (0.0173)
General Covars
Age -0.0038*** -0.0357*** -0.0043*** -0.0036*** -0.0353*** -0.0042*** -0.0037*** -0.0355*** -0.0044***
(0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0006)
AgeSq 0.0000* 0.0003*** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0003*** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0345*** 0.0868*** 0.0362*** 0.0359*** 0.0901*** 0.0386*** 0.0346*** 0.0883*** 0.0366***
(0.0056) (0.0139) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0117) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0061)
Defacto 0.0330*** 0.0446*** 0.0322*** 0.0339*** 0.0482*** 0.0334*** 0.0331*** 0.0462*** 0.0323***
(0.0057) (0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0104) (0.0058)
No.Children 0.0135*** 0.1452*** 0.0161*** 0.0137*** 0.1547*** 0.0170*** 0.0135*** 0.1495*** 0.0163***
(0.0012) (0.0091) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0080) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0067) (0.0015)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0353*** 0.1170*** 0.0404*** 0.0362*** 0.1258*** 0.0429*** 0.0354*** 0.1209*** 0.0410***
(0.0082) (0.0208) (0.0093) (0.0083) (0.0171) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0171) (0.0080)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0396*** 0.0974*** 0.0421*** 0.0400*** 0.1063*** 0.0433*** 0.0396*** 0.1014*** 0.0423***
certificate (0.0062) (0.0149) (0.0077) (0.0063) (0.0147) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0144) (0.0070)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0238*** 0.0609*** 0.0251*** 0.0243*** 0.0688*** 0.0261*** 0.0239*** 0.0645*** 0.0253***
(0.0048) (0.0078) (0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0068) (0.0057) (0.0048) (0.0073) (0.0046)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0145*** 0.0359** 0.0159*** 0.0147*** 0.0413*** 0.0165** 0.0145*** 0.0384*** 0.0161***
(0.0051) (0.0146) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0085) (0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0103) (0.0058)
Cert III or IV 0.0057 0.0004 0.0050 0.0054 -0.0005 0.0043 0.0057 -0.0000 0.0049
(0.0043) (0.0133) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0121) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0106) (0.0036)
Cert I or II 0.0076 -0.0051 0.0091 0.0062 -0.0021 0.0071 0.0075 -0.0037 0.0090
(0.0111) (0.0236) (0.0139) (0.0111) (0.0272) (0.0136) (0.0111) (0.0262) (0.0139)
Cert not defined -0.0065 0.0800 -0.0029 -0.0102 0.0524 -0.0076 -0.0068 0.0676 -0.0032
(0.0176) (0.0865) (0.0185) (0.0180) (0.0653) (0.0224) (0.0176) (0.0532) (0.0232)
Year 11 and below -0.0128*** -0.0503*** -0.0139*** -0.0135*** -0.0576*** -0.0154*** -0.0128*** -0.0536*** -0.0141***
(0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0072) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0063) (0.0040)
Occupation
Managers -0.0150*** -0.0246*** -0.0180*** -0.0145*** -0.0327*** -0.0180** -0.0150*** -0.0282** -0.0182***
(0.0052) (0.0082) (0.0064) (0.0052) (0.0115) (0.0071) (0.0052) (0.0119) (0.0055)
Professionals -0.0194*** -0.0270*** -0.0220*** -0.0193*** -0.0394*** -0.0226*** -0.0194*** -0.0326*** -0.0222***
(0.0052) (0.0086) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0095) (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0082) (0.0059)
Technicians and -0.0056 -0.0180* -0.0078 -0.0049 -0.0233 -0.0074 -0.0055 -0.0204 -0.0079
Trades Workers (0.0068) (0.0097) (0.0082) (0.0068) (0.0144) (0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0125) (0.0068)
Community and -0.0135*** -0.0109 -0.0140*** -0.0128*** -0.0146* -0.0132*** -0.0134*** -0.0126** -0.0140**
Personal Services (0.0046) (0.0084) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0082) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0054)
Sales Workers -0.0109** -0.0183** -0.0128*** -0.0103** -0.0274*** -0.0125** -0.0108** -0.0224** -0.0129**
(0.0043) (0.0091) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0094) (0.0057) (0.0043) (0.0104) (0.0053)
Clerical and Admin -0.0183*** -0.0233*** -0.0190*** -0.0174*** -0.0277*** -0.0180*** -0.0182*** -0.0253*** -0.0189***
Workers (0.0045) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0046) (0.0080) (0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0066) (0.0048)
Machinery Operators -0.0015 0.0253** 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0215* 0.0022 -0.0014 0.0236 0.0008
& Drivers (0.0095) (0.0124) (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0122) (0.0099) (0.0095) (0.0215) (0.0095)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.3589*** 0.4352*** 0.3667*** 0.3426*** 0.3330*** 0.3434*** 0.3575*** 0.3893*** 0.3649***
Response (0.0146) (0.0462) (0.0177) (0.0211) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0143) (0.0272) (0.0151)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
196
Table 7.14: Unemployment IV Estimation Native Specification (with NILF transition) Cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0188* -0.0523 -0.0203 -0.0200* -0.0650 -0.0224 -0.0189* -0.0580 -0.0206*
(0.0112) (0.0335) (0.0133) (0.0114) (0.0397) (0.0158) (0.0112) (0.0356) (0.0120)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0327*** -0.0811** -0.0332** -0.0335*** -0.0902** -0.0346*** -0.0327*** -0.0852** -0.0334***
certificate (0.0105) (0.0319) (0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0416) (0.0130) (0.0105) (0.0338) (0.0119)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0237*** -0.0141 -0.0236** -0.0247*** -0.0225 -0.0251** -0.0238*** -0.0179 -0.0237***
(0.0086) (0.0251) (0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0254) (0.0112) (0.0086) (0.0231) (0.0082)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0322*** -0.0099 -0.0317*** -0.0329*** -0.0184 -0.0326*** -0.0323*** -0.0137 -0.0317***
(0.0090) (0.0243) (0.0077) (0.0091) (0.0307) (0.0112) (0.0090) (0.0310) (0.0105)
Cert III or IV -0.0259*** 0.0083 -0.0240*** -0.0269*** 0.0021 -0.0251*** -0.0260*** 0.0055 -0.0240***
(0.0077) (0.0194) (0.0091) (0.0078) (0.0272) (0.0097) (0.0077) (0.0228) (0.0080)
Cert I or II -0.0287 0.0047 -0.0296 -0.0304 0.0001 -0.0322 -0.0288 0.0026 -0.0299
(0.0218) (0.0672) (0.0239) (0.0219) (0.0660) (0.0274) (0.0218) (0.0472) (0.0217)
Cert not defined -0.0174 -0.0471 -0.0170 -0.0199 -0.0599 -0.0210 -0.0177 -0.0529 -0.0174
(0.0265) (0.1263) (0.0160) (0.0262) (0.1109) (0.0292) (0.0264) (0.1359) (0.0301)
Year 11 and below -0.0285*** 0.0077 -0.0258** -0.0298*** 0.0014 -0.0272*** -0.0286*** 0.0049 -0.0258***
(0.0080) (0.0257) (0.0111) (0.0081) (0.0280) (0.0100) (0.0080) (0.0233) (0.0078)
No Partner Info -0.0632*** -0.0285 -0.0620** -0.0625*** -0.0276 -0.0603*** -0.0632*** -0.0281 -0.0617***
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0253) (0.0215) (0.0320) (0.0190) (0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0223)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed 0.0012 -0.0050 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0065 -0.0030 0.0010 -0.0057 0.0004
(0.0173) (0.0148) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0156) (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0139) (0.0142)
Not in LF -0.0007 0.0175** 0.0009 -0.0013 0.0154 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0166 0.0010
(0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0123) (0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0131) (0.0070)
No Partner Info 0.0248 0.0151 0.0251 0.0230 0.0073 0.0220 0.0246 0.0116 0.0248
(0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0231) (0.0211) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0233) (0.0212)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0155 0.0228* 0.0187 0.0149 0.0263 0.0183 0.0155 0.0244** 0.0188
(0.0099) (0.0120) (0.0159) (0.0098) (0.0167) (0.0128) (0.0098) (0.0124) (0.0135)
Hinduism 0.0086 0.1982 0.0130 0.0068 0.1580 0.0109 0.0085 0.1801 0.0131
(0.0414) (0.2874) (0.0434) (0.0412) (0.2069) (0.0639) (0.0414) (0.2278) (0.0601)
Judaism -0.0446** -0.6013** -0.0460 -0.0462** -0.5878* -0.0490 -0.0447** -0.5953* -0.0464
(0.0212) (0.2925) (0.0342) (0.0209) (0.3283) (0.0303) (0.0212) (0.3137) (0.0297)
Islam -0.0111 0.0428*** -0.0117 -0.0119 0.0456*** -0.0130 -0.0112 0.0441*** -0.0118
(0.0145) (0.0083) (0.0231) (0.0147) (0.0081) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0053) (0.0139)
Other Religion -0.0085 0.0222 -0.0053 -0.0099 0.0232 -0.0066 -0.0086 0.0226 -0.0052
(0.0088) (0.0147) (0.0100) (0.0089) (0.0177) (0.0113) (0.0088) (0.0180) (0.0090)
No Religion -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0003
(0.0028) (0.0081) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0079) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0063) (0.0026)
Refused Religious -0.0027 -0.0087 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0073 -0.0041 -0.0028 -0.0081 -0.0035
Response (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0105) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0079) (0.0060)
Constant 0.1511*** 0.6702*** 0.1595*** 0.1472*** 0.6572*** 0.1559*** 0.1507*** 0.6644*** 0.1598***
(0.0138) (0.0368) (0.0157) (0.0145) (0.0526) (0.0161) (0.0138) (0.0467) (0.0155)
Observations 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266 26,266
R-squared 0.1950 0.1957 0.1952
Number of HH 4,933 4,933 4,933 4,933 4,933 4,933
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.15: Unemployment IV Estimation- Immigrant Specification
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployment -0.0506 -0.2137*** -0.0799 -0.0816 0.0942 -0.0113 -0.0545 -0.1460** -0.0732
(0.0471) (0.0688) (0.0508) (0.1141) (0.3088) (0.1378) (0.0451) (0.0720) (0.0602)
General Covars
Age -0.0027** -0.0138** -0.0031* -0.0028** -0.0114 -0.0031 -0.0027** -0.0133 -0.0031***
(0.0011) (0.0067) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0078) (0.0028) (0.0011) (0.0085) (0.0010)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Married 0.0077 0.0415 0.0121 0.0076 0.0429* 0.0138 0.0077 0.0418** 0.0122
(0.0065) (0.0350) (0.0082) (0.0065) (0.0227) (0.0116) (0.0065) (0.0209) (0.0076)
Defacto 0.0262*** 0.0319** 0.0280*** 0.0260*** 0.0318*** 0.0286** 0.0261*** 0.0319*** 0.0281**
(0.0080) (0.0131) (0.0098) (0.0080) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0080) (0.0117) (0.0116)
No.Children 0.0114*** 0.1029*** 0.0157*** 0.0114*** 0.0986*** 0.0175** 0.0114*** 0.1020*** 0.0158***
(0.0017) (0.0076) (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0192) (0.0078) (0.0017) (0.0303) (0.0019)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0223* 0.1000 0.0251 0.0225* 0.0938*** 0.0260 0.0223* 0.0986 0.0252
(0.0122) (0.0639) (0.0213) (0.0123) (0.0320) (0.0239) (0.0122) (0.0602) (0.0229)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0001 0.0953*** 0.0026 0.0002 0.0800* 0.0038 0.0001 0.0919*** 0.0026
certificate (0.0090) (0.0141) (0.0125) (0.0090) (0.0471) (0.0201) (0.0090) (0.0304) (0.0105)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0115 0.0354*** 0.0096 0.0116 0.0236 0.0089 0.0115 0.0328*** 0.0096
(0.0075) (0.0027) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0200) (0.0099) (0.0075) (0.0110) (0.0109)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0147* 0.0186** 0.0147 0.0147* 0.0073 0.0147 0.0147* 0.0161 0.0147
(0.0080) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0080) (0.0262) (0.0091) (0.0080) (0.0152) (0.0091)
Cert III or IV -0.0090 -0.0042*** -0.0105 -0.0088 -0.0100 -0.0111* -0.0090 -0.0054 -0.0106
(0.0060) (0.0013) (0.0069) (0.0059) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0196) (0.0071)
Cert I or II -0.0136** -0.1275*** -0.0180* -0.0130** -0.1740 -0.0233** -0.0136** -0.1377 -0.0184
(0.0061) (0.0103) (0.0098) (0.0063) (0.5809) (0.0109) (0.0060) (0.0875) (0.0134)
Cert not defined -0.0131 -0.0699*** -0.0172 -0.0132 -0.0952 -0.0188 -0.0131 -0.0754 -0.0172
(0.0081) (0.0031) (0.0153) (0.0082) (0.6118) (0.0145) (0.0081) (0.0474) (0.0179)
Year 11 and below -0.0137** -0.0257*** -0.0157*** -0.0138** -0.0173 -0.0160*** -0.0137** -0.0239 -0.0157**
(0.0053) (0.0001) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0234) (0.0062) (0.0053) (0.0188) (0.0077)
Occupation
Managers 0.0108 0.0038 0.0088 0.0104 0.0048 0.0092 0.0107 0.0040 0.0089
(0.0090) (0.0247) (0.0108) (0.0093) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0090) (0.0203) (0.0097)
Professionals 0.0009 -0.0071 0.0004 0.0003 0.0029 0.0020 0.0008 -0.0049 0.0005
(0.0077) (0.0056) (0.0090) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0120) (0.0077) (0.0204) (0.0088)
Technicians and 0.0049 -0.0157*** 0.0018 0.0042 -0.0066 0.0026 0.0048 -0.0137 0.0019
Trades Workers (0.0104) (0.0004) (0.0077) (0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0181) (0.0111)
Community and 0.0006 -0.0053 -0.0047 0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0046 0.0005 -0.0049 -0.0046
Personal Services (0.0079) (0.0049) (0.0088) (0.0079) (0.0105) (0.0089) (0.0079) (0.0139) (0.0058)
Sales Workers -0.0023 -0.0276** -0.0080 -0.0026 -0.0238 -0.0089 -0.0024 -0.0268 -0.0080
(0.0067) (0.0133) (0.0104) (0.0067) (0.0226) (0.0101) (0.0067) (0.0220) (0.0087)
Clerical and Admin 0.0052 0.0139 0.0073 0.0047 0.0199*** 0.0095 0.0051 0.0152 0.0075
Workers (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0128) (0.0099) (0.0049) (0.0163) (0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0134)
Machinery Operators 0.0014 0.0036 0.0007 0.0007 0.0182 0.0032 0.0013 0.0068 0.0009
& Drivers (0.0206) (0.0054) (0.0280) (0.0207) (0.0416) (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0479) (0.0150)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.0750 0.2195*** 0.1024* 0.1049 -0.0560 0.0380 0.0788* 0.1588* 0.0961
Response (0.0456) (0.0554) (0.0585) (0.1108) (0.2961) (0.1300) (0.0440) (0.0842) (0.0602)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.15: Unemployment IV Estimation
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0148 0.0424** 0.0208 0.0147 0.0409 0.0235 0.0148 0.0421* 0.0209
(0.0141) (0.0182) (0.0163) (0.0141) (0.0353) (0.0191) (0.0141) (0.0254) (0.0170)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0127 0.0106*** -0.0101 -0.0128 0.0074 -0.0093 -0.0128 0.0099 -0.0101
certificate (0.0124) (0.0022) (0.0218) (0.0124) (0.0194) (0.0151) (0.0124) (0.0187) (0.0113)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0023 -0.0071** 0.0028 0.0023 -0.0076 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0072 0.0028
(0.0108) (0.0036) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0315) (0.0151) (0.0108) (0.0227) (0.0117)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0192 0.0188*** 0.0196 0.0193 0.0130 0.0196 0.0192 0.0176 0.0196*
(0.0125) (0.0007) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0219) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0237) (0.0109)
Cert III or IV -0.0024 0.0170 -0.0004 -0.0019 0.0186* -0.0008 -0.0023 0.0173 -0.0004
(0.0097) (0.0135) (0.0093) (0.0099) (0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0097) (0.0220) (0.0088)
Cert I or II -0.0260*** -0.0685*** -0.0469 -0.0264*** -0.0661 -0.0528 -0.0260*** -0.0680 -0.0473**
(0.0093) (0.0073) (0.0369) (0.0094) (0.0674) (0.0486) (0.0093) (0.1055) (0.0229)
Cert not defined -0.0428** -0.1288*** -0.0621** -0.0423** -0.0310 -0.0558* -0.0428** -0.1073*** -0.0615*
(0.0195) (0.0177) (0.0311) (0.0195) (0.0951) (0.0307) (0.0195) (0.0409) (0.0340)
Year 11 and below -0.0104 0.0110 -0.0121 -0.0101 0.0176 -0.0127 -0.0103 0.0125 -0.0121
(0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0107) (0.0096) (0.0227) (0.0116) (0.0095) (0.0325) (0.0112)
No Partner Info -0.0729*** -0.0786*** -0.0732*** -0.0798*** -0.0730*** 0.0121 -0.0787***
(0.0147) (0.0204) (0.0148) (0.0265) (0.0147) (0.0119) (0.0254)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0184 -0.0052** -0.0121 -0.0175 -0.0095 -0.0125 -0.0183 -0.0062 -0.0122
(0.0122) (0.0025) (0.0098) (0.0133) (0.0264) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0077) (0.0135)
Not in LF -0.0045 0.0065*** -0.0030 -0.0043 0.0069 -0.0024 -0.0044 0.0065 -0.0030
(0.0075) (0.0022) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0143) (0.0119) (0.0075) (0.0152) (0.0075)
No Partner Info 0.0541*** 0.0115 0.0638*** 0.0545*** 0.0142 0.0663** 0.0542*** 0.0639***
(0.0137) (0.0103) (0.0203) (0.0139) (0.0174) (0.0260) (0.0137) (0.0208)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0164* -0.0723 -0.0199** -0.0164* -0.0739* -0.0219 -0.0164* -0.0727*** -0.0200*
(0.0092) (0.0443) (0.0101) (0.0092) (0.0448) (0.0162) (0.0092) (0.0281) (0.0102)
Hinduism -0.0046 -0.0065 0.0018 -0.0049 -0.0071 0.0050 -0.0046 -0.0067 0.0020
(0.0144) (0.0127) (0.0188) (0.0144) (0.0359) (0.0218) (0.0144) (0.0539) (0.0143)
Judaism -0.0163 -0.0070 -0.0228* -0.0162 -0.0089 -0.0252* -0.0163 -0.0074 -0.0230
(0.0156) (0.0123) (0.0135) (0.0155) (0.0316) (0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0186)
Islam -0.0223*** 0.0010 -0.0215* -0.0214*** -0.0371 -0.0240 -0.0222*** -0.0073 -0.0217**
(0.0066) (0.0042) (0.0117) (0.0074) (0.0949) (0.0206) (0.0066) (0.0207) (0.0108)
Other Religion -0.0156 -0.0429** -0.0179 -0.0154 -0.0525 -0.0196** -0.0156 -0.0450 -0.0181
(0.0117) (0.0216) (0.0143) (0.0117) (0.0347) (0.0094) (0.0117) (0.0476) (0.0141)
No Religion -0.0089* -0.0153 -0.0086 -0.0088* -0.0139** -0.0083 -0.0089* -0.0150 -0.0086*
(0.0047) (0.0288) (0.0062) (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.0047) (0.0141) (0.0045)
Refused Religious -0.0121 -0.0214 -0.0142 -0.0119 -0.0260 -0.0156 -0.0121 -0.0224 -0.0143
Response (0.0091) (0.0155) (0.0119) (0.0091) (0.0307) (0.0103) (0.0091) (0.0154) (0.0091)
Constant 0.1106*** 0.1919 0.1169*** 0.1138*** 0.1342 0.1118** 0.1110*** 0.1792 0.1162***
(0.0260) (0.1598) (0.0372) (0.0284) (0.1760) (0.0467) (0.0260) (0.2015) (0.0286)
Observations 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511
R-squared 0.0449 0.0430 0.0447
Number of HH 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.16: Unemployment IV Estimation Immigrant Specification (with NILF transition)
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Unemployment -0.2444*** -0.3415*** -0.2582*** -0.2659*** -0.2665*** -0.2760** -0.2459*** -0.3214*** -0.2595***
(0.0417) (0.1027) (0.0427) (0.0887) (0.0733) (0.1188) (0.0401) (0.1026) (0.0558)
General Covars
Age -0.0049*** -0.0343*** -0.0056*** -0.0049*** -0.0338*** -0.0060*** -0.0049*** -0.0342*** -0.0056***
(0.0014) (0.0120) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0084) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0069) (0.0021)
AgeSq 0.0000* 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0003*** 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0003*** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Married 0.0266*** 0.0783*** 0.0288*** 0.0259*** 0.0791** 0.0295*** 0.0265*** 0.0785*** 0.0288***
(0.0087) (0.0226) (0.0102) (0.0090) (0.0313) (0.0070) (0.0087) (0.0276) (0.0083)
Defacto 0.0486*** 0.0618*** 0.0493*** 0.0481*** 0.0618*** 0.0492*** 0.0485*** 0.0618** 0.0492***
(0.0109) (0.0214) (0.0101) (0.0109) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0257) (0.0101)
No.Children 0.0110*** 0.1161*** 0.0138*** 0.0108*** 0.1167** 0.0151*** 0.0110*** 0.1163*** 0.0138***
(0.0021) (0.0203) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0468) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0415) (0.0030)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0238* 0.1400** 0.0257* 0.0236 0.1412*** 0.0262** 0.0238* 0.1403*** 0.0257***
(0.0143) (0.0614) (0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0009) (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.0376) (0.0098)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0164 0.1476*** 0.0183* 0.0160 0.1483*** 0.0191* 0.0164 0.1478** 0.0183*
certificate (0.0115) (0.0380) (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0316) (0.0103) (0.0115) (0.0574) (0.0105)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0166* 0.0608** 0.0165 0.0163* 0.0613* 0.0163 0.0166* 0.0610*** 0.0165**
(0.0094) (0.0252) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0343) (0.0133) (0.0094) (0.0224) (0.0079)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0161* 0.0438** 0.0174* 0.0160* 0.0432** 0.0178 0.0161* 0.0436*** 0.0174**
(0.0095) (0.0197) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0173) (0.0122) (0.0095) (0.0128) (0.0077)
Cert III or IV -0.0155* 0.0112 -0.0147 -0.0154* 0.0119 -0.0144 -0.0155* 0.0114 -0.0147**
(0.0080) (0.0172) (0.0121) (0.0080) (0.0136) (0.0116) (0.0080) (0.0120) (0.0072)
Cert I or II -0.0069 -0.0963 -0.0082 -0.0060 -0.1083 -0.0086 -0.0069 -0.0995 -0.0082
(0.0127) (0.1207) (0.0086) (0.0128) (0.1352) (0.0132) (0.0127) (0.0763) (0.0103)
Cert not defined -0.0291** -0.0631 -0.0316 -0.0277* -0.0696* -0.0318 -0.0290** -0.0648 -0.0315
(0.0148) (0.0557) (0.0263) (0.0148) (0.0421) (0.0308) (0.0147) (0.0458) (0.0479)
Year 11 and below -0.0199*** -0.0433*** -0.0211* -0.0198*** -0.0463*** -0.0216* -0.0199*** -0.0441** -0.0211***
(0.0072) (0.0149) (0.0112) (0.0072) (0.0178) (0.0124) (0.0072) (0.0197) (0.0069)
Occupation
Managers -0.0014 -0.0251 -0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0279*** -0.0068 -0.0014 -0.0259 -0.0053
(0.0100) (0.0516) (0.0119) (0.0101) (0.0018) (0.0148) (0.0100) (0.0167) (0.0078)
Professionals -0.0136 -0.0487 -0.0181*** -0.0138 -0.0500*** -0.0200 -0.0136 -0.0490** -0.0181**
(0.0090) (0.0506) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0127) (0.0090) (0.0220) (0.0088)
Technicians and -0.0002 -0.0169 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0161*** -0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0167 -0.0016
Trades Workers (0.0121) (0.0520) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0012) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0234) (0.0167)
Community and -0.0064 -0.0326 -0.0122 -0.0068 -0.0339*** -0.0143 -0.0065 -0.0330*** -0.0123
Personal Services (0.0090) (0.0422) (0.0118) (0.0092) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0090) (0.0119) (0.0083)
Sales Workers -0.0093 -0.0529 -0.0153* -0.0096 -0.0554*** -0.0177 -0.0093 -0.0536*** -0.0153**
(0.0079) (0.0400) (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0126) (0.0147) (0.0079) (0.0193) (0.0076)
Clerical and Admin -0.0072 -0.0356 -0.0112 -0.0076 -0.0360 -0.0129 -0.0073 -0.0357** -0.0113*
Workers (0.0107) (0.0537) (0.0100) (0.0109) (0.0243) (0.0189) (0.0107) (0.0163) (0.0064)
Machinery Operators -0.0113 -0.0047 -0.0124 -0.0120 -0.0034 -0.0129 -0.0114 -0.0043 -0.0124
& Drivers (0.0211) (0.0434) (0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0689) (0.0346) (0.0211) (0.0363) (0.0324)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.3501*** 0.3840*** 0.3589*** 0.3607*** 0.3480*** 0.3686*** 0.3508*** 0.3744*** 0.3596***
Response (0.0339) (0.0811) (0.0418) (0.0504) (0.0543) (0.0811) (0.0333) (0.0770) (0.0391)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.16: Unemployment IV Estimation
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0069 0.0029 0.0088 0.0068 0.0038 0.0098 0.0069 0.0031 0.0089
(0.0160) (0.0703) (0.0200) (0.0160) (0.0371) (0.0194) (0.0160) (0.0430) (0.0201)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0286** -0.0063 -0.0256** -0.0287** -0.0045 -0.0242 -0.0287** -0.0058 -0.0255
certificate (0.0144) (0.0472) (0.0118) (0.0144) (0.0086) (0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0701) (0.0217)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0085 0.0303 0.0111 0.0082 0.0339** 0.0121 0.0085 0.0312 0.0111
(0.0131) (0.0330) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0131) (0.0361) (0.0159)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0213 -0.0022 0.0218 0.0213 -0.0015 0.0220 0.0213 -0.0020 0.0218
(0.0144) (0.0356) (0.0210) (0.0144) (0.0088) (0.0137) (0.0144) (0.0485) (0.0205)
Cert III or IV 0.0005 0.0133 0.0021 0.0008 0.0187 0.0030 0.0005 0.0148 0.0022
(0.0116) (0.0434) (0.0131) (0.0117) (0.0227) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0531) (0.0179)
Cert I or II -0.0227* -0.1302** -0.0404 -0.0234* -0.1284 -0.0480* -0.0227* -0.1297 -0.0406**
(0.0131) (0.0657) (0.0354) (0.0133) (0.2278) (0.0254) (0.0130) (0.1370) (0.0183)
Cert not defined -0.1119*** -0.2530*** -0.1440*** -0.1021** -0.2601*** -0.1512*** -0.1112*** -0.2549*** -0.1438***
(0.0265) (0.0220) (0.0405) (0.0451) (0.0152) (0.0393) (0.0260) (0.0588) (0.0261)
Year 11 and below -0.0071 -0.0234 -0.0091 -0.0071 -0.0176 -0.0096 -0.0071 -0.0218 -0.0091
(0.0118) (0.0194) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0242) (0.0146) (0.0118) (0.0741) (0.0148)
No Partner Info -0.0804*** 0.0053 -0.0812*** -0.0803*** -0.0811*** -0.0804*** 0.0062 -0.0812***
(0.0165) (0.0375) (0.0210) (0.0165) (0.0117) (0.0165) (0.0509) (0.0109)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0536*** -0.0308 -0.0505** -0.0529*** -0.0337*** -0.0487** -0.0536*** -0.0315 -0.0504***
(0.0182) (0.0271) (0.0203) (0.0186) (0.0037) (0.0204) (0.0182) (0.0353) (0.0184)
Not in LF -0.0243** -0.0152 -0.0245* -0.0241** -0.0167*** -0.0242* -0.0243** -0.0156 -0.0244*
(0.0111) (0.0378) (0.0136) (0.0112) (0.0064) (0.0147) (0.0111) (0.0196) (0.0131)
No Partner Info 0.0676*** 0.0699*** 0.0674*** 0.0084 0.0707*** 0.0675*** 0.0699***
(0.0153) (0.0175) (0.0153) (0.0454) (0.0094) (0.0153) (0.0134)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0129 -0.0457 -0.0130 -0.0135 -0.0474*** -0.0134 -0.0129 -0.0462 -0.0130
(0.0123) (0.0371) (0.0155) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0428) (0.0098)
Hinduism 0.0118 -0.0410 0.0095 0.0116 -0.0417 0.0084 0.0118 -0.0412 0.0095
(0.0192) (0.0443) (0.0154) (0.0192) (0.0908) (0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0259) (0.0123)
Judaism -0.0040 0.1109** -0.0088 -0.0043 0.1213 -0.0107 -0.0040 0.1137 -0.0089
(0.0230) (0.0490) (0.0222) (0.0231) (0.2080) (0.0204) (0.0230) (0.1039) (0.0228)
Islam -0.0272** 0.0252 -0.0254 -0.0266** 0.0166 -0.0240 -0.0272** 0.0229 -0.0254***
(0.0106) (0.0360) (0.0171) (0.0111) (0.0216) (0.0276) (0.0106) (0.0383) (0.0094)
Other Religion -0.0146 -0.0352 -0.0158 -0.0145 -0.0374 -0.0161 -0.0146 -0.0358 -0.0158
(0.0142) (0.0385) (0.0181) (0.0142) (0.0490) (0.0214) (0.0142) (0.0429) (0.0155)
No Religion -0.0079 -0.0065 -0.0072 -0.0080 -0.0056 -0.0068 -0.0079 -0.0062 -0.0072*
(0.0058) (0.0102) (0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0279) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0217) (0.0040)
Refused Religious -0.0137 -0.0238*** -0.0152 -0.0135 -0.0242 -0.0157 -0.0136 -0.0239 -0.0152*
Response (0.0110) (0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0338) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0245) (0.0078)
Constant 0.1609*** 0.6672*** 0.1746*** 0.1631*** 0.6540*** 0.1825*** 0.1611*** 0.6637*** 0.1749***
(0.0338) (0.2001) (0.0472) (0.0350) (0.0922) (0.0352) (0.0338) (0.1666) (0.0505)
Observations 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787 5,787
R-squared 0.1940 0.1933 0.1939
Number of HH 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070 1,070
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.17: Stability IV Estimation - Native Specification
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Stability 0.1489*** 0.3903 0.1489*** 0.0400* 0.1041** 0.0390 0.0664*** 0.1583*** 0.0672***
(0.0345) (0.5280) (0.0474) (0.0226) (0.0471) (0.0250) (0.0188) (0.0262) (0.0123)
General Covars
Age -0.0022*** -0.0243*** -0.0022*** -0.0012*** -0.0197*** -0.0015** -0.0014*** -0.0206*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0088) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0005)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0148*** 0.0430** 0.0148*** 0.0166*** 0.0440*** 0.0170*** 0.0162*** 0.0439*** 0.0164***
(0.0045) (0.0180) (0.0056) (0.0042) (0.0089) (0.0059) (0.0042) (0.0074) (0.0046)
Defacto 0.0170*** 0.0263 0.0170*** 0.0183*** 0.0269*** 0.0173*** 0.0180*** 0.0268*** 0.0173***
(0.0047) (0.0180) (0.0055) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0060)
No.Children 0.0118*** 0.1462*** 0.0118*** 0.0112*** 0.1403*** 0.0129*** 0.0113*** 0.1414*** 0.0125***
(0.0010) (0.0127) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0100) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0139) (0.0012)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0305*** 0.0535 0.0305*** 0.0239*** 0.0532*** 0.0266*** 0.0255*** 0.0533*** 0.0273***
(0.0074) (0.0406) (0.0107) (0.0066) (0.0162) (0.0079) (0.0067) (0.0166) (0.0071)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0193*** 0.0532** 0.0193*** 0.0175*** 0.0500*** 0.0190*** 0.0179*** 0.0506*** 0.0189***
certificate (0.0053) (0.0236) (0.0073) (0.0050) (0.0077) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0148) (0.0064)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0149*** 0.0240 0.0149*** 0.0136*** 0.0301*** 0.0142*** 0.0139*** 0.0290*** 0.0143***
(0.0040) (0.0236) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0083) (0.0049)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0124*** 0.0254 0.0124*** 0.0104** 0.0210*** 0.0112*** 0.0109*** 0.0218*** 0.0114***
(0.0044) (0.0315) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0069) (0.0038)
Cert III or IV 0.0070* -0.0036 0.0070 0.0057* -0.0011 0.0051* 0.0060* -0.0016 0.0056
(0.0036) (0.0116) (0.0054) (0.0033) (0.0072) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0081) (0.0047)
Cert I or II 0.0019 -0.0306 0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0175 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0200 -0.0001
(0.0074) (0.0546) (0.0109) (0.0067) (0.0401) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0404) (0.0086)
Cert not defined 0.0122 0.1157 0.0122 0.0044 0.0909* 0.0059 0.0063 0.0956 0.0073
(0.0143) (0.0993) (0.0228) (0.0132) (0.0535) (0.0283) (0.0132) (0.0816) (0.0175)
Year 11 and below -0.0010 -0.0241*** -0.0010 -0.0024 -0.0241*** -0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0241*** -0.0024
(0.0029) (0.0078) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0056) (0.0024)
Occupation
Managers -0.0083 -0.0320* -0.0083 0.0019 -0.0106* 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0147 -0.0014
(0.0058) (0.0185) (0.0075) (0.0050) (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0093) (0.0051)
Professionals -0.0107* -0.0255 -0.0107 -0.0002 -0.0087 -0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0119*** -0.0031
(0.0055) (0.0167) (0.0073) (0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0048)
Technicians and 0.0030 -0.0221 0.0030 0.0104 -0.0031 0.0096* 0.0086 -0.0067** 0.0079
Trades Workers (0.0070) (0.0367) (0.0085) (0.0065) (0.0087) (0.0054) (0.0065) (0.0029) (0.0077)
Community and -0.0065 -0.0199 -0.0065 -0.0014 -0.0072 -0.0015 -0.0026 -0.0096 -0.0028
Personal Services (0.0044) (0.0150) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0076) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0064) (0.0047)
Sales Workers -0.0089** -0.0203 -0.0089* -0.0007 -0.0072 -0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0097* -0.0027
(0.0045) (0.0135) (0.0053) (0.0039) (0.0088) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0058) (0.0044)
Clerical and Admin -0.0084* -0.0173 -0.0084* -0.0044 -0.0094 -0.0043 -0.0054 -0.0109 -0.0054
Workers (0.0043) (0.0131) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0082) (0.0052) (0.0039) (0.0070) (0.0045)
Machinery Operators 0.0043 0.0388 0.0043 0.0055 0.0191* 0.0069 0.0052 0.0229 0.0063
& Drivers (0.0089) (0.0429) (0.0072) (0.0082) (0.0098) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0239) (0.0098)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.0403 0.0489 0.0403 0.0277 0.0360* 0.0271 0.0308 0.0384 0.0303
Response (0.0285) (0.0485) (0.0321) (0.0271) (0.0206) (0.0323) (0.0272) (0.0511) (0.0308)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.17: Stability IV Estimation - Native Specification Cont
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0068 -0.0051 -0.0068 -0.0105 -0.0037 -0.0103 -0.0096 -0.0040 -0.0094
(0.0099) (0.0242) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0046) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0291) (0.0088)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0188** -0.0095 -0.0188** -0.0194** -0.0035 -0.0173 -0.0193** -0.0047 -0.0178**
certificate (0.0089) (0.0187) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0181) (0.0114) (0.0087) (0.0252) (0.0089)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0136* -0.0090 -0.0136** -0.0177** -0.0109 -0.0176*** -0.0167** -0.0106 -0.0165**
(0.0075) (0.0238) (0.0062) (0.0074) (0.0155) (0.0055) (0.0073) (0.0107) (0.0079)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0150* 0.0132 -0.0150** -0.0177** 0.0198 -0.0161*** -0.0170** 0.0186 -0.0160*
(0.0077) (0.0251) (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0179) (0.0054) (0.0076) (0.0140) (0.0089)
Cert III or IV -0.0217*** 0.0039 -0.0217*** -0.0210*** 0.0135 -0.0194*** -0.0212*** 0.0117 -0.0201**
(0.0066) (0.0200) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0109) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0146) (0.0088)
Cert I or II -0.0038 0.0220 -0.0038 -0.0015 0.0348 -0.0001 -0.0021 0.0324 -0.0011
(0.0198) (0.0663) (0.0281) (0.0196) (0.0416) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0586) (0.0154)
Cert not defined -0.0493*** -0.0710 -0.0493*** -0.0402*** -0.0868** -0.0435*** -0.0424*** -0.0838*** -0.0445***
(0.0099) (0.0640) (0.0134) (0.0073) (0.0356) (0.0084) (0.0076) (0.0279) (0.0119)
Year 11 and below -0.0167** 0.0287 -0.0167** -0.0184*** 0.0358 -0.0156** -0.0180*** 0.0345* -0.0161*
(0.0068) (0.0366) (0.0079) (0.0067) (0.0234) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0189) (0.0085)
No Partner Info -0.0697*** -0.0899 -0.0697*** -0.0474*** -0.0286 -0.0449*** -0.0528*** -0.0402 -0.0512***
(0.0164) (0.1701) (0.0184) (0.0132) (0.0245) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0316) (0.0116)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed 0.0034 0.0013 0.0034 -0.0005 -0.0040 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0030 0.0004
(0.0134) (0.0279) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0172) (0.0085) (0.0128) (0.0060) (0.0135)
Not in LF 0.0047 0.0087 0.0047 0.0045 0.0096 0.0051 0.0045 0.0094 0.0050
(0.0058) (0.0127) (0.0067) (0.0054) (0.0115) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0057)
No Partner Info 0.0478*** 0.0973 0.0478** 0.0218* 0.0331 0.0205 0.0281** 0.0452* 0.0273**
(0.0166) (0.1835) (0.0194) (0.0131) (0.0253) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0272) (0.0128)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0088 -0.0060 0.0088 0.0035 0.0026 0.0045 0.0048 0.0010 0.0054
(0.0081) (0.0306) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0072) (0.0148) (0.0072)
Hinduism 0.0338 0.3223 0.0338 0.0286 0.3441 0.0379 0.0298 0.3400 0.0360
(0.0510) (0.2348) (0.0480) (0.0504) (0.4250) (0.1448) (0.0504) (0.4877) (0.0956)
Judaism -0.0087 -0.2630 -0.0087 -0.0190*** -0.0839*** -0.0189** -0.0165*** -0.1178*** -0.0163
(0.0112) (0.3465) (0.0148) (0.0047) (0.0268) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0117) (0.0110)
Islam 0.0013 0.2333 0.0013 -0.0028 0.0803*** -0.0027 -0.0018 0.1092*** -0.0018
(0.0147) (0.2870) (0.0158) (0.0134) (0.0256) (0.0079) (0.0135) (0.0120) (0.0106)
Other Religion -0.0030 -0.0175 -0.0030 -0.0076* -0.0137 -0.0077 -0.0065 -0.0144* -0.0066
(0.0057) (0.0262) (0.0073) (0.0044) (0.0088) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0083) (0.0057)
No Religion -0.0000 0.0012 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0017 -0.0006
(0.0023) (0.0127) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0024)
Refused Religious -0.0009 0.0040 -0.0009 -0.0042 0.0025 -0.0040 -0.0034 0.0028 -0.0033
Response (0.0049) (0.0073) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0076) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Constant -0.0339 0.0890 -0.0339 0.0369** 0.1996*** 0.0402** 0.0197 0.1787*** 0.0211
(0.0254) (0.2205) (0.0353) (0.0186) (0.0652) (0.0186) (0.0168) (0.0384) (0.0158)
Observations 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967 22,967
R-squared 4,645 4,645 4,645 4,645 4,645 4,645
Number of HH 0.0252 0.0096
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.18: Stability IV Estimation Native Specification (with NILF transition)
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Stability 0.1846*** 0.4485* 0.1846*** 0.0489** 0.1274 0.0490 0.0842*** 0.1819*** 0.0854***
(0.0466) (0.2476) (0.0434) (0.0231) (0.0967) (0.0342) (0.0205) (0.0535) (0.0189)
General Covars
Age -0.0026*** -0.0266*** -0.0026*** -0.0014*** -0.0213*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0222*** -0.0019***
(0.0006) (0.0037) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0032) (0.0005)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0151*** 0.0463*** 0.0151*** 0.0174*** 0.0474*** 0.0179*** 0.0168*** 0.0472*** 0.0171***
(0.0047) (0.0106) (0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0089) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0103) (0.0048)
Defacto 0.0182*** 0.0276*** 0.0182*** 0.0195*** 0.0285*** 0.0186*** 0.0192*** 0.0283*** 0.0186***
(0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0059) (0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0060)
No.Children 0.0122*** 0.1466*** 0.0122*** 0.0115*** 0.1399*** 0.0130*** 0.0117*** 0.1410*** 0.0126***
(0.0011) (0.0147) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0109) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0096) (0.0013)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0322*** 0.0557** 0.0322*** 0.0241*** 0.0550*** 0.0265*** 0.0262*** 0.0551*** 0.0277***
(0.0078) (0.0279) (0.0093) (0.0066) (0.0175) (0.0077) (0.0068) (0.0165) (0.0060)
Grad diploma, grad 0.0210*** 0.0592** 0.0210*** 0.0188*** 0.0549** 0.0203*** 0.0194*** 0.0556*** 0.0203***
certificate (0.0055) (0.0250) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0225) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0081) (0.0056)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0147*** 0.0255 0.0147*** 0.0131*** 0.0321*** 0.0137*** 0.0135*** 0.0310*** 0.0139***
(0.0042) (0.0214) (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0070) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0094) (0.0030)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0127*** 0.0273*** 0.0127*** 0.0103** 0.0224*** 0.0110*** 0.0109*** 0.0233** 0.0113***
(0.0045) (0.0081) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0092) (0.0044)
Cert III or IV 0.0070* -0.0032 0.0070 0.0055 0.0003 0.0049* 0.0059* -0.0003 0.0055
(0.0038) (0.0198) (0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0086) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0106) (0.0038)
Cert I or II 0.0003 -0.0278 0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0130 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0155 -0.0021
(0.0080) (0.0291) (0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0419) (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0499) (0.0070)
Cert not defined 0.0111 0.0990 0.0111 0.0013 0.0710 0.0024 0.0039 0.0757 0.0045
(0.0155) (0.0751) (0.0112) (0.0136) (0.0740) (0.0169) (0.0138) (0.0733) (0.0193)
Year 11 and below -0.0015 -0.0289** -0.0015 -0.0034 -0.0285*** -0.0040 -0.0029 -0.0286*** -0.0032
(0.0031) (0.0116) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0064) (0.0020)
Occupation
Managers -0.0125* -0.0431* -0.0125* 0.0001 -0.0187*** -0.0012 -0.0032 -0.0228** -0.0041
(0.0067) (0.0228) (0.0068) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0090) (0.0054)
Professionals -0.0156** -0.0367* -0.0156** -0.0025 -0.0170** -0.0032 -0.0059 -0.0203** -0.0064
(0.0065) (0.0211) (0.0077) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0095) (0.0040)
Technicians and -0.0008 -0.0333* -0.0008 0.0083 -0.0124 0.0071 0.0059 -0.0160 0.0051
Trades Workers (0.0075) (0.0198) (0.0104) (0.0066) (0.0107) (0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0138) (0.0070)
Community and -0.0089* -0.0263 -0.0089* -0.0026 -0.0114 -0.0029 -0.0042 -0.0139 -0.0045
Personal Services (0.0049) (0.0177) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0077) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0124) (0.0037)
Sales Workers -0.0127** -0.0295 -0.0127** -0.0025 -0.0141** -0.0028 -0.0051 -0.0167 -0.0054**
(0.0053) (0.0221) (0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0139) (0.0022)
Clerical and Admin -0.0109** -0.0242* -0.0109** -0.0060 -0.0147* -0.0062 -0.0073* -0.0163 -0.0074*
Workers (0.0048) (0.0139) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0082) (0.0054) (0.0040) (0.0104) (0.0042)
Machinery Operators 0.0029 0.0401 0.0029 0.0045 0.0190 0.0056 0.0040 0.0226*** 0.0049
& Drivers (0.0094) (0.0292) (0.0110) (0.0082) (0.0152) (0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0090)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.3179*** 0.2958*** 0.3179*** 0.3087*** 0.2888*** 0.3064*** 0.3111*** 0.2900*** 0.3095***
Response (0.0501) (0.0739) (0.0548) (0.0501) (0.0590) (0.0557) (0.0500) (0.0741) (0.0357)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.18: Stability IV Estimation Native Specification (with NILF transition) Cont
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad -0.0071 -0.0035 -0.0071 -0.0117 -0.0018 -0.0113 -0.0105 -0.0021 -0.0102
(0.0101) (0.0298) (0.0132) (0.0096) (0.0194) (0.0108) (0.0097) (0.0209) (0.0105)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0201** -0.0078 -0.0201** -0.0210** -0.0008 -0.0188** -0.0208** -0.0020 -0.0194*
certificate (0.0091) (0.0175) (0.0102) (0.0087) (0.0196) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0214) (0.0100)
Bachelor or hons. -0.0112 -0.0048 -0.0112 -0.0162** -0.0070 -0.0158* -0.0149** -0.0066 -0.0146
(0.0077) (0.0174) (0.0112) (0.0074) (0.0168) (0.0081) (0.0074) (0.0106) (0.0091)
Adv diploma, dip. -0.0152* 0.0128 -0.0152 -0.0183** 0.0203 -0.0167** -0.0175** 0.0191 -0.0166*
(0.0079) (0.0229) (0.0098) (0.0076) (0.0183) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0144) (0.0096)
Cert III or IV -0.0208*** 0.0086 -0.0208** -0.0198*** 0.0198* -0.0180*** -0.0201*** 0.0179** -0.0190**
(0.0067) (0.0161) (0.0088) (0.0065) (0.0118) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0081) (0.0096)
Cert I or II -0.0114 0.0219 -0.0114 -0.0081 0.0364 -0.0068 -0.0090 0.0339 -0.0082
(0.0203) (0.0627) (0.0207) (0.0199) (0.0635) (0.0270) (0.0199) (0.0721) (0.0279)
Cert not defined -0.0526*** -0.0683 -0.0526*** -0.0412*** -0.0857** -0.0439*** -0.0442*** -0.0827** -0.0457***
(0.0113) (0.0619) (0.0204) (0.0075) (0.0342) (0.0115) (0.0080) (0.0351) (0.0125)
Year 11 and below -0.0170** 0.0284 -0.0170* -0.0191*** 0.0369*** -0.0165** -0.0186*** 0.0355** -0.0170*
(0.0070) (0.0328) (0.0092) (0.0067) (0.0138) (0.0075) (0.0067) (0.0162) (0.0096)
No Partner Info -0.0804*** -0.1019 -0.0804*** -0.0524*** -0.0328 -0.0503*** -0.0597*** -0.0445 -0.0584***
(0.0197) (0.1008) (0.0128) (0.0149) (0.0228) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0301) (0.0169)
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed 0.0006 0.0031 0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0027 -0.0042 -0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0030
(0.0141) (0.0165) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0117) (0.0148) (0.0132) (0.0154) (0.0135)
Not in LF 0.0048 0.0099 0.0048 0.0045 0.0109 0.0050 0.0046 0.0107 0.0049
(0.0061) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0056) (0.0121) (0.0070) (0.0057) (0.0153) (0.0057)
No Partner Info 0.0589*** 0.1126 0.0589*** 0.0262* 0.0404** 0.0255 0.0347** 0.0526* 0.0343*
(0.0203) (0.1106) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0171) (0.0154) (0.0307) (0.0178)
Religion
Buddhism 0.0099 -0.0086 0.0099 0.0033 0.0008 0.0041 0.0050 -0.0008 0.0055
(0.0088) (0.0260) (0.0129) (0.0072) (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0074) (0.0147) (0.0066)
Hinduism 0.0317 0.1333 0.0317 0.0263 0.1531 0.0318 0.0277 0.1497 0.0309
(0.0492) (0.2471) (0.0533) (0.0478) (0.4192) (0.0637) (0.0479) (0.2107) (0.2071)
Judaism -0.0116 -0.3087** -0.0116 -0.0246*** -0.1086 -0.0251** -0.0212** -0.1426*** -0.0214*
(0.0160) (0.1565) (0.0180) (0.0092) (0.0671) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0408) (0.0114)
Islam 0.0026 0.2648** 0.0026 -0.0024 0.0929* -0.0022 -0.0011 0.1220*** -0.0010
(0.0155) (0.1224) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0522) (0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0286) (0.0121)
Other Religion 0.0015 -0.0060 0.0015 -0.0042 -0.0019 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0025
(0.0074) (0.0275) (0.0088) (0.0059) (0.0171) (0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0238) (0.0088)
No Religion 0.0008 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0001
(0.0025) (0.0095) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0029)
Refused Religious 0.0007 0.0016 0.0007 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0035 -0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0025
Response (0.0053) (0.0114) (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0105) (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0071) (0.0040)
Constant -0.0523 0.1006 -0.0523* 0.0360* 0.2211*** 0.0388 0.0130 0.2007** 0.0140
(0.0330) (0.1355) (0.0281) (0.0190) (0.0338) (0.0278) (0.0179) (0.0815) (0.0211)
Observations 23,054 23,054 23,054 23,054 23,054 23,054 23,054 23,054 23,054
R-squared 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659 4,659
Number of HH 0.0394 0.0141
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.19: Stability IV Estimation- Immigrant Specification
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Stability 0.1194*** 0.3617 0.1254* 0.0325 -0.0696 0.0098 0.0729** 0.0721 0.0793*
(0.0390) (21.7307) (0.0754) (0.0471) (0.4138) (0.0443) (0.0302) (0.1017) (0.0441)
General Covars
Age -0.0030** -0.0218 -0.0032* -0.0026** -0.0099 -0.0033* -0.0028** -0.0138*** -0.0040***
(0.0012) (1.0421) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0134) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0014)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0114) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Married 0.0035 -0.0021 0.0043 0.0047 0.0284 0.0106 0.0041 0.0184 0.0088
(0.0073) (2.1537) (0.0131) (0.0069) (0.0476) (0.0105) (0.0070) (0.0181) (0.0080)
Defacto 0.0265*** 0.0281 0.0273** 0.0258*** 0.0331 0.0282*** 0.0261*** 0.0314* 0.0282***
(0.0088) (2.0489) (0.0126) (0.0083) (0.0323) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0167) (0.0076)
No.Children 0.0098*** 0.1507 0.0108*** 0.0107*** 0.1271*** 0.0172** 0.0103*** 0.1348*** 0.0166***
(0.0018) (0.5287) (0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0363) (0.0080) (0.0018) (0.0317) (0.0062)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0392*** 0.0661 0.0406* 0.0319** 0.1016 0.0353* 0.0353** 0.0900 0.0404*
(0.0145) (1.6895) (0.0216) (0.0141) (0.0831) (0.0190) (0.0140) (0.0760) (0.0236)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0066 0.0602 -0.0060 -0.0050 0.0823** -0.0006 -0.0058 0.0750** -0.0009
certificate (0.0090) (1.6192) (0.0172) (0.0086) (0.0332) (0.0136) (0.0087) (0.0346) (0.0118)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0094 0.0384 0.0093 0.0082 0.0309 0.0081 0.0087 0.0334** 0.0091
(0.0075) (1.3730) (0.0096) (0.0071) (0.0281) (0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0135) (0.0072)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0187** 0.0087 0.0192* 0.0158* 0.0164 0.0171** 0.0172** 0.0139 0.0190
(0.0085) (0.9112) (0.0115) (0.0082) (0.0303) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0098) (0.0130)
Cert III or IV -0.0113* 0.0082 -0.0114 -0.0086 0.0187 -0.0081 -0.0098* 0.0152 -0.0097*
(0.0061) (0.1114) (0.0081) (0.0059) (0.0273) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0114) (0.0055)
Cert I or II -0.0151* 0.0607 -0.0156 -0.0089 0.0015 -0.0068 -0.0118* 0.0209 -0.0123
(0.0078) (0.3546) (0.0107) (0.0063) (0.1562) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0332) (0.0141)
Cert not defined 0.0412* 0.0038 0.0429 0.0084 0.0197 -0.0028 0.0237 0.0145 0.0218
(0.0220) (0.8155) (0.0398) (0.0192) (0.0385) (0.0229) (0.0160) (0.0254) (0.0169)
Year 11 and below -0.0158*** 0.0471 -0.0162* -0.0136*** -0.0258 -0.0155** -0.0146*** -0.0018 -0.0163***
(0.0054) (6.0428) (0.0088) (0.0050) (0.0870) (0.0069) (0.0050) (0.0278) (0.0052)
Occupation
Managers -0.0082 -0.0416 -0.0095 0.0028 -0.0156 0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0241 -0.0064
(0.0107) (0.5724) (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0160) (0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0221) (0.0109)
Professionals -0.0107 -0.0401 -0.0119 -0.0018 -0.0169 -0.0025 -0.0059 -0.0245 -0.0095
(0.0092) (1.2865) (0.0100) (0.0088) (0.0187) (0.0113) (0.0083) (0.0255) (0.0116)
Technicians and 0.0051 -0.0131 0.0039 0.0032 -0.0201 -0.0009 0.0040 -0.0178 -0.0007
Trades Workers (0.0103) (1.8970) (0.0109) (0.0095) (0.0268) (0.0148) (0.0097) (0.0133) (0.0092)
Community and -0.0068 -0.0263 -0.0090 -0.0022 -0.0272 -0.0099 -0.0044 -0.0269 -0.0129
Personal Services (0.0085) (0.4775) (0.0132) (0.0080) (0.0355) (0.0103) (0.0080) (0.0167) (0.0117)
Sales Workers -0.0127 -0.0531 -0.0147 -0.0065 -0.0385 -0.0125 -0.0094 -0.0433** -0.0176**
(0.0077) (0.9476) (0.0123) (0.0073) (0.0251) (0.0101) (0.0071) (0.0191) (0.0084)
Clerical and Admin -0.0016 -0.0177 -0.0022 0.0012 0.0018 0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0046 -0.0006
Workers (0.0102) (0.0258) (0.0193) (0.0097) (0.0243) (0.0125) (0.0098) (0.0168) (0.0100)
Machinery Operators -0.0105 0.0184 -0.0101 0.0002 0.0245 0.0070 -0.0048 0.0225 0.0002
& Drivers (0.0217) (5.6286) (0.0291) (0.0217) (0.0545) (0.0355) (0.0212) (0.0345) (0.0160)
Missing/Refused Occ -0.0453*** -0.1144 -0.0454** -0.0240 0.0119 -0.0135 -0.0339** -0.0296 -0.0308*
Response (0.0154) (13.2945) (0.0224) (0.0159) (0.2186) (0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0438) (0.0183)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.19: Stability IV Estimation- Immigrant Specification Cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0126 0.0517 0.0129 0.0061 0.0057 0.0072 0.0091 0.0208 0.0117
(0.0134) (0.8364) (0.0231) (0.0126) (0.0740) (0.0172) (0.0127) (0.0230) (0.0172)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0018 0.0954 -0.0005 -0.0048 0.0066 -0.0010 -0.0034 0.0358 0.0031
certificate (0.0130) (3.4990) (0.0207) (0.0127) (0.0853) (0.0186) (0.0127) (0.0368) (0.0216)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0067 0.0396 0.0065 0.0028 -0.0165 0.0007 0.0046 0.0019 0.0033
(0.0107) (1.1065) (0.0130) (0.0106) (0.0599) (0.0170) (0.0105) (0.0320) (0.0082)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0147 0.0471 0.0149 0.0147 0.0184 0.0171 0.0147 0.0278 0.0171
(0.0123) (1.7567) (0.0183) (0.0120) (0.0329) (0.0163) (0.0121) (0.0233) (0.0146)
Cert III or IV 0.0034 0.0128 0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0094 -0.0029 0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0001
(0.0099) (0.0607) (0.0094) (0.0098) (0.0189) (0.0116) (0.0097) (0.0212) (0.0098)
Cert I or II -0.0152 0.0790 -0.0188 -0.0231** -0.1049 -0.0548 -0.0194* -0.0444 -0.0436
(0.0134) (6.2572) (0.0423) (0.0100) (0.1887) (0.0340) (0.0107) (0.0764) (0.0334)
Cert not defined -0.0070 0.0207 -0.0078 -0.0108 -0.0088 -0.0151 -0.0090 0.0009 -0.0122
(0.0089) (2.7274) (0.0126) (0.0087) (0.0331) (0.0109) (0.0086) (0.0312) (0.0097)
Year 11 and below -0.0938*** 0.0302 -0.0970*** -0.0791*** 0.0023 -0.0828*** -0.0860*** 0.0115 -0.0945***
(0.0182) (1.0581) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0287) (0.0256) (0.0172) (0.0178) (0.0300)
No Partner Info
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0231*** -0.0135 -0.0226** -0.0252*** -0.0053 -0.0211*** -0.0242*** -0.0080 -0.0205***
(0.0073) (0.2287) (0.0095) (0.0049) (0.0105) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0102) (0.0062)
Not in LF -0.0086 -0.0051 -0.0086 -0.0069 0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0077 0.0015 -0.0058
(0.0069) (1.3093) (0.0098) (0.0058) (0.0250) (0.0067) (0.0062) (0.0197) (0.0084)
No Partner Info 0.0859*** 0.0897*** 0.0662*** 0.0723*** 0.0754*** 0.0874***
(0.0186) (0.0167) (0.0191) (0.0258) (0.0174) (0.0232)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0226*** -0.0793 -0.0232 -0.0192** -0.0677* -0.0226** -0.0208** -0.0715*** -0.0249*
(0.0086) (0.7610) (0.0149) (0.0080) (0.0371) (0.0112) (0.0081) (0.0243) (0.0133)
Hinduism -0.0103 0.0199 -0.0089 -0.0108 0.0145 -0.0038 -0.0105 0.0163 -0.0020
(0.0139) (0.6018) (0.0187) (0.0125) (0.0647) (0.0178) (0.0131) (0.0711) (0.0172)
Judaism 0.0005 -0.0215 -0.0006 -0.0109 -0.0080 -0.0235** -0.0057 -0.0124 -0.0148
(0.0161) (0.2683) (0.0196) (0.0159) (0.0196) (0.0095) (0.0153) (0.0245) (0.0160)
Islam -0.0135 -0.2596 -0.0140 -0.0152** 0.0316 -0.0196* -0.0144** -0.0641 -0.0196
(0.0087) (20.7393) (0.0141) (0.0059) (0.2435) (0.0106) (0.0066) (0.1039) (0.0172)
Other Religion -0.0066 -0.0492 -0.0067 -0.0074 0.0183 -0.0052 -0.0070 -0.0039 -0.0059
(0.0132) (2.8969) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0543) (0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0417) (0.0133)
No Religion -0.0074 -0.0075 -0.0073 -0.0088* -0.0018 -0.0083* -0.0082* -0.0036 -0.0070
(0.0047) (0.8005) (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0135) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0152) (0.0055)
Refused Religious -0.0045 -0.0276 -0.0058 -0.0074 -0.0234 -0.0147 -0.0061 -0.0247 -0.0132
Response (0.0099) (0.4881) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0261) (0.0106) (0.0095) (0.0188) (0.0123)
Constant 0.0150 0.0002 0.0150 0.0756* 0.1366 0.1048** 0.0474 0.0918 0.0636
(0.0356) (4.8956) (0.0594) (0.0419) (0.1842) (0.0498) (0.0322) (0.0934) (0.0454)
Observations 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023 5,023
R-squared 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
Number of HH 0.0337
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.20: Stability IV Estimation Immigrant Specification (with NILF transition)
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Stability 0.1493*** 0.3385*** 0.1691*** 0.0327 -0.0549 0.0197 0.0865** 0.0773 0.1014*
(0.0534) (0.0905) (0.0636) (0.0474) (0.4375) (0.0607) (0.0337) (0.1446) (0.0519)
General Covars
Age -0.0030** -0.0220*** -0.0037* -0.0024** -0.0107 -0.0031** -0.0027** -0.0145* -0.0040**
(0.0013) (0.0051) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0117) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0074) (0.0018)
AgeSq 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Married 0.0054 0.0099 0.0075 0.0073 0.0417 0.0136* 0.0064 0.0310 0.0119
(0.0081) (0.0204) (0.0143) (0.0074) (0.0424) (0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0331) (0.0095)
Defacto 0.0305*** 0.0357 0.0320* 0.0297*** 0.0443 0.0325*** 0.0301*** 0.0414 0.0324***
(0.0098) (0.0300) (0.0185) (0.0092) (0.0313) (0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0273) (0.0113)
No.Children 0.0098*** 0.1473*** 0.0127** 0.0110*** 0.1234*** 0.0170*** 0.0104*** 0.1315*** 0.0175***
(0.0019) (0.0141) (0.0059) (0.0018) (0.0341) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0236) (0.0041)
Educational
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0417*** 0.0745 0.0457** 0.0328** 0.1068 0.0379 0.0369*** 0.0959 0.0438**
(0.0152) (0.0775) (0.0213) (0.0142) (0.0784) (0.0249) (0.0143) (0.0974) (0.0187)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0082 0.0630 -0.0057 -0.0056 0.0836 -0.0010 -0.0068 0.0767** -0.0008
certificate (0.0096) (0.0593) (0.0148) (0.0088) (0.0517) (0.0152) (0.0090) (0.0390) (0.0082)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0084 0.0403** 0.0089 0.0074 0.0333 0.0083 0.0079 0.0356*** 0.0093
(0.0078) (0.0203) (0.0080) (0.0073) (0.0286) (0.0111) (0.0075) (0.0113) (0.0105)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0168* 0.0083 0.0177 0.0134 0.0148 0.0144** 0.0150* 0.0126 0.0163**
(0.0088) (0.0247) (0.0115) (0.0083) (0.0445) (0.0059) (0.0084) (0.0123) (0.0067)
Cert III or IV -0.0149** 0.0066 -0.0152** -0.0108* 0.0166 -0.0103 -0.0127** 0.0132 -0.0125
(0.0068) (0.0504) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0282) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0124) (0.0085)
Cert I or II -0.0105 0.0480 -0.0134 -0.0017 -0.0054 -0.0019 -0.0058 0.0125 -0.0090
(0.0121) (0.1187) (0.0154) (0.0105) (0.1224) (0.0077) (0.0106) (0.0489) (0.0100)
Cert not defined 0.0516* 0.0035 0.0564 0.0080 0.0187 0.0006 0.0281 0.0135 0.0283
(0.0279) (0.0484) (0.0387) (0.0192) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0293)
Year 11 and below -0.0200*** 0.0286 -0.0211** -0.0165*** -0.0368 -0.0190*** -0.0181*** -0.0148 -0.0206***
(0.0060) (0.0398) (0.0101) (0.0054) (0.0417) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0367) (0.0059)
Occupation
Managers -0.0150 -0.0553*** -0.0202 -0.0004 -0.0315 -0.0058 -0.0071 -0.0395*** -0.0158
(0.0121) (0.0173) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0515) (0.0126) (0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0143)
Professionals -0.0167 -0.0567*** -0.0222 -0.0049 -0.0350 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0423*** -0.0192**
(0.0104) (0.0177) (0.0158) (0.0092) (0.0472) (0.0134) (0.0089) (0.0136) (0.0084)
Technicians and 0.0027 -0.0317** -0.0025 0.0003 -0.0358 -0.0065 0.0014 -0.0344** -0.0073
Trades Workers (0.0111) (0.0161) (0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0291) (0.0077) (0.0101) (0.0160) (0.0090)
Community and -0.0107 -0.0411*** -0.0177* -0.0046 -0.0413 -0.0151* -0.0074 -0.0412*** -0.0198**
Personal Services (0.0093) (0.0112) (0.0092) (0.0083) (0.0298) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0121) (0.0081)
Sales Workers -0.0175** -0.0642*** -0.0245** -0.0090 -0.0504 -0.0176** -0.0130* -0.0550*** -0.0249***
(0.0088) (0.0198) (0.0109) (0.0077) (0.0357) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.0161) (0.0095)
Clerical and Admin -0.0053 -0.0281 -0.0081 -0.0014 -0.0087 -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0152 -0.0062
Workers (0.0109) (0.0222) (0.0142) (0.0101) (0.0382) (0.0090) (0.0102) (0.0124) (0.0128)
Machinery Operators -0.0179 0.0075 -0.0175 -0.0032 0.0140 -0.0001 -0.0100 0.0118 -0.0077
& Drivers (0.0228) (0.0377) (0.0177) (0.0220) (0.0605) (0.0339) (0.0216) (0.0297) (0.0199)
Missing/Refused Occ 0.4421*** 0.3726* 0.4363*** 0.4577*** 0.4708* 0.4592*** 0.4505*** 0.4378*** 0.4453***
Response (0.1229) (0.2133) (0.0643) (0.1220) (0.2454) (0.1161) (0.1222) (0.1205) (0.1067)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7.20: Stability IV Estimation Immigrant Specification (with NILF transition) Cont.
Dependent variable is fertility
Lagged Unemployment Redundancy Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Variables IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV IV FE IV RE IV
Partner’s Educ.
Qualification
Postgrad 0.0105 0.0422 0.0118 0.0015 0.0040 0.0031 0.0057 0.0168 0.0091
(0.0140) (0.0956) (0.0222) (0.0127) (0.0451) (0.0167) (0.0129) (0.0317) (0.0153)
Grad diploma, grad -0.0034 0.0876*** 0.0013 -0.0074 0.0094 -0.0031 -0.0055 0.0357 0.0026
certificate (0.0136) (0.0338) (0.0238) (0.0130) (0.0946) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0583) (0.0190)
Bachelor or hons. 0.0065 0.0221 0.0057 0.0009 -0.0264 -0.0016 0.0034 -0.0101 0.0013
(0.0112) (0.0392) (0.0124) (0.0108) (0.0443) (0.0134) (0.0108) (0.0453) (0.0142)
Adv diploma, dip. 0.0125 0.0389 0.0129 0.0125 0.0164 0.0145 0.0125 0.0239 0.0148
(0.0126) (0.0316) (0.0171) (0.0121) (0.0436) (0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0316) (0.0181)
Cert III or IV 0.0027 0.0008 0.0022 -0.0033 -0.0136 -0.0049 -0.0005 -0.0087 -0.0017
(0.0105) (0.0247) (0.0146) (0.0099) (0.0305) (0.0117) (0.0099) (0.0287) (0.0093)
Cert I or II -0.0172 0.0538*** -0.0247 -0.0277** -0.1116 -0.0554* -0.0228* -0.0561 -0.0453
(0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0375) (0.0111) (0.2132) (0.0316) (0.0124) (0.1768) (0.0491)
Cert not defined -0.0093 -0.0047 -0.0119 -0.0146 -0.0311 -0.0203** -0.0122 -0.0223 -0.0172*
(0.0096) (0.0218) (0.0165) (0.0091) (0.0709) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0425) (0.0103)
Year 11 and below -0.1029*** 0.0275 -0.1115*** -0.0837*** 0.0094 -0.0889*** -0.0926*** 0.0155 -0.1030***
(0.0196) (0.0381) (0.0292) (0.0181) (0.0401) (0.0254) (0.0177) (0.0224) (0.0208)
No Partner Info
Partner’s LFS
Unemployed -0.0229*** -0.0128 -0.0218** -0.0256*** -0.0050 -0.0217*** -0.0243*** -0.0076 -0.0207***
(0.0086) (0.0116) (0.0097) (0.0049) (0.0229) (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0117) (0.0067)
Not in LF -0.0118 -0.0027 -0.0110 -0.0093 0.0064 -0.0059 -0.0104 0.0034 -0.0073
(0.0078) (0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0063) (0.0166) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0120) (0.0095)
No Partner Info 0.0966*** 0.1070*** 0.0707*** 0.0793*** 0.0827*** 0.0976***
(0.0204) (0.0322) (0.0192) (0.0241) (0.0178) (0.0238)
Religion
Buddhism -0.0243*** -0.0889*** -0.0267** -0.0198** -0.0771** -0.0238*** -0.0218*** -0.0811** -0.0274
(0.0090) (0.0170) (0.0126) (0.0080) (0.0329) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0383) (0.0170)
Hinduism -0.0103 0.0196 -0.0056 -0.0116 0.0144 -0.0052 -0.0110 0.0161 -0.0017
(0.0152) (0.0609) (0.0220) (0.0137) (0.0780) (0.0192) (0.0142) (0.0782) (0.0177)
Judaism 0.0045 -0.0221 0.0043 -0.0121 -0.0113 -0.0203 -0.0045 -0.0150 -0.0092
(0.0190) (0.0147) (0.0216) (0.0173) (0.0397) (0.0193) (0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0219)
Islam -0.0131 -0.2427*** -0.0147 -0.0152** 0.0221 -0.0187 -0.0142* -0.0669 -0.0195
(0.0105) (0.0730) (0.0197) (0.0061) (0.3300) (0.0137) (0.0073) (0.0904) (0.0134)
Other Religion -0.0107 -0.0490* -0.0110 -0.0117 0.0125 -0.0092 -0.0113 -0.0082 -0.0096
(0.0142) (0.0263) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.1105) (0.0154) (0.0135) (0.0560) (0.0102)
No Religion -0.0073 -0.0071 -0.0065 -0.0093** -0.0018 -0.0085* -0.0084* -0.0036 -0.0066
(0.0048) (0.0153) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0215) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0102) (0.0041)
Refused Religious -0.0018 -0.0270*** -0.0057 -0.0060 -0.0246 -0.0129* -0.0040 -0.0254 -0.0117
Response (0.0105) (0.0048) (0.0131) (0.0096) (0.0278) (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0198) (0.0112)
Constant -0.0050 0.0569 -0.0040 0.0767* 0.1655 0.0987** 0.0390 0.1290 0.0533
(0.0437) (0.1408) (0.0466) (0.0427) (0.1926) (0.0483) (0.0342) (0.1581) (0.0471)
Observations 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044 5,044
R-squared 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002
Number of HH 0.0720 0.0248
Robust standard errors in parentheses
FE & RE report the bootstrapped VCE with 100 reps
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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